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ABSTRACT 
Business-to-Business Electronic Marketplaces: Membership and Use Drivers.  
(December 2003) 
Hope Arlene Koch, B.B.A., The University of Mary Hardin-Baylor;  
M.B.A., Baylor University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:       Dr. Joobin Choobineh 
Dr. E. Powell Robinson, Jr. 
 
Business-to-business (B2B) electronic marketplaces (e-marketplaces) are one of 
the most heralded developments in recent years.  These marketplaces bring together 
businesses buying and selling goods and services in an online buying community.  
E-marketplaces promise to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of procurement 
activities by replacing traditional manual processes with automated electronic 
procedures and by expanding the number of available trading partners.   Despite the 
technology availability and the high potential benefits, very few e-marketplaces have 
succeeded.  This three-year study identifies and investigates two major B2B 
e-marketplace stumbling blocks:  attracting a sufficient number of members, and then 
influencing these members to use the e-marketplace.   
This investigation uses a variety of qualitative techniques to solicit information 
from nearly fifty executives representing four B2B e-marketplaces with contrasting 
membership and use levels.  Within each e-marketplace, the study solicited information 
from high and low use organizations, buying and selling organizations, and a 
nonparticipant organization.  The interview data was analyzed using line-by-line analysis 
from grounded theory.  The analysis involved assimilating the unique stories of each 
manager into drivers that affect e-marketplace membership or use.  These drivers were 
then compared to membership levels and/or use levels.   
The analysis resulted in three research models.  Each research model is a 
data-driven representation of factors driving B2B e-marketplace membership, B2B 
e-marketplace use, and a particular organization’s B2B e-marketplace use.  Each model 
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contains several unique drivers and offers a comprehensive picture of what is happening 
in e-marketplaces. 
These findings enhance management’s understanding of e-marketplaces, their 
role in business, their challenges, and ways of overcoming these challenges in order to 
reap the benefits of e-marketplace participation.  This study brings one of the first 
grounded theory investigations of B2B e-marketplace membership and use to the limited 
academic research in this area.  This research offers insights to a number of theories, 
including transaction cost economics, institutional theory, resource dependency theory, 
and public goods theory. 
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CHAPTER I 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Business-to-business (B2B) electronic marketplaces (e-marketplaces) have been 
one of the most heralded developments in recent years.  These marketplaces bring 
businesses selling goods and services with businesses buying goods and services into an 
online community.  E-marketplaces promise to increase the efficiency and effectiveness 
of business purchasing by replacing traditional limited seller-buyer networks with a 
marketplace with many more sellers competing on the basis of cost, quality, and service.  
E-marketplaces allow sellers to reach more buyers, so everyone benefits.  Given the 
trillions of dollars spent in business transactions annually, the e-marketplace concept is 
attractive.  When industry discovered e-marketplaces in late 1999, analysts and 
technology experts predicted e-marketplaces would transform existing industry practices 
almost over night.  Press releases of organization joining e-marketplaces, predictions of 
exponential growth, and anticipated benefits filled the business press literature.  The 
quotes below illustrate this.   
 
In 2001 between 600 and 1,000 B2B e-marketplaces exist; by 
2003 there will be 4,200 (Tumolo 2001).  
 
B2B e-marketplaces will result in increased cost savings, 
increased operational efficiency, and improved information, with 
some predicting up to 30% annual cost savings (Tumolo 2001) 
reaching $1 trillion by 2010 (Memishi 2001). 
 
 
 
 
__________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of Information Systems Research. 
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However, as witnessed by the dot.com crash, establishing a financially viable 
B2B e-marketplace takes longer and is more difficult than anticipated.  Hundreds of 
e-marketplaces have gone out of business, many without handling a single transaction 
(Hamm 2002). As such, many organizations abandoned their e-marketplace endeavors.  
The following statistics show the decline of e-marketplaces. 
 
 In one survey, 50% of companies said B2B e-marketplaces were 
either absolutely not or mostly not meeting their expectations 
(Clark 2001).    
 
Analysts predict ten failures for every successful B2B 
e-marketplace (Bannan 2001).   
 
At a 2001 Forrester conference, Siebel Systems’ founder and 
Chief Executive Officer predicted, no B2B e-marketplace will 
survive  (Gulledge 2002).  
 
The consulting firm Booz Allen & Hamilton, Inc. estimated there 
were 1734 online marketplaces in 2000 and only 407 are expected 
to remain by 2004 (Meehan 2002). 
 
During the electronic commerce (EC) boom and through the EC bust, we were 
conducting field research on two firms’ B2B e-marketplace endeavors.  Each firm was a 
founding member of an industry B2B e-marketplace.  Both e-marketplaces struggled to 
attract members and both firms struggled to use the offerings of the e-marketplace they 
had joined.  The eighteen-month field studies indicated two major challenges to 
establishing a viable B2B e-marketplace:  attracting members, and then influencing the 
members to use the marketplace.  Given this situation, this dissertation investigates three 
related questions.  See Figure 1. 
Question one investigates marketplace membership drivers.  Question two 
investigates marketplace characteristics making use feasible for all the e-marketplace’s 
member organizations.  For example, is the e-marketplace as efficient as existing 
industry procurement procedures?  Question three focuses on characteristics within each 
member organization impacting the organization’s use of the e-marketplace.  For 
example, does the organization’s top management support marketplace use? 
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Figure 1  Research Questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1. 1.   WHAT IS A B2B E-MARKETPLACE? 
A B2B e-marketplace is a network facilitated by telecommunications created to 
enable multiple buyers and sellers to exchange information and complete transactions 
(Zwass 1999) for goods and services in a virtual location.  B2B e-marketplaces can 
include financial intermediaries to settle transactions and logistics companies to assist in 
transporting products. See Figure 2.  The ultimate goal for B2B e-marketplaces is to 
evolve into a one-stop shop addressing all its members’ commerce, content, and 
collaboration needs (Brunn et al. 2002). 
 
Research Question 1:  What drives B2B e-marketplace membership? 
Research Question 3:  What organizational characteristics 
impact an organization’s B2B e-marketplace use? 
Research Question 2:  What marketplace characteristics drive B2B 
e-marketplace use? 
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Figure 2  B2B E-marketplace 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associated with a B2B e-marketplace is a business model and a set of value 
propositions offered to its stakeholders.  The business model describes how the 
marketplace is going to make money. The value propositions describe benefits the 
marketplace offers its members and other stakeholders. 
Business models include (Robinson 2003)    products and services offered, 
activities the firm performs to deliver these products and services, technology 
requirements, strategic partners, and revenue sources.  Revenue sources can include  fees 
for joining, fees based on transactions,  fees based on sales, advertising charges, software 
charges, consulting charges, or any combination of these. 
B2B e-marketplaces build value propositions on three elements:  increased 
market efficiencies, increased supply chain efficiencies, and new value creation (Brunn 
et al. 2002).  Increased market efficiencies occur as B2B e-marketplaces use the 
Internet’s speed and transparency to intensify competition, bringing prices closer to 
Logistics
companies 
Financial 
intermediaries 
MARKETPLACE
 Value-added 
services 
 Enabling 
infrastructure 
 
Sellers 
Inquire  
& sell 
BuyersInquire  
& buy 
Goods 
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theoretical equilibrium.  Increased supply chain efficiencies occur as B2B 
e-marketplaces provide increased visibility across the supply chain, facilitating improved 
demand forecasting, inventory management, and production planning.  New value 
creation will occur as B2B e-marketplaces promote collaboration and allow increased 
information availability. 
Within these basic value propositions, B2B e-marketplaces offer an array of 
value-added services.  These services may include establishing a platform for data 
aggregation, spot purchases, auctions, catalog hosting, price negotiation, demand 
forecasting, collaboration, and inventory management. 
A B2B e-marketplace is a type of interorganizational information system (IOIS).  
An IOIS is an infrastructure of computers and communication crossing company 
boundaries and permitting information sharing (Cash and Konsynski 1985).  Unlike 
organization-specific information systems, successful IOIS use requires cooperation and 
communication between at least two firms.   Electronic data interchange (EDI), 
customer-oriented strategic systems, and electronic commerce are the most common 
IOIS forms.  B2B e-marketplaces differ from other IOIS, as B2B e-marketplaces require 
that a critical mass of buyers and sellers use the marketplace.   
1. 2.   RESEARCH METHOD AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
We used a variety of qualitative techniques including participant observation, 
interviews, and document reviews to investigate the three research questions.  The 
investigation included four B2B e-marketplaces, each with contrasting membership and 
use levels.  Within each e-marketplace, we interviewed executives from organizations 
buying and selling over the e-marketplace and organizations with high and low use 
levels.  We also interviewed at least one organization that chose not to participate in 
each B2B e-marketplace.  We interviewed nearly fifty executives.   
We analyzed the interview data using line-by-line analysis, advocated in 
grounded theory.  By assimilating the stories from many different managers, we 
identified factors influencing B2B e-marketplace membership and use.  This resulted in 
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three research models.  Each model provides data-driven insight into each research 
question.  Research model one explains what factors drive organizations to join B2B 
e-marketplaces.  Research model two explains what factors drive a B2B e-marketplace’s 
use.  Research model three explains organizational characteristics affecting a particular 
organization’s B2B e-marketplace use. 
These theoretical models enhance management’s understanding of 
e-marketplaces, their role in electronic commerce, and the drivers influencing 
membership and use.  This is important since e-marketplaces offer a number of potential 
benefits.  Yet, many organizations have not joined B2B e-marketplaces and of those that 
have, few use their services extensively.   
 From an academic perspective, this research looks at a unique type of 
interorganizational information system (IOIS).  B2B e-marketplaces differ from IOIS 
discussed in the literature (e.g., EDI) as benefits hinge on obtaining a critical mass of 
buyers and sellers that use the marketplace.  Most IOIS studies focus on information 
technology connecting two organizations, or one organization and its stakeholders.  
Given the existence of the technological infrastructure enabling B2B e-marketplaces and 
the anticipated benefits of e-marketplaces, this type of IOIS will become more 
predominant in practice.  The literature reviews indicate very little academic research on 
B2B e-marketplaces in general and B2B e-marketplace membership and use drivers in 
particular.  This is one of the first academic studies addressing this emerging IOIS trend.  
This research identifies implementation challenges and ways of overcoming these 
challenges. 
The theoretical models developed in this research are supported by several well-
accepted economic and organizational theories including transaction cost economics, 
institutional theory, resource dependency theory, and public goods theory.  In addition,  
the theoretical models also identify specific areas in which the existing theories are 
incomplete and require further development.   
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1. 3.   DISSERTATION GUIDE 
This dissertation has ten chapters and three appendices.   
Chapters II and III contain literature reviews.  Chapter II reviews the B2B 
e-marketplace research.  Since little research exists in this area, Chapter III reviews the 
IOIS technology adoption and use literature.    The research methodology is discussed in 
Chapter IV.  Based on a preliminary field note analysis, Chapter V presents three 
diagrams guiding the structured interview portion of the field research.  Chapter VI 
describes the four B2B e-marketplaces in this study.  The dissertation uses pseudonyms 
instead of the companies’ actual names.  
 Chapters VII, VIII, and IX discuss the research findings.  Chapter VII presents 
marketplace membership drivers.  Chapter VIII examines marketplace characteristics 
driving B2B e-marketplace’s use.  Chapter IX discusses organizational characteristics 
impacting an organization’s B2B e-marketplace use.  The research conclusions, 
including a summary, contributions, limitations, and future research, are in Chapter X.   
Appendix A presents interview guides for marketplaces, member organizations, 
and nonmember organizations.  Appendix B presents a confessional account of obtaining 
entrée to the organizations in this study.  Appendix C defines acronyms used in the 
dissertation. 
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CHAPTER II  
2 BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE 
 LITERATURE REVIEW  
Business-to-business (B2B) electronic marketplaces (e-marketplaces) have been 
in the limelight since 1999 with the commercialization of the Internet and subsequent 
“dot.com” boom.  However, Malone et al. (1987) discussed this concept years before, 
recognizing technology advances would soon allow multiple buyers and sellers to link 
via electronic communication networks. As part of our B2B e-marketplace research, this 
chapter reviews the B2B e-marketplace literature.  The chapter contributes to theory by 
providing an overview of work in the B2B e-marketplace field and providing a model 
organizing the B2B e-marketplace literature.   
The twenty-five B2B e-marketplace papers reviewed fit into life cycle stages, 
commonly discussed in systems development (Whitten et al. 2001).  Whitten et al. 
divide an information system life cycle into system development and system operation 
and support.  The authors explain that systems are built, implemented, used, evaluated, 
and rebuilt. The primary distinction between the model and the systems life cycle is that 
the life cycle emphasizes design and the model does not.   We did not find literature 
discussing B2B e-marketplace design.  In addition, while conducting case study research 
on two B2B e-marketplaces, we inquired about the role of system design in 
marketplaces.  The respondents purchased packaged marketplace software and explained 
system design is a minimum criterion necessary for B2B e-marketplace functionality. 
We organize the literature review into idea, implementation, use, and evaluation 
stages.    Work in the idea stage includes B2B e-marketplace anticipated benefits and 
impacts.  Work in the implementation stage includes implementation advice, 
implementation decisions, and implementation challenges.  Once systems are 
implemented, organizations begin using them.  Work in this stage includes B2B 
e-marketplace effects and categories.  The use stage is followed by an evaluation stage, 
where organizations measure impacts and make improvements.  Since organizations are 
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still struggling with implementation, more research is needed in implementation, use, 
and evaluation.   
We posit Figure 3 as a conceptual model of the B2B e-marketplace research.   
Figure 3  Conceptual Model of B2B E-marketplace Research  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 categorizes the reviewed literature by author, life cycle stage, focus, theoretical 
approach, and method.  The paragraphs below discuss work in each stage 
 
Table 1  B2B E-marketplace Literature 
Author Life Cycle Stage Focus Theoretical 
Approach 
Method 
1. (Arvin et al. 
2002) 
Implementation Helps B2B 
e-marketplace 
makers understand 
emerging best 
practices; helps 
potential participants 
determine 
functionality to seek 
from B2B 
e-marketplaces  
None Case study 
2. (Bailey and 
Bakos 1997)  
Use Investigates how 
intermediaries 
benefit participants 
in electronic markets 
by reducing 
transaction and 
coordination costs   
Electronic 
markets  
Case study 
IDEA 
Anticipated benefits 
Anticipated impacts 
EVALUATION 
USE 
Effects 
Categories 
Decisions
 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
Challenges 
Advice
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Table 1 Continued 
 
Author Life Cycle Stage Focus Theoretical 
Approach 
Method 
3. (Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson 
1993)  
Idea Explains why the 
number of suppliers 
used by a buyer have 
declined when 
theory predicts the 
opposite when 
information 
technology is used 
Incomplete 
contracts 
Mathematical 
modeling 
4. (Bakos 1991)  Idea Examines how 
prices, seller profits, 
and buyer welfare 
are affected by 
reducing search 
costs in commodity 
and differentiated 
markets 
Economic Author’s 
opinion and 
literature 
review 
5. (Bakos 1997)  Idea Analyzes electronic 
market impacts by 
focusing on buyer 
search cost reduction 
None Mathematical 
modeling 
6. (Bakos 1998)  Idea Explains how the 
Internet affects 
markets 
None Author’s 
opinion and 
literature 
review 
7. (Bannan 
2001)  
Use Describes 
e-marketplaces, 
current status,  
successful 
e-marketplaces, and 
unsuccessful 
e-marketplaces  
None Author’s 
opinion and 
literature 
review 
8. (Andrew et 
al. 2000)  
Idea, 
Implementation, 
Use 
Provides advice on 
realizing the benefits 
of, creating value 
with, and choosing 
marketplaces.  
Discusses types of 
marketplaces    
None Survey, 
interviews, and 
public data 
analysis   
9. (Brunn et al. 
2002)  
Implementation Defines setting up 
B2B e-marketplaces 
to meet challenges 
and achieve success 
Temple 
framework 
Literature 
review, theory 
development, 
and case study 
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Table 1 Continued 
 
Author Life Cycle Stage Focus Theoretical 
Approach 
Method 
10. (Chircu and 
Kauffman 
2000)  
Use Develops an 
intermediation, 
disintermediation, 
and reintermediation 
framework 
explaining electronic 
markets’ long-term 
effects   
Electronic 
markets, 
resource 
dependency 
theory, and 
appropriability 
of innovation 
value 
Literature 
review and 
case study 
11. (Choudhury 
1998)  
Idea, 
Implementation 
Explains when 
buyers use electronic 
markets and how 
electronic markets 
affect  prices, 
inventory levels, and 
broker roles  
Electronic 
markets 
Case study and 
survey 
12. (Christiaanse 
and Markus 
2002)  
Idea Describes B2B 
e-marketplace 
channel structure, 
including 
antecedents and 
consequences 
Transaction cost 
theory,  strategic 
networks theory,  
marketing 
channel theory, 
and political 
economy theory 
Literature 
review 
13. (Dai and 
Kauffman 
2000)  
Implementation Motivators for 
buyers to move from 
extranets to 
electronic markets 
Electronic 
markets 
Mathematical 
modeling 
14. (Dai and 
Kauffman 
2001)  
Use Motivators for 
various online 
business models and 
purchasing firms’ 
adoption 
requirements  
Electronic 
markets  
Set of mini 
cases from a 
review of 
websites 
15. (Gulledge 
2002)  
Use Inhibitors to supplier 
marketplace 
adoption and 
proposal for an 
improved 
marketplace  
None Author’s 
experience and 
literature 
review 
16. (Kaplan and 
Sawhney 
2000)  
Use Identifies 4  
electronic 
marketplace business 
models   
None Author’s 
opinion and 
literature 
review 
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Table 1 Continued 
 
Author Life Cycle Stage Focus Theoretical 
Approach 
Method 
17. (Klueber et 
al. 2001)  
Implementation Proposes a 
procedure to analyze 
the potential for 
partnering with an 
electronic 
marketplace 
None Action 
Research 
18. (Lee and 
Clark 1996b)  
Implementation Explains B2B 
e-marketplace 
adoption in terms of  
drivers, barriers, and 
overcoming barriers  
Business process 
reengineering 
perspective 
Case study 
19. (Lee and 
Clark 1996a)  
Idea, 
Implementation 
Analyzes electronic 
market 
implementation 
impact on search, 
price discovery, and 
trade settlement  
Economics Author’s 
opinion and 
literature 
review 
20. (Malone et al. 
1987)  
Idea, 
Implementation 
Explains information 
technology 
advances’ effect on 
firms and market 
structures  
Transaction cost 
economics 
Author’s 
opinion and 
literature 
review 
21. (Memishi 
2001)  
Implementation, 
Use 
Describes B2B EC 
exchanges current 
status including 
problems and 
success factors 
None Author’s 
opinion and 
literature 
review 
22. (Senn 1996)  Implementation, 
Evaluation 
Helps managers 
evaluate electronic 
markets  
None Author’s 
opinion and 
literature 
review 
23. (Soh and 
Markus 
2002)  
Use Proposes a strategic 
archetype approach 
for classifying B2B 
e-marketplaces 
Strategic 
positioning 
theory 
External data 
review 
24. (Tumolo 
2001)  
Idea, 
Implementation, 
Use 
Discusses B2B 
exchange issues, 
including  status, 
types of, success 
factors, and failure 
factors 
None Author’s 
opinion and 
literature 
review 
25. (Yoo et al. 
2001)  
Use Compares electronic 
B2B marketplaces 
with different 
ownership structures 
None Empirical 
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2. 1.   IDEA 
Malone et al.’s (1987) prediction that with the presence of electronic 
communication technologies, electronic markets would become the favored mechanism 
for coordinating material and information flows among organizations launched work 
addressing the B2B e-marketplace idea.  Malone et al.’s prediction is known as the 
electronic markets hypothesis.  Later, Bakos (1998) explains the functions of 
electronic markets as matching buyers and sellers, facilitating transactions, providing 
institutional infrastructure, aggregating product information, price discovery, and 
providing procurement and industry specific expertise.  Bakos explains marketplace 
members can include  buyers, sellers, technology providers, and investors.   
The idea stage is characterized by organizations learning about B2B 
e-marketplaces and gathering information to make informed implementation decisions.  
“Anticipated benefits” and “anticipated impacts” research streams make up the idea 
stage.   
2.1.1. Anticipated Benefits 
“Anticipated benefits” is defined as expected advantages from e-marketplace use.  
Bakos (1998) identifies electronic market benefits with regard to product, price, and 
transaction cost.   
Electronic markets offer three advantages for products.  First, electronic markets 
allow increased personalization and customization of product offerings. For example, 
delivering electronic magazines customized to each individual reader’s preferences. 
Second, electronic markets allow aggregation and disaggregation of information-based 
product components.  For example, making individual software applets available as 
needed rather than the entire software package.  Third, electronic markets lower search 
costs for buyers shopping for products and communication costs for sellers 
communicating information about products.  For example, a buyer searching for hotels 
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and airline tickets can compare the prices of different sellers by using a specialized 
search engine like Expedia (www.expedia.com). 
Electronic markets offer price advantages.  First, they allow buyers to make 
offers and electronically negotiate prices, changing the microstructure of markets.  
Second, they enable tracking customers’ information via data warehousing and data 
mining, facilitating customized pricing.  Third, they facilitate increased information 
sharing and communication between buyers and sellers, enabling price discrimination.  
Price discrimination includes charging different prices to different consumers in 
different situations. 
Since electronic markets improve information sharing between buyers and 
sellers, they reduce order execution costs.  Decreased costs can occur in logistics, 
transportation, distribution, inventory, and payment systems. 
A Boston Consulting Group report (Andrew et al. 2000) outlines nine electronic 
market value creation sources.  These include:  aggregation, process automation, 
transparency/auctions, lower marketing and sales costs, lower transaction costs, lower 
inventory costs, lower cycle time, and improved asset utilization.  The report divides 
value creation sources into value shift activities and value creation activities. 
2.1.2. Anticipated Impacts  
B2B e-marketplace anticipated impacts research considers how B2B 
e-marketplaces will affect varying business aspects.  Most work in this area is based on 
Malone et al.’s (1987) electronic markets hypothesis derived from transaction cost 
economics.  However, Christiaanse and Markus’ (2002) work considers four other 
theoretical explanations enhancing the transaction cost economics perspective on B2B 
e-marketplace impacts.  First, we discuss work focusing on the electronic markets 
hypothesis, followed by work addressing other B2B e-marketplace impacts. 
Malone et al.’s (1987) electronic markets hypothesis posits electronic markets 
will impact communication, brokerage, and integration.    In the paragraphs below we 
discuss these impacts, along with work in the area.   
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The electronic communication effect posits electronic markets will lower 
communication costs, enable electronic demand and supply aggregation, and enhance a 
firm’s ability to more closely coordinate its economic activity.  Bakos’(1991) opinions 
support the existence of an electronic communication effect.  His article considers 
electronic market implications; particularly, how improved price dissemination will 
affect buyers and sellers.  Bakos posits increased communication is likely to reduce 
seller profits and increase buyer welfare, especially in commodity markets.  In addition, 
he suggests sellers control how markets evolve in order to protect profits.  The best case 
for sellers is markets providing product information.   
Testing the electronic communication effect, Bakos (1997) uses mathematical 
modeling to show reduced search costs in a differentiated market with heterogeneous 
buyer tastes and seller product offerings, impact market equilibrium, resulting in 
increased efficiency, possibly lower prices, and increased seller competition.    
Choudhury (1998) proposes electronic markets will lower prices (1) in commodity 
markets, and (2) in markets with differentiated products if the system supports selection 
with price information.  Electronic markets will not lower prices if the market is 
differentiated and the system supports only identification with product information.  
Choudhury also proposes electronic markets will lower buyer inventory levels.   
The electronic brokerage effect predicts electronic communication technologies 
will enable technologically capable intermediaries to replace traditional middlemen and 
reduce transaction costs.  Within this stream, Choudhury’s (1998) research proposes 
electronic markets will reduce buyer broker use.  However, Lee and Clark (1996a) posit 
the introduction of electronic brokerage systems may transform direct search markets 
into brokered markets.  They also posit electronic auction systems implemented in 
intermediary markets can create new auction forms.  Bailey and Bakos’ (1997) case 
studies find markets do not become disintermediated with information 
technology-facilitated transactions.  The authors identify several new roles for electronic 
intermediaries.  These include aggregating, matching suppliers and customers, and 
providing trust and interorganizational market information. 
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The electronic integration effect predicts electronic communication technology 
will enable suppliers and buyers to use information technology to create joint, 
interpenetrating processes.  In support of this effect, Malone et al. (1987) posit electronic 
markets may become more like electronic hierarchies.  The authors explain since 
electronic communication technology enables sharing databases and integrating physical 
and electronic processes, their implementation will be customized to the buyer-supplier 
relationship (physical, human, and time).  This increased integration will lead to 
hierarchical rather than market relationships.  Showing a relationship between electronic 
markets and decreased suppliers, Bakos and Brynjolfsson’s (1993) work supports this 
idea.  Bakos and Brynjolfsson find information technology increases the importance of 
noncontractible investments by suppliers (e.g., quality, responsiveness, and innovation) 
and when these investments are important, firms use fewer suppliers. 
A few researchers posit electronic market impacts that do not fall in the above 
categories.  
Based on the literature, Christiaanse and Markus (2002)  explain potential B2B 
e-marketplace impacts using four theories:  transaction cost,  strategic networks,  
marketing channel, and political economy.  The authors put forth decision-making 
structure, relational integration, and ownership structure as B2B e-marketplace channel 
structure dimensions.  The model posits internal economy, internal polity, external 
economy, and external polity influence channel structure.   Channel structure 
consequences include economic performance and polity performance.  Economic 
performance includes efficiency measured as inventory turnover and profit margin and 
effectiveness  measured as adaptiveness and innovativeness. 
 Tumolo (2001) posits buyers changing suppliers in order to buy through the 
marketplace may get poor product performance, especially when buying critical parts or 
components.  In the case of suppliers, marketplaces may dominate over other selling 
channels and cause suppliers that do not join the right marketplace to miss sales.   
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2. 2.   IMPLEMENTATION 
The model posits anticipated benefits led to decisions to implement B2B 
e-marketplaces.  We define implementation as making efforts to adopt and use an e-
marketplace.  In this section, we discuss three B2B e-marketplace implementation 
research streams: decisions, challenges, and advice.    
2.2.1. Implementation Decisions 
Several research articles investigate B2B e-marketplace implementation 
decisions.  We define implementation decision as an organization choosing to adopt and 
try to use a B2B e-marketplace.   
Malone et al. (1987) investigate buyer and supplier motives for joining electronic 
markets.  They. find that buyers and suppliers have different motives for joining 
electronic markets.  Suppliers join electronic markets because they want buyers to 
purchase their product rather than competitors.  Buyers join electronic markets to 
increase numbers of alternative suppliers and to better compare alternatives.   
In a case study of four B2B e-marketplaces, Lee and Clark (1996b) take a 
business process reengineering perspective to investigate economic forces driving B2B 
e-marketplace adoption.  Lee and Clark identify efficiency and effectiveness increases in 
information gathering, contract formation, and trade settlement as primary determinants 
of B2B e-marketplace adoption by market-making firms. 
Choudhury (1998) investigation of when buyers use electronic markets finds that 
buyers use electronic markets to purchase products low in asset specificity and 
description complexity.  Dai and Kauffman (2000) investigate factors motivating buyers 
to move from an extranet, an internal network accessible to authorized outsiders,  to an 
electronic market.  Dai and Kauffman find a buyer’s decision a function of  desired gains 
from lower search and operation costs enabled by an electronic market, importance of 
information sharing between suppliers, level of competition in the supplier market, and 
desired levels of supplier-specific relationship investments.  Senn (1996) posits 
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organizations participate in electronic markets to create products, deliver services, and 
reach potential customers.   
Drawing on his experience, Gulledge (2002) considers suppliers’ B2B 
e-marketplace adoption decisions.  Gulledge explains supplier reluctance in adopting 
B2B e-marketplaces as a function of profit and technology squeeze.  The profit squeeze 
points out that B2B e-marketplaces are likely to reduce supplier profit margins since 
their value proposition is reducing supply chain costs.  The technology squeeze explains 
that suppliers are likely to have to participate in multiple B2B e-marketplaces, each with 
slightly different technical interfaces. 
2.2.2. Implementation Challenges 
Several authors discuss B2B e-marketplace implementation challenges. We 
define implementation challenges as difficulties organizations have in trying to use the 
e-marketplace they have chosen to adopt.  These challenges include attaining a critical 
mass of buyers and sellers, guaranteeing promises made on the marketplace, and 
integrating marketplaces with existing systems.   
Using a resource dependency perspective, Lee and Clark  (1996b) identify and 
explain B2B e-marketplace implementation challenges based on four B2B e-marketplace 
case studies.  The authors identify the following barriers to B2B e-marketplace adoption:  
uncertainty associated with describing electronic products, risk associated with doing 
business using a new system that may not attract a critical mass of buyers and sellers, 
and change resistance associated with an unwillingness to give up large investments in 
existing infrastructure.  
Critical mass involves attracting enough buyers and sellers to use and financially 
sustain the marketplace.  Lee and Clark explain firms adversely affected by electronic 
markets will resist implementing the marketplace, and thus prevent achieving critical 
mass.  Tumolo (2001) cites critical mass as a hurdle for organizations implementing 
B2B EC exchanges.   
Guaranteeing purchased products will be the right product delivered at the right 
time is also an implementation challenge for B2B e-marketplaces.  Several authors 
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discuss this.  Lee and Clark (1996a) posit the need for product rating standards and a 
trusted third party for product evaluation.    In a description of problems with exchanges, 
two articles (Memishi 2001, Rajkumar 2001)  cite a lack of uniform data description 
standards explaining that most organizations will want to participate in multiple 
exchanges and the different ways of describing products must be standardized.   
Two articles (Memishi 2001, Rajkumar 2001) explain B2B EC exchanges need 
to determine how to seamlessly integrate transactions made over the exchange with the 
organization’s existing information systems.  
2.2.3. Implementation Advice 
Several reports offer practitioners advice on implementing B2B e-marketplaces.  
We define implementation advice as offering suggestions.  
A Boston Consulting Group report (Andrew et al. 2000) offers marketplaces and 
participants advice.  The report advises organizations on types of marketplaces to 
participate in, as well as participation strategies.  For marketplaces, the report proposes 
three major sources of revenue, explaining marketplace revenue will come from services 
supporting collaboration activities.  Marketplaces depending on transaction fees or 
commerce services  for revenue will not survive.  The report offers advice for creating 
viable e-marketplaces.   
Klueber et al. (2001) use action research to propose some motivations, a concept, 
and a procedure for analyzing the potential for partnering with an electronic market.  
Analysis criteria include:  state of control, value chain coverage, market form, strategic 
fit, revenue generation, and customer incentives. 
Brunn et al. (2002) develop the Temple Framework, addressing several B2B 
e-marketplace implementation aspects.  The Temple Framework defines B2B 
e-marketplace success as profitability and looks at the setup B2B e-marketplaces must 
create to achieve success.  The framework addresses the following aspects of B2B 
e-marketplace setup:  focus, governance, functionality, technology, and partnerships.  It 
identifies building liquidity and capturing value  as challenges B2B e-marketplaces need 
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to address.  The framework is based on a synthesis of contemporary B2B e-marketplace 
research and literature and is supported by a case study of gatetrade.net. 
Researchers from McKinsey & Company and CAPS Research (Arvin et al. 2002) 
develop a report helping exchanges understand and leverage emerging best practices.  
The report also helps buyers, suppliers, and investors determine functionality to seek 
from different types of e-supply tools in order to realize supply chain value.  The authors 
define value as revenue, cost, asset utilization, risk, cycle time, quality, and customer 
service improvement.  The study is based on interviews conducted between July and 
November 2001.  The interviews include executives from ten industry-sponsored 
exchanges and six private exchanges.   
2. 3.   USE  
Once organizations overcome implementation challenges, marketplace use 
begins.  Currently, B2B e-marketplace  use research includes categories and  effects.  
Since many organizations are still struggling with implementing B2B e-marketplaces, 
limited research in this stage exists.   
2.3.1. Categories 
A popular research stream involves categorizing existing B2B e-marketplaces 
along varying dimensions.  Authors have developed different classification schemes and 
have classified B2B e-marketplaces based on the ways the different e-marketplaces have 
developed. 
Tumolo (2001) categorizes marketplaces based on whether they focus on 
multiple industries or a single industry.  Tumolo indicates that horizontal and vertical 
marketplaces exist.  Horizontal marketplaces provide many commodity products used 
across industries (e.g., office supplies).  Vertical marketplaces focus on a specific 
industry and provide members with specialized products, in-depth industry knowledge, 
and collaboration opportunities.  Memishi (2001) posits exchanges focusing on vertical 
industries are likely to be more successful than those serving a variety of industries, as 
their expertise will enable awareness of market needs. 
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The Boston Consulting Group report (Andrew et al. 2000) finds two types of 
B2B e-marketplaces:  private and public.  A single buyer or seller drives a private B2B 
e-marketplace with participation open primarily to the company’s suppliers or 
customers.  Industry consortia establish public B2B e-marketplaces, which are open to 
any industry participant.   
Kaplan and Sawhney (2000) identify four B2B e-marketplace business models.  
These models are classified by type of product and transaction characteristics.  MRO 
(maintenance, repair, and operation)  hubs are horizontal markets enabling systematic 
purchasing of operating supplies.  Yield managers are horizontal markets supporting 
spot purchasing of operating supplies.  Electronic catalog hubs operate in vertical 
markets and provide integrated product information used for repetitive purchasing of 
manufacturing inputs.  Exchange hubs are vertical markets for spot purchasing of 
manufacturing input. 
Dai and Kauffman  (2001) use pricing practices and supplier identification 
practices to categorize B2B e-marketplaces.  They posit four B2B e-marketplace types:  
private aggregation, public aggregation, private negotiation, and public bidding.  In 
private aggregation, buyers purchase large quantities and frequently ordered items from 
preselected suppliers at fixed prices.   In public aggregation, buyers purchase from all 
possible suppliers at fixed prices.  Public aggregation is usually used in fragmented 
markets and for time critical or small quantity purchases.  In private negotiation, buyers 
procure production inputs using dynamic pricing from prescreened suppliers.  In public 
bidding, buyers identify eligible suppliers from member firms for asset/capacity 
exchanges.  
Dai and Kauffman have three findings with regard to the four B2B 
e-marketplaces types.  First, the electronic markets hypothesis does not predict the 
private aggregation and matching networks that have arisen on the Internet.  In many 
cases, buyers forgo the benefits from extensive searches in order to engage in closer 
relationships with fewer suppliers.  Second, online B2B e-marketplaces not only enable 
electronic transactions, they also promote expertise sharing and collaboration among 
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multiple partners involved in highly complex business processes.  This was not entirely 
foreseen by the theory of electronic markets.  Third, current B2B e-marketplaces and 
electronic procurement solutions fail to deliver sufficient value in the settlement and 
logistics step of the electronic markets hypothesis.   
Ownership structure is another way to categorize B2B e-marketplaces.    
Marketplaces can be independently owned (neutral) or participant-owned (biased).  
Memishi (2001) explains organizations do not want to join marketplaces owned by their 
competitor.  Marketplace success hinges on founding organizations distancing 
themselves from the marketplace by creating an independent ownership structure.  As of 
2001, independent third party intermediaries run most e-marketplaces (2001).    
In contrast to this recommendation, two studies show truly neutral marketplaces 
may not yield as many benefits as industry-owned marketplaces.  Bannan  (2001) reports 
successful B2B e-marketplaces secure most of their funding from companies using them.   
Yoo et al. (2001) empirically analyzes neutral and biased (buyer-owned and 
supplier-owned) B2B e-marketplaces.  Using price, market share, surplus, social welfare, 
and competitiveness, the authors find biased B2B e-marketplaces are better than neutral 
B2B e-marketplaces with regard to total surplus (e.g., cost savings).  They also find 
buyer-owned B2B e-marketplaces generate larger surplus than supplier-owned B2B 
e-marketplaces. 
Soh and Markus (2002) explain empirical classification schemes for B2B 
e-marketplaces are rich, but fall short offering implied theory explaining outcome 
differences.  The authors propose a strategic archetype approach for classifying B2B 
e-marketplaces.  A strategic archetype is a frequently occurring named grouping of firms 
with similar configurations of multiple attributes.  The approach is based on strategic 
positioning theory (Porter 1996), which proposes value proposition, product-market 
focus, and value activity fit is required for superior performance.   The authors review 
external data (e.g., websites and annual reports) of  two successful B2B e-marketplaces 
in the electronic components industry to illustrate the strategic archetypes approach. 
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2.3.2. Effects 
We define effects as the impacts of B2B e-marketplace use.  Two studies 
investigate B2B e-marketplace effects. 
Bailey and Bakos (1997) use thirteen case studies to investigate how 
intermediaries benefit participants in electronic markets.  They find markets do not 
become disintermediated when information technology is used as a transaction 
facilitator.  The authors identify four new roles for electronic intermediaries:  
aggregating, matching suppliers and customers, and providing trust and 
interorganizational market information. 
Chircu and Kauffman (2000) develop an intermediation, disintermediation, and 
reintermediation framework explaining long-term effects of electronic markets.  Using 
this framework in a travel industry field study, the authors show traditional travel agents 
will avoid disintermediation and remain profitable in the long run. 
2. 4.   EVALUATION 
Organizations must evaluate their e-marketplace endeavor. We define evaluation as 
assessing marketplace operations, impacts, and improvement opportunities.  Evaluation 
occurs before and after implementation decisions.  Little work exists in this area because 
most marketplaces are still struggling with implementation.   
Senn  (1996) posits evaluating an electronic market’s potential based on the 
following benefits:  extending reach, bypassing traditional channels, augmenting 
traditional markets, boosting service, and advertising. Senn also posits evaluating 
electronic market projects with benchmarks and timetables. 
2. 5.   B2B E-MARKETPLACE LITERATURE SYNOPSIS 
This chapter reviews B2B e-marketplace literature and develops a conceptual 
model, Figure 3, showing B2B EC research falls into some stages of the system life 
cycle.  Table 1 categorizes the reviewed literature by author, life cycle stage, focus, 
theoretical approach, and method.  The paragraphs below discuss work in each stage.  
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Early B2B e-marketplace work recognizes information technologies’ potential of linking 
multiple buyers and sellers.  Most work focuses on B2B e-marketplace idea and 
implementation stages.  Very little research addresses B2B e-marketplace use or 
evaluation. 
Theoretical approach refers to concepts underpinning the investigation.  The 
electronic markets hypothesis and transaction cost economics are dominant theoretical 
underpinnings in B2B e-marketplace research.   
The electronic markets hypothesis (Malone et al. 1987) predicts electronic 
markets will be the favored mechanism for coordinating material and information flows 
among organizations in the presence of electronic communication technologies.  
Transaction cost economics (Williamson 1979, Williamson 1982, Williamson 1985, 
Williamson 1994, Williamson and Ouchi 1981) forms the basis of the electronic markets 
hypothesis.  Transaction cost economics posits  an organization’s goal is to minimize the 
cost of exchanging resources in the environment and the costs of managing exchanges 
inside the organization.  Table 1 indicates that most B2B e-marketplace research is based 
on the author’s opinion and a literature review.  The area needs more empirical research. 
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CHAPTER III 
3 INTERORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
ADOPTION AND DIFFUSION LITERATURE REVIEW 
3. 1.   INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation investigates business-to-business (B2B) electronic marketplace 
(e-marketplace) membership and use drivers.  Part of this process requires being aware 
of existing literature and how this research’s findings compare and contrast to previous 
work.  Chapter II reviewed the B2B e-marketplace literature.  This provided some 
background on B2B e-marketplaces and indicated gaps in the research stream.  The 
literature has investigated aspects of B2B e-marketplace membership and use drivers on 
a limited basis.  As such, this chapter broadens the literature review.  B2B e-
marketplaces are a type of interorganizational information system (IOIS).  Membership 
and use are aspects of adoption and diffusion.  The paragraphs below review the IOIS 
adoption and diffusion research.   
Bursting onto the business scene in the 1980s, IOIS have sparked academic and 
practitioner interest.  Practitioners experience implementation success and failure, while 
academics (Kauffman and Walden 2001) research a variety of areas, including 
predicting effects, proposing facilitators, and evaluating investments.   
The Internet’s commercialization in the mid-1990s sparked more interest with 
practitioners trying to deploy electronic commerce (EC).  While there have been many 
B2B EC success stories (Patton 2001), there have also been many failures  (Barlas 2001, 
Bates et al. 2001, Ericson 2001, Kauffman and Walden 2001) and some reports  (Clark 
2001) explain B2B EC adoption has been much slower than anticipated. 
Before IOIS, particularly EC, will change society or work practices, these 
technologies must be adopted and diffused.  What facilitates IOIS adoption and 
diffusion?  Chwelos et al. (2001) hypothesize variables at technological, 
interorganizational, and organizational levels facilitate emerging IOIS adoption. 
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In an evaluation of Chwelos et al.’s hypothesis, this chapter categorizes variables 
found to significantly influence adoption and diffusion of various IOIS forms.  In this 
process, we review twenty-seven empirical IOIS adoption and diffusion studies 
published between 1985-2002.  The categorization supports and extends Chwelos et al.’s 
hypothesis.   
The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows.  Section 3. 2.   
describes different IOIS types.  Section  3. 3.   explains IOIS adoption and diffusion 
research.  Section 3. 4.   discusses theoretical underpinnings of IOIS research.  Section 3. 
5.   evaluates Chwelos et al.’s (2001) hypothesis by analyzing significant IOIS variables.  
Section 3. 6.   provides concluding remarks.   
3. 2.   INTERORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS (IOIS) 
Cash and Konsynski (1985) define an IOIS as a computer and communication 
infrastructure crossing company boundaries enabling information sharing.  Several types 
of IOIS exist:  customer-oriented strategic systems (COSS),  electronic data interchange 
(EDI), B2B electronic commerce (EC), and B2B e-marketplaces. Reich and Benbasat 
(1990, p. 326)  define a COSS as “an information system linking a company to its 
customers to support or shape the company’s competitive strategy.”  Premkumar et al. 
(1997, p. 108) define EDI as “the direct computer-to-computer communication between 
an organization and its trading partners of business documents and information in a 
machine-readable, structured format that permits data to be processed by the receiver 
without rekeying.”  Zwass (1996, p.3) defines B2B EC as sharing business information, 
maintaining business relationships, and conducting business transactions via 
telecommunication networks.  Bakos (1997, p. 1679) defines a B2B e-marketplace as an 
IOIS allowing multiple buyers and sellers to exchange prices and product information 
and execute transactions.   
Each IOIS differs slightly from the other.  B2B e-marketplaces require a critical 
mass of buyers and sellers, whereas EDI,  B2B EC, and COSS do not.  The difference 
between COSS and EDI is less clear.  The main distinction is COSS primarily focuses 
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on linking a company with its customers and EDI includes other business partners.  EDI 
differs from B2B EC as EDI is a direct connection over a private line and B2B EC can 
be conducted over the Internet. 
Table 2 shows reviewed studies categorized by IOIS type and implementation 
stage.  We review twenty-eight studies.  Table 2 shows twenty-nine studies because two 
studies  (Hart and Saunders, 1997, Premkumar and Ramamurthy, 1995) concentrate 
on both EDI adoption and diffusion.  COSS categorizes a variety of studies focusing on 
customer-oriented information systems. 
Table 2  Summary of 27 IOIS Adoption and Diffusion Facilitator Studies 
STUDY  
TYPE OF IOIS ADOPTION DIFFUSION TOTAL 
COSS 4 1 5 
EDI 11 6 17 
B2B EC 1 4 5 
B2B 1 1 2 
Total 17 12 29 
 
Table 2 indicates seventeen of the twenty-seven IOIS studies focus on EDI.  Two 
empirical studies focus on B2B e-marketplace drivers.   
3. 3.   RESEARCH PAPERS 
Most researchers (Cavaye and Cragg 1995, Reich and Benbasat 1990, Rogers 
1995) agree technology adoption occurs in stages.  While a number of stages have been 
proposed, the most common stages are technology adoption and diffusion.  Technology 
adoption is characterized by several actions related to learning about an innovation.  
These include collecting information, building knowledge, examining relevance, and 
evaluating appropriateness.   Technology adoption culminates in an innovation adoption 
decision.  Rogers (1995) distinguishes between technology adoption and diffusion since 
it is possible for an organization to adopt an innovation and not use it.   
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Technology diffusion involves an innovation’s implementation and use 
spreading over a period of time.  Technology diffusion studies focus on why and how an 
innovation’s use spreads and innovation characteristics leading to widespread 
acceptance.    In many diffusion studies use is the dependent variable. Table 3 notes 
these studies.  Table 3  categorizes IOIS research focusing on technology adoption and 
technology diffusion.  We organize the table alphabetically by author.   
 
Table 3  Interorganizational Information Systems Technology Adoption and Use 
Facilitator Literature 
Author 
 
 
Facilitators of 
Adoption and 
Diffusion 
(Significant 
Independent 
Variables) 
Adoption/ 
Diffusion 
Phenomenon  
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Source of Data Theoretical Base 
1. (Bouchard 
1993)  
Key business 
partner 
implementation, 
use, and/or 
mandates  
EDI adoption  Survey of 175 
retail suppliers, 
2 retail supplier 
case studies, 
and 10 
computer- 
supported 
interviews of 
retail suppliers 
Innovation 
diffusion theory 
and critical mass 
theory 
2. (Cavaye and 
Cragg 1995)  
Technology 
opportunity, 
good marketing 
programs, and 
user technology 
awareness  
Customer-
oriented IOIS 
adoption 
9 case studies 
of 
profit-oriented 
firms selling a 
product/service 
None 
3. (Chwelos et al. 
2001)  
External 
pressure, 
perceived 
benefits, and 
readiness 
EDI adoption 
intention 
Survey of 268 
small to 
medium 
organizations in 
the Purchasing 
Managers 
Association of 
Canada 
Critical mass 
theory,  
innovation 
diffusion theory, 
and power 
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Table 3 Continued 
 
Author 
 
 
Facilitators of 
Adoption and 
Diffusion 
(Significant 
Independent 
Variables) 
Adoption/ 
Diffusion 
Phenomenon  
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Source of Data Theoretical Base 
4. (Cox and 
Ghoneim 
1996)  
Coherent 
strategy, top 
management 
support, adding 
value, review, 
continuous 
improvement, 
and core business 
activity 
integration 
EDI 
implementation 
and  EDI 
integration 
benefits  and 
barriers 
Survey of 85 
organizations 
representing a 
variety of 
industries and 1 
case study  
None 
5. (Crook and 
Kumar 1998)  
Organizational 
context 
(organizational 
size, information 
technology 
capability, senior 
management 
commitment), 
environmental 
context (industry 
experience with 
EDI, nature of 
suppliers and 
customers,  
customer 
facilitated use), 
external pressure, 
system benefits, 
and 
implementation 
support 
EDI Use Case study 
using grounded 
theory of 4 
organizations in 
4 different 
industries 
None 
6. (Damsgaard 
and Lyytinen 
1998)  
Interorganization
al collaboration,  
herd effect, 
environment 
favoring 
cooperation, 
trade 
organization 
support, and 
infrastructure 
EDI diffusion  Field study of 9 
organizations 
from 3 
industries in 
Finland 
Institutional 
theory and 
innovation 
diffusion theory 
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Facilitators of 
Adoption and 
Diffusion 
(Significant 
Independent 
Variables) 
Adoption/ 
Diffusion 
Phenomenon  
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Source of Data Theoretical Base 
7. (Deeter-
Schmelz et al. 
2001)  
Supplier support 
and technology 
communication 
convenience 
B2B EC 
adoption 
Survey of 222 
members of the 
National 
Association of 
Purchasing 
Managers 
Innovation 
diffusion theory 
8. (Grewal et al. 
2001)  
Emphasizing 
efficiency 
motivations, 
deemphasizing 
legitimacy 
motivations, and 
information 
technology 
capabilities 
B2B 
e-marketplace 
use 
Survey of 306 
participants in 
the Polygon 
marketplace 
Institutional 
theory, 
transaction cost 
theory, and 
motivation- 
ability 
framework 
9. (Grover 1993)  Top management 
support,  
champion 
existence, 
compatibility, 
complexity 
(less),  
recognizing 
information 
technologies’ 
integral role, 
large size, strong 
in-house 
information 
technology 
infrastructure, 
strategic 
information 
systems 
planning,  
aggressive 
management 
willing to take 
risks, aggressive 
technology 
policy, and 
participatory 
decision-making 
Customer-based 
IOIS adoption 
Survey of 226 
senior 
executives 
None 
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(Significant 
Independent 
Variables) 
Adoption/ 
Diffusion 
Phenomenon  
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Source of Data Theoretical Base 
10. (Han and Noh 
1999-2000)  
Inhibitors:  
system stability, 
data security, 
inconvenient use, 
unsatisfactory 
purchases, and 
social 
disturbance 
B2B EC 
diffusion 
Survey of 325 
people with EC 
experience 
None 
11. (Hart and 
Saunders 
1997)  
Power EDI adoption  Theoretical 
framework and 
case study of a 
retail firm 
Power 
 
 
  
12. (Hart and 
Saunders 
1997)  
Trust EDI use Theoretical 
framework and 
case study of a 
retail firm 
Power 
13. (Hope et al. 
2001)  
Clear e-business 
vision, customer 
readiness and 
technological 
awareness, top 
management 
support, creative 
managerial 
thinking, 
information 
sharing and open 
communication, 
system marketing 
and promotion, 
staff skilled in 
technical and 
business issues, 
appropriate 
timing of project 
start up, clear and 
certain legislative 
and policy 
environment, 
current 
technology, and 
external expertise 
B2B EC 
diffusion 
Case study of 5 
medium-sized 
companies in 
the 
transportation 
and logistics 
industry of New 
Zealand 
None 
    32 
Table 3 Continued 
 
Author 
 
 
Facilitators of 
Adoption and 
Diffusion 
(Significant 
Independent 
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Adoption/ 
Diffusion 
Phenomenon  
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Source of Data Theoretical Base 
14. (Iacovou et al. 
1995)  
Perceived 
benefits and 
external pressure 
EDI adoption 
by small 
organizations  
Case study of 7 
managers of 
small 
organizations 
Innovation 
diffusion theory 
and resource 
dependency 
theory 
15. (Lee and Clark 
1996b)  
Facilitators:  
increased 
efficiency and 
effectiveness;  
barriers:  
uncertainty, risk, 
and change 
resistance 
 
B2B 
e-marketplace 
adoption  
Case study of 4 
B2B 
e-marketplaces 
Business process 
reengineering 
perspective 
16. (O'Callaghan 
et al. 1992)  
Perceived 
relative 
advantage 
EDI computer 
based interface 
offerings 
adoption 
decision 
10 field 
interviews, 1 
focus group, 
and a  survey of 
1242 members 
of the 
Independent 
Insurance 
Agents of 
America  
 
 
Innovation 
diffusion theory 
17. (Premkumar 
and 
Ramamurthy 
1995)  
Internal need, top 
management 
support, 
competitive 
pressure, and 
exercised power 
EDI adoption 
decision modes 
(proactive vs. 
reactive)  
Survey of 
information 
systems and 
sales/purchasin
g executives 
from 201 firms  
Power and social 
exchange theory 
18. (Premkumar 
and 
Ramamurthy 
1995)  
Proactive 
adoption 
EDI diffusion 
defined as 
adaptation, 
connectivity, 
and integration 
Survey of 
information 
systems and 
sales/purchasin
g executives 
from 201 firms  
Power and social 
exchange theory 
19. (Premkumar et 
al. 1994)  
Relative 
advantage, 
technical 
compatibility, 
low cost, and 
duration 
EDI adaptation, 
internal 
diffusion, and 
external 
diffusion  
Survey of 
information 
systems and 
sales/purchasin
g executives 
from 201 firms 
Innovation 
diffusion theory 
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Adoption/ 
Diffusion 
Phenomenon  
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Source of Data Theoretical Base 
20. (Premkumar et 
al. 1997)  
Firm size, top 
management 
support, 
competitive 
pressure, and 
customer support 
EDI adoption  Survey of 181 
firms in the 
trucking 
industry 
Innovation 
diffusion theory 
and resource 
dependency 
theory 
21. (Ramamurthy 
et al. 1999)  
Facilitators:  
Internal support, 
benefit potential, 
compatibility, 
customer 
support, and 
competitive 
pressure; 
inhibitor:  
resource intensity 
EDI diffusion 
defined as 
internal and 
external 
integration 
Field survey of 
83 firms in the 
motor carriers 
industry 
Sociopolitical 
process 
framework, 
organizational 
theory, 
innovation 
diffusion theory, 
use of 
information 
technology for 
competitive 
advantage, and 
information 
systems 
implementation 
 
22. (Ranganathan 
et al. 2001)  
Top management 
support, 
organizational 
change, strategy, 
project 
management, 
valuation, 
internal 
information 
technology, 
external 
information 
technology,  
collaboration,  
and external 
business 
environment 
B2B EC 
deployment 
Survey of 100 
firms in 
Singapore and 
case studies 
with 
information 
technology 
executives 
Innovation 
diffusion theory 
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Adoption/ 
Diffusion 
Phenomenon  
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Source of Data Theoretical Base 
23. (Reich and 
Benbasat 
1990)  
Product 
champion, top 
management 
support, 
proactive 
information 
systems function, 
external pressure, 
customer 
involvement, 
system 
marketing, and 
expressed 
customer need  
Customer-
oriented 
strategic system 
adoption  
Case study of 
11 customer-
oriented 
strategic 
systems, 
interviews with 
line and 
information 
systems 
management 
None 
24. (Runge 1985, 
Runge 1988)  
Product 
champion, 
customer 
involvement in 
development 
process, 
marketing efforts,  
extension of 
existing 
information 
systems, and 
ignoring or 
circumventing 
normal 
information 
system planning 
and approval 
processes 
Telecommunica
tion-based 
information 
system adoption 
Case study of 
35 systems in 
Britain 
None 
25. (Sabherwal 
and 
Vijayasarathy 
1994)  
Product 
information 
intensity, value 
chain information 
intensity, and 
environmental 
uncertainty  
Telecommunica
tion use 
between 
customers and 
suppliers 
Survey of 86 
senior 
executives from 
medium-sized 
companies 
None 
26. (Saunders and 
Clark 1992)  
Perceived cost EDI adoption Surveys of 192 
vendors 
Power 
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(Significant 
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Diffusion 
Phenomenon  
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Source of Data Theoretical Base 
27. (Tabor 2001)  Customer- B2B EC use  Case study of a 
major U.S. 
airline 
None 
28. (Teo et al. 
1995)  
Complexity, 
operational risk, 
strategic risk, and 
observability 
EDI adoption 
intention  
112 surveys 
from senior 
management of 
firms listed in 
the Singapore 
stock exchange 
Innovation 
diffusion theory 
29. (Williams 
1994)  
Demand 
uncertainty, 
power, and 
relative 
advantage 
EDI adoption Interviews and 
156 surveys 
from customers, 
suppliers, 
shippers, and 
carriers, who 
are members of 
the Council of 
Logistics 
Management 
Organizational 
theory and power 
theory 
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3.3.1. Intent to Adopt/Adoption 
In this section, we discuss research focusing on facilitators of IOIS adoption 
and/or adoption intentions.  We organize the section by IOIS type discussing earlier 
IOIS types first.  
3.3.1.1.   Customer-oriented Strategic Systems (COSS) 
This section discusses research focusing on different types of customer-oriented 
interorganizational systems.  Authors use a variety of names for variations of customer 
focused IOIS.  We use the term customer-oriented strategic systems in referring to these 
studies.  However, in discussing individual studies, we use the term the authors use.  
Runge (1985) investigates factors facilitating adoption and acceptance of 
telecommunication-based interorganizational systems using a case study method.  His 
interviews are based on a literature survey and include businesses and technical 
managers of thirty-five different telecommunication-based information systems.  Runge 
finds five factors consistently mentioned as important in IOIS acceptance and adoption.  
These include  product champions,  customer involvement in the development process, 
system marketing, existing information system extension, and normal information 
systems planning and approval process circumvention.  
Reich and Benbasat (1990) investigate factors facilitating  system development, 
high adoption rate, and competitive advantage using eleven customer-oriented strategic 
system case studies.  Reich and Benbasat find champion existence, top management 
support, proactive information systems function, external pressure, marketing the 
system, customer involvement, and expressed customer need facilitate adoption. 
Grover (1993) investigates factors facilitating customer-based interorganizational 
system adoption.  Using a survey, Grover finds proactive technological orientation and 
internal push factors facilitate adoption.  Proactive technological orientation contains 
variables indicating technological sophistication.  These include engaging in strategic 
information systems planning, recognizing information technologies’ integral role, 
having a strong in-house information technology infrastructure, having aggressive 
management willing to take risks, having an aggressive technology policy, and 
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encouraging participatory decision-making.  Internal push measures organizational 
support for customer-based interorganizational systems.  Sustained and active top 
management support and champion existence comprise internal push.  The study also 
finds compatibility and large organization size facilitates adoption; complexity inversely 
relates to adoption. 
Cavaye and Cragg (1995) use case studies to investigate factors facilitating 
stages in the customer-oriented strategic systems development cycle.  We include this 
study in the adoption literature because three of the four stages relate to adoption.  The 
third stage’s dependent variable is adoption rate in the first year, and entering this stage 
is contingent upon completion of the first two stages.  The fourth stage focuses on 
obtaining benefits from the IOIS, with dependent variables including increased sales and 
increased user satisfaction.  This stage is not discussed in the literature review. 
Cavaye and Cragg show technology opportunity, good marketing programs, and 
user technology awareness strongly relate to technology adoption.  Technology 
opportunity has a strong relationship with identifying system opportunities.  Good 
marketing programs and user technology awareness enable first year system adoption.  
Several variables have mixed relationships with technology adoption.  Competitive 
pressure has mixed results as an IOIS opportunity identification facilitator.  Champion 
existence, extending existing systems beyond company boundaries, and experienced 
information systems staff have mixed results as IOIS building facilitators.  The system 
being built in reaction to expressed customer needs, user participation, and low system 
costs have mixed results as first year IOIS adoption facilitators. 
3.3.1.2.   Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 
This section discusses studies examining EDI adoption.   
Surveying one hundred and ninety two vendors, Saunders and Clark (1992) find 
perceived EDI cost reduces adopt intentions. 
Using field interviews, a focus group, and a survey, O’Callaghan et al. (1992), 
investigate factors affecting decisions to adopt insurance carriers’ EDI computer-based 
interface offerings.  Using insights from innovation theory, the authors find a positive 
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relationship between perceived relative advantage of EDI over present systems and 
adoption decisions.   
Bouchard (1993) uses a survey, case study, and computer-supported interviews 
to investigate decision criteria for organizational EDI adoption.  Supporting critical mass 
theory, Bouchard finds key business partner adoption, use, and/or mandates influence 
organizational EDI adoption decisions.  Bouchard finds characteristics associated with 
innovation diffusion theory moderately influence  EDI adoption decisions. 
Williams (1994) uses interviews and surveys to investigate factors influencing 
EDI adoption in distribution channels.  The authors interview transaction channel firms, 
marketing channel firms, consultants, and EDI third-party providers to verify 
investigated variables.  Upon determining variables to investigate, one hundred fifty six 
members of the Council of Logistics Management completed questionnaires.  The 
questionnaires show different influence variables  for each channel type. In marketing 
channels, organizations adopt EDI to reduce demand uncertainty.  In logistical channels, 
carriers adopt EDI because shippers request or force them.  However, some carriers 
adopt EDI because of its relative advantage.  Organizational theory and power theory 
form the theoretical base of William’s work. 
Iacovou et al. (1995) develop and empirically test an EDI adoption framework 
for small businesses.  The model’s independent variables include  perceived benefits, 
organizational readiness, and external pressure.  EDI adoption, EDI integration, and EDI 
impact are dependent variables.  Their case study has several findings.  A moderate 
relationship exists between perceived benefits and EDI adoption and integration, 
moderately supporting diffusion of innovation theory.  Promotion increased benefits 
awareness.  A moderate relationship exists between readiness and integration.  Third, the 
relationship between external pressure (operationalized as dependency) and adoption is 
strong.  This offers strong support for resource dependency theory, even though the 
authors did not mention this theory. 
Teo et al. (1995) investigate factors affecting an organization’s EDI adoption 
intention using a survey.  Factors investigated come from innovation diffusion theory 
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and include relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, observability, trialability, and 
risk (operational and strategic).  The authors find present adoption intention dependent 
on complexity, operational risk, and strategic risk.  Low complexity, low operational 
risk, and low strategic risk are associated with high present adoption intention.  Future 
adoption intention is contingent upon complexity, observability, and strategic risk.  
Premkumar et al. (1997) examine EDI adoption in the European trucking 
industry using a field survey.  Using discriminant analysis, the authors find two 
organizational factors (firm size and top management support) and two 
interorganizational factors (competitive pressure and customer support) separate 
adopters from non-adopters.  Specifically, competitive pressure is the most important 
adoption facilitator.  Customer support was second.  Customer support involves larger 
companies helping small companies that they do business with adopt EDI.  Help 
includes providing smaller companies training programs, software, and incentives.  The 
study finds larger companies more likely to adopt EDI than smaller companies.  
Innovation diffusion theory and resource dependency theory form the study’s theoretical 
basis.  
Damsgaard and Lyytinen (1998) use a field study to investigate typical EDI 
diffusion patterns in Finland; how organizational, industry, and environmental factors 
affect these patterns; and various diffusion pattern success rates in EDI 
institutionalization.  The authors examine adoption patterns at three levels to develop 
diffusion patterns.  The authors believe innovation diffusion theory does not explain 
their findings.  Innovation diffusion theory focuses on technical features and individual 
adopters as adoption explanations.  Damsgaard and Lyytinen’s findings link successful 
EDI diffusion in Finland to a blend of institutional, technological, socio-economic, and 
cultural issues.  In the study, collaboration, cooperation, trade organization support, 
infrastructure, and the herd effect increase diffusion.  The herd effect refers to EDI 
adoption fueled by others’ adoption. 
Chwelos et al. (2001) use a survey testing readiness, perceived benefits, and 
external pressure as EDI adoption intention determinants. The study finds all three 
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factors significant predictors of EDI adoption intention.  However, external pressure and 
readiness influence EDI adoption intention more than perceived benefits.  Critical mass 
theory, innovation diffusion theory, and power theory form the authors’ theoretical base.   
3.3.1.3.   Business-to-Business (B2B) Electronic Commerce (EC) 
One study discusses B2B EC adoption.  Deeter-Schmelz et al. (2001) use a 
survey to test the impact of supplier support and technology communication convenience 
on buyer Internet adoption for corporate purchasing activities.  The study finds supplier 
support directly affects Internet purchase intent and communication convenience impacts 
both buyer adoption behavior and Internet purchase intent.  Innovation diffusion theory 
forms the study’s theoretical underpinnings. 
3.3.1.4.   Business-to-Business (B2B) Electronic Marketplaces (E-marketplaces) 
Taking a business process reengineering perspective, Lee and Clark (1996b) use 
four B2B e-marketplace case studies to investigate forces driving and barriers to B2B 
e-marketplace adoption. The authors use throughput growth rate to measure adoption.  
The authors find increased efficiency and effectiveness in information gathering, 
contract formation, and trade settlement drive B2B e-marketplace adoption.  The authors 
identify the following adoption barriers:  uncertainty describing electronic products; risk 
doing business in a new way that may not attract a critical mass of buyers and sellers; 
and change resistance associated with replacing large investments in existing 
infrastructure. 
3.3.2. Diffusion 
This section chronologically discusses IOIS diffusion facilitator research.     
3.3.2.1.   Customer-oriented Strategic System (COSS) 
Sabherwah and Vijayasarathy (1994) use a survey to investigate the effects of 
environmental uncertainty, product information intensity, value chain information 
intensity, and information systems maturity on customers and supplier 
telecommunication link use.  The study also investigates how these links impact 
organizational performance.  Porter and Millar (1985) define product information 
intensity as the degree the organization’s customers utilize information for selection, 
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purchase, use, and maintenance of its products or services.  The authors define value 
chain information intensity, as degree the organization requires information to acquire, 
manufacture, distribute, sell, and maintain its products or services.   
The authors find a positive association between product information intensity, 
value chain information intensity, and environment uncertainty and telecommunication 
link use by and customers and suppliers.   
3.3.2.2.   Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 
Using innovation diffusion theory, Premkumar et al. (1994) investigate the 
relationship between various innovation characteristics (complexity, compatibility, costs, 
relative advantage, and communicability) and several diffusion attributes (adaptation, 
internal diffusion, external diffusion, and implementation success) in EDI organization.  
Based on surveys from two hundred and one U.S. firms, the authors find different 
innovation characteristics predict different diffusion stages. The adaptation stage refers 
to initial use of an innovation, meaning use of EDI in the first application. The authors 
find high relative advantage, high technical compatibility, and lower costs led to better 
EDI adaptation in organizations.   Internal diffusion refers to the extent of EDI 
integration into organizational activities.  The authors find high relative advantage and 
long duration predict the extent of internal diffusion.  External diffusion refers to the 
extent the firm is successful linking with external partners and converting external 
transaction documents into electronic form. The authors find higher technical 
compatibility and longer duration predict the extent a firm achieves external diffusion.   
Cox and Ghoneim (1996) use a case study and a survey to study similarities and 
differences in various industries’ EDI implementation process experiences.  Their 
research investigates sector influence on EDI facilitators and inhibitors, EDI integration 
into different sector internal business processes, and whether EDI delivers its maximum 
benefit when integrated with internal business processes.  Their research indicates EDI 
implementation drivers vary across industries.  EDI critical success factors include 
senior management-supported EDI strategy, EDI strategy aimed at adding core business 
process and trading community value; continual, comprehensive EDI strategy review, 
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and core business process EDI integration.  Since the authors were more concerned with 
EDI use than adoption, we include this research in the diffusion section.  
Crook and Kumar (1998) use qualitative data collection and grounded theory 
data analysis to study EDI use in four organizations, each in different industries.  Crook 
and Kumar’s study addresses several EDI use aspects including  causal conditions, 
types, encouragement strategies, consequences, and contextual factors.  The authors find 
several EDI use facilitators.  The study shows organizational context including: 
organizational size, information technology capability, and senior management 
commitment facilitate EDI use.  The study shows several environmental context 
variables facilitate organizational EDI use.  These include industry EDI experience, 
supplier nature, and customer-facilitated EDI use.  The study also finds external pressure 
facilitates EDI use.  External pressure includes customers forcing a firm’s EDI use and 
firms feeling a need to use EDI to remain competitive.  The authors find the desire to 
reap system benefits such as cost savings increases and customer service improvements 
facilitates EDI use.   Support also facilitates EDI use.  Support includes training, 
incentives encouraging use, and assistance selecting the technical infrastructure.   
Ramamurthy et al. (1999) investigate interorganizational (customer support, 
customer expertise, and competitive pressure) and organizational (internal support, 
benefit potential, compatibility, and resource intensity) variables’ effect on EDI 
diffusion.  The authors define EDI diffusion as external and internal integration.  Using a 
field survey of eighty-three firms in the motor carriers industry, the authors find 
compatibility positively and resource intensity negatively affect external integration.  
Expected/realized benefits impact internal EDI integration.  Internal support influences 
internal and external integration.  Interorganizational variables (customer support and 
competitive pressure) influence both internal and external integration. 
3.3.2.3.   Business-to-Business (B2B) Electronic Commerce (EC) 
Using a survey, Han and Noh (1999-2000) investigate factors discouraging EC 
growth.  First, the study finds unstable systems and low data security levels inhibit EC 
usage.  Second, the study finds unstable systems, low data security levels, inconvenient 
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use, and unsatisfactory purchases affect EC satisfaction.  Third, the study finds  
unsatisfactory purchases, social disturbance, and inconvenient use affect EC usefulness 
expectations. 
Hope et al. (2001) use a literature review and case studies to determine critical 
success factors for B2B EC development.  After reviewing the article, we categorize 
Hope et al.’s research with diffusion facilitators because the authors define B2B EC 
development in stages dealing with diffusing adopted technology rather than deciding to 
adopt technology.  This decision was based on Hope et al.’s critical success factor 
categorization of  adopting/updating internal software resources, developing 
interconnectedness, and achieving a virtual corporation.   
In Hope et al.’s study, four critical success factors are predominant.  These are: 
clear vision, customer readiness, top management support, and creative management 
thinking.  The study identifies EC success factors not mentioned in the literature.  These 
include:  information sharing culture, clear and certain legislative and policy 
environment, and project start up timing.  Hope et al. mention several other critical 
success factors including:  marketing and system promotion, skilled staff in technical 
and business issues, current technology, and external expertise.  
Ranganathan et al. (2001) use a literature review, interviews, and a survey to 
develop a list of forty-six B2B application deployment facilitators and inhibitors.  The 
authors measure B2B application deployment as the extent the following goals are 
fulfilled:  improved customer service, better inventory control, lower marketing and 
distribution costs, reduced cycle time, better supplier relationships, increased 
competitive advantage, and reduced operation costs.  We categorize this study in the 
diffusion section because achieving these goals requires the system be used.  The authors 
find the following factors facilitate B2B application deployment:  top management 
support, organizational change, strategy-related project management, valuation, internal 
information technology environment, collaboration, external information technology 
environment, and external business environment. 
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Tabor (2001) investigates EC success facilitators using a case study of an early 
adopter airline.  We discuss Tabor’s research with the diffusion studies since she defines 
success as achieving stated goals, including transaction volume targets and transaction 
cost reduction.  The study finds the following EC diffusion facilitators:  
customer-focused approach in design and process issues, easy to use technology, project 
leadership, consistent goals and strategy, culture supporting innovation, project adding 
transaction cost and/or customer search cost value, product equity/trust, innovative 
characteristics, management commitment, team composition, core competence, project 
management, and technology performance. 
3.3.2.4.   Business-to-Business (B2B) Electronic Marketplaces (E-marketplaces) 
Grewal et al.’s (2001) study is some of the first  empirical work on B2B 
e-marketplaces.  Using transaction cost theory, the motivation-ability framework, and 
institutional theory,  the authors investigate firm electronic market participation.  The 
investigation includes a survey of three hundred and six buyers, sellers, retailers, 
pawnbrokers, appraisers, and other intermediaries in Polygon.  Polygon is an unbiased 
third party driven electronic marketplace for jewelry trading.  
In their investigation, Grewal et al. classify firm participation into exploration, 
expert, and passive states.  Exploration firm participation involves firms learning how to 
do business in the marketplace.  Expert firm participation involves firms believing they 
have successfully reengineered their business processes to function effectively in the 
electronic market.  In this state, firms have substantial knowledge about their electronic 
markets and procedural knowledge of doing business in the market.  In the passive state, 
firms carry out virtually no business on the electronic market, but continue to maintain a 
market presence.   
Grewal et al.  find electronic market participation depends on organizational 
motivation and ability.   Achieving the expert state requires firms to emphasize 
efficiency, emphasize information technology capabilities, and deemphasize legitimacy 
motives.  The authors conceptualize legitimacy motivations as firms entering the 
e-marketplace to jump on the bandwagon, mimic others, and/or establish an image of 
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being technologically proficient.  The authors conceptualize efficiency as firms entering 
the e-marketplace to: reduce the cost of running their business, streamline operations, 
and/or reduce the cost of transacting business with trading partners.    The authors 
conceptualize information technology capabilities as having: strong information 
technology planning capabilities, strong technical support staff, an understanding of the 
potential benefits of information technology applications, and adequate information 
technology knowledge. 
3.3.3. Adoption and Diffusion 
The paragraphs below discuss two EDI studies investigating both adoption and 
diffusion facilitators.   
Premkumar and Ramamurthy (1995) use a field survey to investigate how five 
interorganizational and four organizational factors affect EDI adoption decisions.  The 
authors use power and social exchange theory as theoretical underpinning to investigate 
factors affecting an organization’s EDI adoption approach (proactive vs. reactive).  
Examined interorganizational factors include net dependence, exercised power, 
transaction climate, and competitive pressure.  Examined organizational factors include:  
top management support, champion existence, organizational compatibility, internal 
need and information system infrastructure.  The study finds competitive pressure, 
exercised power, internal need, and top management support differentiate proactive and 
reactive firms.  Reactive firms had high competitive pressure and exercised power 
scores, indicating outside pressure led to their EDI adoption.  Proactive firms scored 
high on internal need and top management support.  The study also finds proactive firms 
have greater adaptation, more external trading partner connectivity, and better EDI 
information integration with internal information system applications than reactive 
firms. 
Hart and Saunders (1997) develop a theoretical framework addressing power and 
trust’s influence on EDI adoption and use.  They then use a case study to illustrate the 
framework’s dimensions.  Hart and Saunders’ framework posits more powerful firms 
influence their trading partners to adopt EDI.  Once EDI is adopted, trust between firms 
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determines expanded use.  The authors explain in buyer-supplier relationships, power is 
a function of dependence on the other party and using this dependence to influence the 
other parties’ actions.  The authors incorporate Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) 
explanation of trust as confidence in the goodwill of others. The authors define trust as 
anticipated optimistic behavior of other parties.   
The research posits and illustrates dependent firms are vulnerable to their more 
powerful trading partners’ coercive tactics.  However, better results and true 
interorganizational integration occur when EDI adoption is considered an opportunity to 
reinforce firms’ relationships rather than a requirement imposed by more powerful firms.   
3. 4.   THEORY 
Table 3 indicates a number of theories underpin IOIS research.   
Innovation diffusion theory is the most common.  Rogers’ (1995) innovation 
diffusion theory identifies innovation attributes influencing adoption.  Innovation 
diffusion theory posits a user’s technology adoption decision is a rational choice based 
on technology characteristics. The theory posits decision makers adopt technology they 
perceive has greater  relative advantage, compatibility, trialability, and observability,  
and less complexity.  
Power theories underpin several IOIS adoption and diffusion studies.  Several 
notions on power exist.  Emerson (1962) did some of the first power work with social 
exchange theory.  Social exchange theory notes “actor X’s dependence on actor Y is (a) 
directly proportional to X’s motivational investment in Y mediated goals, and (b) 
inversely proportional to those goals’ availability to X outside the Y-X relationship”  
(Emerson 1962, p. 32).  Thompson (1967) has a similar observation on power, noting an 
organization is dependent on some element of its task environment (a) in proportion to 
the organization’s need for resources or performances that element provides, and (b) in 
inverse proportion to other elements’ ability to provide the same resource or 
performance” (1967, p. 31).  Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer 1988, Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978) posits that an organization’s environment is unstable and that 
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organizations try to reduce vulnerabilities and increase power relative to their 
constituents in order to survive.  The degree an organization is dependent upon external 
resources is determined by the resource’s importance, the organization’s discretion over 
it, and whether alternatives exist.  In applying this theory to technology adoption, 
resource dependency theory explains interorganizational relationships may not be based 
on efficiency.  Rather, they may be formed to reduce environmental uncertainty and may 
be the result of power and influence over dependent organizations.   
A few IOIS studies mention institutional and organizational structure theories.  
Institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977) looks at 
organizational survival efforts focused on  satisfying external stakeholders.  Institutional 
theory suggests organizations adopt rules and practices that may not necessarily increase 
technical efficiency, but increase legitimacy in external stakeholders' eyes.  
Organizational behavior theory (Thompson 1967) suggests organizational variables 
such as size influence technical innovations adoption.  IOIS research shows a large firm 
size facilitates customer-based IOIS adoption (Grover 1993), EDI adoption (Premkumar 
et al. 1997), and EDI use (Crook and Kumar 1998). 
Economic-based theories underpin some B2B e-marketplace adoption and 
diffusion studies.  As a whole, these theories underpin studies of organizational 
decisions to participate in B2B e-marketplaces.  Transaction cost economics 
(Williamson 1979, Williamson 1982, Williamson 1985, Williamson 1994, Williamson 
and Ouchi 1981) posits an organization’s goal is minimizing the cost of exchanging 
resources in the environment and the cost of managing exchanges inside the 
organization.  Based on transaction cost economics, the electronic markets hypothesis 
(Malone et al. 1987) predicts electronic markets as the favored mechanism for 
coordinating material and information flows among organization in the presence of 
electronic communication technologies. The move to the middle hypothesis  (Clemons 
et al. 1993)  agrees with the electronic markets hypothesis idea that information 
technology will lead to increased outsourcing.  But, it also hypothesizes that buyers will 
move toward long-term relationships with a smaller set of suppliers in order to (1)  
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leverage economies of scale due to investments in IT required to coordinate business 
relationships, and (2)  provide supplier incentives.  Along this same line, incomplete 
contracts theory   (Hart and Moore 1990) argues certain things (e.g., supplier 
innovativeness) are observed by parties in a relationship, but are not verifiable by third 
parties (e.g., courts or arbitrators).  These things cannot be contracted ahead of time, but 
must be bargained for later. Incomplete contracts theory posits suppliers are more likely 
to invest in noncontractible aspects of relationships if buyers commit to a small supply 
base. 
Many IOIS studies, particularly B2B e-marketplace studies, cite the importance 
of achieving critical mass.  Critical mass theory   (Fulk et al. 1996, Granovetter 1978, 
Granovetter 1985, Markus 1990, Monge et al. 1998)posits some innovations require 
collaboration among potential adopters for any adopter to benefit.  It further posits that if 
a network cannot obtain an installed base equal to the largest equilibrium network size, it 
will have to exit from the market if it cannot surpass the critical mass and become 
self-sustaining.  Critical mass theorists believe decisions to participate in collective 
actions are based on perceptions of what the group is doing.  Who participates, how 
many participate, and contributions to date influence participation decisions. 
3. 5.   ANALYSIS 
Table 4 takes twenty-seven IOIS studies in Table 3 and categorizes variables 
significantly influencing adoption and diffusion of various IOIS forms.  We adopt 
Chwelos et al.’s category definitions.  Interorganizational level research focuses on how 
environments and/or other firms’ actions influence IOIS adoption and diffusion.  
Organizational level research focuses on internal attributes influencing IOIS adoption 
and diffusion.  Technological level research focuses on perceived innovation 
characteristics influencing IOIS adoption and diffusion.  
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Table 4    Categorization and Frequency of Significant Independent Variables by 
Study Type and Technology Type 
No. of Studies 
Focusing on 
No. of Studies  
 Focusing on 
Independent 
Variable 
Category 
Adoption Diffusion  COSS EDI B2B  
EC 
B2B 
E-marketplace 
Collaboration Interorganizational  2  1 1  
Environment 
(includes 
uncertainty)               
(- relationship in 1 
study) 
Interorganizational 2 3 1 1 2 1 
External expertise 
utilization 
Interorganizational 1 1  1 1  
External pressure 
(- relationship in 1 
study) 
Interorganizational 8 4 1 10  1 
Implementation 
support 
Interorganizational 2 3  4 1  
Information 
intensity (value 
chain) 
Interorganizational  1 1    
Nature of suppliers 
and customers 
Interorganizational  1  1   
Timing of project 
start up 
Interorganizational  1   1  
Trade organization 
support 
Interorganizational  1  1   
Trust Interorganizational  2  1 1  
User involvement Interorganizational 2 1 2  1  
Valuation Interorganizational  1   1  
Interorganizational Total 15 21 5 20 9 2 
Interorganizational  2  1 1  Environment 
favoring cooperation 
(includes 
information sharing)
Organizational       
Interorganizational 2  1 1   Need (perceived) 
Organizational       
Interorganizational 1 1  1 1  Readiness 
Organizational       
Interorganizational 1 2 1 1 1  Technology 
awareness Organizational       
    50 
 
Table 4 Continued 
 
No. of Studies 
Focusing on 
No. of Studies  
 Focusing on 
Independent 
Variable 
Category 
Adoption Diffusion  COSS EDI B2B  
EC 
B2B 
E-marketplace 
Interorganizational/Organizational Total 4 5 2 4 3 0 
Adoption decision 
(proactive) 
Organizational  1  1   
Champion existence  Organizational 3  3    
Culture supporting 
innovation 
Organizational  2  1 1  
Duration of project 
(longer) 
Organizational  1  1   
Evaluation 
procedures 
Organizational  1  1   
Firm size (large) Organizational 1 1  2   
Goals, strategy, and 
vision (consistent 
and clear) 
Organizational  4  1 3  
Information 
intensity (product) 
Organizational  1 1    
Information systems 
function (proactive) 
Organizational 1  1    
Information systems 
staff skill 
Organizational  1   1  
Innovativeness Organizational  1   1  
Integration into core 
business activities 
Organizational 1 2 1 1 1  
Leadership Organizational  1   1  
Management of 
project 
Organizational  2   2  
Managerial thinking 
(creative) 
Organizational  1   1  
Marketing and 
promotion 
Organizational 3 1 3  1  
Organizational 
change (- 
relationship in 1 
study) 
Organizational 1 1   1 1 
Participatory 
decision making 
Organizational 1  1    
Planning and 
approval processes    
(-relationship in 1 
study) 
Organizational 2  2    
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Table 4 Continued 
 
No. of Studies 
Focusing on 
No. of Studies  
 Focusing on 
Independent 
Variable 
Category 
Adoption Diffusion  COSS EDI B2B  
EC 
B2B 
E-marketplace 
Resource intensity (-
relationship) 
Organizational  1  1   
Risk (- relationship 
for 1 study) 
Organizational 4  1 2  1 
Risk taking 
propensity of top 
management  
Organizational 1  1    
Team composition Organizational  1   1  
Top management 
support 
Organizational 4 6 2 5 3  
Organizational Total 22 29 16 16 17 2 
Data security Technological  1   1  
Observability Technological 1   1   
Relative advantage 
(includes perceived)  
Technological 7 8 1 9 2 3 
Technology 
(adaptability) 
Technological       
Technology 
(compatibility) 
Technological 1 2 1 2   
Technology 
(complexity) (less) 
Technological 2  2    
Technology 
(convenience) 
Technological  1   1  
Technology (cost) Technological 1 1  2   
Technology (current, 
infrastructure) 
Technological 2 5 2 2 3  
Technology (ease of 
use) 
Technological  1   1  
Technology 
(satisfaction) 
Technological  1   1  
Technology (social 
disturbance) 
Technological  1   1  
Technology 
(stability) 
Technological  1   1  
Technology 
performance  
Technological  1   1  
Technological Total 14 23 6 16 12 3 
  Grand Total 55 78 29 56 41 7 
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The categorization supports Chwelos et al.’s hypothesis and finds IOIS adoption 
and diffusion research also addresses technological, organizational, and 
interorganizational levels.  The categorization expands Chwelos et al.’s hypothesis based 
in EDI adoption studies to adoption and diffusion studies for customer-oriented strategic 
systems, EDI, B2B EC, and B2B e-marketplaces.   
Chwelos et al.’s (2001) hypothesis did not recognize that the same variable might 
have multiple categorizations.  In categorizing independent variables reported in the 
IOIS literature, four variables (perceived need, environment favoring cooperation, 
readiness, and technology awareness) belong to both organizational and 
interorganizational categories.  Perceived need in IOIS relates to an organization’s 
perception of their business partners’ needs.  Perceived need falls into the 
interorganizational category.  In recognizing customers’ needs, these needs become 
organizational needs.  As such, perceived need belongs to both organizational and 
interorganizational categories.  In IOIS, both the organization’s environment and the 
organization’s relationship with other organizations involved in implementing the IOIS 
must be cooperative; therefore, environment favoring cooperation falls into both 
organizational and interorganizational categories.  Readiness as a facilitator of adoption 
and diffusion also falls into organizational and interorganizational categories.  Since 
IOIS span organizational boundaries, both the organization and its partners must be 
ready to adopt the IOIS.  Technology awareness also falls into organizational and 
interorganizational categories.  Both the organization and its business partners must be 
aware of new technology for it to be adopted and diffused.   
Several authors (Grover 1993, Premkumar et al. 1997) use environmental for 
what Chwelos et al. call interorganizational.  Grover’s environmental variables include 
four industry variables (maturity, competition, information intensity, and adaptable 
innovations) and two customer variables (power and vertical coordination).  Premkumar 
et al.’s environmental category includes climate, net-dependence, competitive pressure, 
and customer support.  Breaking Chwelos’ interorganizational category into an 
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environmental category and an interorganizational category will benefit future IOIS 
research.  The interorganizational category would include how business partner 
relationships influence technology adoption and diffusion.  The environmental category 
would focus on how other surroundings influence technology adoption and diffusion.   
This analysis of variables significantly influencing IOIS adoption and/or 
diffusion provides a starting point for studies researching emerging IOIS.  Table 4 shows 
independent variables significantly influencing technology adoption and technology 
diffusion.  Table 4 also shows frequency of significant independent variable for COSS, 
EDI, B2B EC, and B2B e-marketplaces.   For example, user involvement significantly 
influences IOIS adoption in two studies and IOIS diffusion in one study.  Of the studies 
finding user involvement significant, two focus on COSS and one focuses on B2B EC. 
3. 6.   CONCLUSION  
In their 2002 MIS Quarterly article, Webster and Watson (2002, p. 13) state, “the 
progress of information systems as a field is impeded because there are few published 
review articles.”  This chapter contributes to the field by bringing together IOIS research 
and providing a starting point for work on emerging IOIS.  This chapter summarizes 
significant independent variables, dependent variables, study focus, research methods, 
and theoretical approaches of twenty-seven IOIS studies. See Table 3.  We further 
analyze significant independent variables found in IOIS research.  See  Table 4. 
Chwelos et al.’s (2001) EDI research synthesis and EDI adoption model provides 
the hypothesis framing the research.  The authors hypothesize organizational, 
technological, and interorganizational level constructs facilitate IOIS adoption.  In this 
chapter, we evaluate Chwelos et al.’s hypothesis by reviewing independent variables 
significantly influencing IOIS adoption and diffusion in twenty-eight empirical IOIS 
studies.  This chapter supports and extends their hypothesis by applying it to both 
adoption and diffusion for an array of IOIS.   
In the review, significant independent variables did fall into Chwelos et al.’s 
categories; however, a few variables fell into multiple categories (organizational and 
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interorganizational).  As such, we extend Chwelos et al.’s hypothesis and propose 
variables found to significantly influence IOIS adoption and diffusion also facilitate 
emerging IOIS adoption and diffusion. 
 Table 4 shows more occurrences of independent variables influencing diffusion 
than adoption.  Fifty-five independent variable occurrences facilitate adoption and 
seventy-eight independent variable occurrences influence diffusion.  Most variables with 
significant IOIS adoption and diffusion relationships are in the organizational category.  
The technological and interorganizational categories have nearly equal significant 
independent variable occurrences.  External pressure, top management support, and 
relative advantage have frequently been proven to significantly influence IOIS adoption 
and diffusion.   
Table 2 indicates fifty-eight percent of the reviewed work focuses on EDI.  EDI 
has been widely adopted and in existence longer than B2B EC and B2B e-marketplaces.  
Table 2 indicates only two B2B e-marketplace adoption and diffusion investigations.  
The field will benefit from investigations in this area.   
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CHAPTER IV 
4 RESEARCH METHODS, DESIGN, ANALYSIS, AND EVALUATION 
4. 1.   RESEARCH METHOD 
Figure 4 illustrates our research methods, which include:  participant 
observations, document reviews, literature reviews, unstructured interviews, and 
structured interviews. 
 
Figure 4  Research Methods 
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This research began in August 2000.  At this time there was significant electronic 
commerce (EC) buzz, particularly business-to-business (B2B) and electronic 
marketplaces (e-marketplaces).  Wall Street was rewarding organizations with EC 
initiatives and corporate America was announcing record numbers of B2B EC 
endeavors.  However, other than B2B EC endeavor announcements, very little was 
written about B2B EC, particularly B2B e-marketplaces.  Given this,  a grounded 
theory  (Charmaz 1983, Glaser and Strauss 1967, Strauss and Corbin 1997, Strauss and 
Corbin 1998) approach was most appropriate.  The other research methods were not 
appropriate.  An experiment would divorce the research questions from their context and 
only allow investigating a few relationships.  A survey would have resulted in 
information on preconceived variables.  It would not have allowed new drivers to 
emerge, and would not have provide explanations regarding why drivers were important 
and in what context they were important. 
Glaser and Strauss pioneered grounded theory in their book, The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory  (1967).  The book was written at a time when the academic 
community viewed qualitative research as only a helpful preliminary to the “real” 
research methods of quantitative research.  Glaser and Strauss’ book explains how to use 
qualitative data in developing theoretical analysis.  The grounded theory method 
emphasizes discovery and theory development  over logical deductive reasoning from 
prior theoretical frameworks.  In grounded theory, data collection and analysis proceed 
simultaneously.   Data shape the research process and products rather than theoretical 
frameworks.  The grounded theory perspective holds that “using someone else’s 
theoretical framework adds little innovation and may perpetuate ideas that otherwise 
could be further refined, discarded, or transcended” (Charmaz 1983, p. 110).  As 
advocated by grounded theory, we entered the field with open minds and learned about 
B2B e-marketplace issues as they arose, rather than trying to fit preconceived 
frameworks to a B2B e-marketplace context. 
This initial phase of the research spanned eighteen months, from August 2000 
through January 2002.  This phase included participant observations, unstructured 
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interviews, and document reviews of B2B e-marketplaces in the convenience store 
industry, utility industry, lubricants industry, and oil and gas industry.  Conducting this 
research involved negotiating access and writing field notes.  Given today’s business 
environment, it was not appropriate to tape record interviews.  While in the field we took 
notes.  Because we needed to stay engaged with our informants, we wrote key words 
down and filled in gaps upon leaving the field.  When we left the field, we immediately 
typed our field notes using thick description (Emerson et al. 1995).  Thick description 
involves collecting field notes that capture information about the research question, other 
information that emerges during the field visit that may not seem relevant to the study, 
and slices of the lives of our participants.  A ninety-minute interview usually took two 
eight-hour days to type.   
This initial phase included:   
 six ninety-minute visits with a B2B e-marketplace for the 
convenience store industry;  
 eight six-hour visits with one of twenty-one United States utilities 
involved in a B2B e-marketplace for the utility industry;  
 one two-hour visit with an organization in the lubricants business 
participating in several B2B e-marketplaces; and  
 one ninety-minute interview with a representative from a B2B 
e-marketplace in the oil and gas industry.  
 
These initial field observations indicated that B2B e-marketplaces are struggling 
to attract members and then to influence these members to use the marketplace.  The 
predominance of these struggles in our initial field note coding led to more focused 
research questions. 
 
 Research Question 1:  What drives B2B e-marketplace membership? 
 Research Question 2:  What marketplace characteristics drive B2B 
e-marketplace use? 
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 Research Question 3:  What organizational characteristics impact an 
organization’s B2B e-marketplace use? 
 
Based on initial coding of our field notes, we developed three preliminary 
research models.  See Chapter V.  Each preliminary research model is a picture of the 
research question and the factors that seem to impact it.  For example, preliminary 
research model two posits compatibility, uniform standards, and trust as B2B 
e-marketplace characteristics driving marketplace use.   
Upon identifying the three research questions and preliminary research models, 
we searched for existing literature supporting the models.  Most of the literature review 
occurred between May 2001 and April 2002; however, we stay abreast of recent 
research.  The literature has not addressed the research questions and offers little 
empirical support for the preliminary models in the context of B2B e-marketplaces.  As 
such, we expanded the literature review to include interorganizational information 
systems (IOIS) and the B2B e-marketplace trade press.  Within this context, we found 
some support for the models’ questions and drivers.   
Given the limited academic research in this area, interviews were the most 
appropriate way to investigate the research questions.  As previously discussed, the 
models and questions are based on our experiences with four field sites.  Structured 
interviews allow us to understand if the models’ proposed drivers are in fact drivers.  
Accompanying structured interviews with unstructured interviews allows soliciting 
proposed driver explanations and allows new drivers to surface accompanied by 
explanations of why these drivers are important.  When new drivers surface, we  probe 
for these drivers in the remaining interviews.   
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Before reentering the field to conduct the structured and unstructured 
interviews, we developed interview guides for:   
 B2B e-marketplace representatives,  
 member organizations (e.g., buyers and sellers), and  
 organizations that chose not to join the e-marketplace.    
The field experience, three research models, and Reich and Benbasat’s interview 
protocol  (1990) form the guides’ basis.  Six Texas A&M professors from an array of 
disciplines reviewed the guides.   In May 2002, we pilot tested our guides.  This 
involved conducting interviews with a B2B e-marketplace Buyer Development Manager 
and two procurement people from a B2B e-marketplace member organization.  Based on 
feedback from these pilot tests, we revised the interview guides.  The interview guides 
are in Appendix A. 
The structured and unstructured interviews occurred between May 2002 and May 
2003.  Interview data collection is likely to suffer problems, including interviewee recall 
and truth shading.  We use several methods explained in Reich and Benbasat’s  (1990) 
article to increase interview reliability.  First, we use second-hand information to appear 
informed about the project and its outcomes.  This information increases the chances of 
spotting irregularities in interview data and questioning the interviewer.  Second, we 
design the interview guides to solicit information in several ways.  We begin interviews 
with open questions about the topic and then ask more specific questions assessing the 
drivers’ relationships to the research question.   
4. 2.   RESEARCH DESIGN 
The preliminary fieldwork and initial coding indicate different e-marketplace 
members have varying e-marketplace perspectives and experiences.   To elaborate on 
this idea, we design the research so that for each case, we solicit information from the 
B2B e-marketplace, a high seller, a low seller, a high buyer, a low buyer, and a 
nonmember.  See Figure 5. 
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Figure 5  Research Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eisenhardt’s work (1989) guided the number of cases in the study.  Eisenhardt 
suggests using between four and ten cases to conduct case study research.  This allows 
enough cases for the work to be convincing, but limits the volume so that a thorough 
analysis is possible.  Given the depth of each case (e.g., the marketplace, buyers, sellers, 
and a nonmember), we chose four case studies.  We chose a theoretical sample of B2B 
e-marketplaces and member organizations, selecting marketplaces and member 
organizations differing from one another. 
Criteria for selecting B2B e-marketplaces for our study required the marketplace 
be envisioned as a telecommunication network linking multiple buyers and sellers in 
order to share information and/or conduct business.  We chose four B2B e-marketplaces, 
each with different existence periods, numbers of members, and  transaction levels.  At 
the beginning of the study, three of the four marketplaces had just formed.  All four 
marketplaces had high expectations regarding their success.  By the end of the study 
only two marketplaces were still in existence.  The interviews included discussion about 
the entire life cycle of the two failed e-marketplaces.   
Our field investigation required interviewing people within each marketplace 
who knew about attracting organizational membership and influencing member 
organizations to use the marketplace.  Table 5 shows the B2B e-marketplace 
B2B 
E-MARKETPLACE
High 
Seller 
High
Buyer 
Low
Buyer 
Low 
Seller 
Nonmember 
Inquire & sell Inquire & buy 
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representatives interviewed.  Interviews ranged between ninety minutes and five and a 
half hours.   
 
Table 5  B2B E-marketplace Representative Interviews 
Marketplace Name People Interviewed 
National Trucking Exchange (NTX)  Sales Regional Director 
 
Pegasus  President and Chief Executive Officer 
 Sales Vice President 
 Buyer Development Manager 
 
C-Store Exchange (CSX)  President and Chief Operating Officer  
 One board member 
 
Retail Matrix  Strategic Alliances Senior Vice President 
 
 
For each marketplace, we planned to interview a high seller, a low seller, a high 
buyer, a low buyer, and a nonmember.  Table 6 shows the marketplace member 
organizations in our study, including the classification type, name, and job titles of the 
people interviewed.  The table shows sometimes we interviewed more member 
organizations and more people within a member organization than required by the 
design.     In other cases, a participant organization type did not exist within the 
marketplace.  Only three organizations joined CSX.  No organizations joined Retail 
Matrix.  In this situation, we interviewed organizations close to joining. 
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Table 6  B2B E-marketplace Member Organization Interviews 
Marketplace Name Member Organization 
Classification and Type 
Member 
Organization Name 
Interviewee Job Title 
High seller  R.E. Transport   Bid Manager 
Low seller Southwestern Trucking  Manger Special Projects 
High buyer Texas Plastics  Distribution Manager 
Low buyer Leading Edge Brands  Sales Representative 
 Controller 
Nonmember Merit  President 
National Trucking 
Exchange (NTX) 
Nonmember McMurray Foodservice  Vice President of Logistics 
High seller  Office Plus  Vice President Strategic 
Accounts 
 Quality Manager 
 President 
 Division Customer Service 
Representative 
Low seller Bearing Point 
Manufacturing 
 Account Executive, 
E-commerce 
Low seller Mining Manufacturing  Manager Capital Projects 
High buyer Synergy  Purchasing Manager 
High buyer Gulf Coast Energy 
(Regulated) 
 Corporate Purchasing and 
E-Procurement Manager 
Low buyer  Lone Star Utilities  Procurement Services Manager 
 Senior Contract Representative 
Low buyer Gulf Coast Energy 
(Unregulated) 
 Purchasing Manager 
Low buyer U.S. Electric and Power  Director, Strategic 
Procurement and Supply Chain 
Pegasus 
Nonmember U.S. Electric and Power  Director, Strategic 
Procurement and Supply Chain 
Low seller/buyer  McMurray Distributing   Director of  E-Business and 
International Systems 
 Information Systems President 
 Vice President of Marketing 
 Vice President of New Market 
Development 
Low seller Momentum Manufacturing  Interview Pending 
Low buyer Gulf Coast Oil  Retail Sales Manager 
Nonmember United States Convenience 
Store Association 
 Senior Vice President of 
Strategic Alliances 
C-Store Exchange 
(CSX) 
Nonmember SuperSport Retail  Coordinating Manager, 
E-Business and Emerging 
Technology 
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Table 6 Continued 
 
Marketplace Name Member Organization 
Classification and Type 
Member 
Organization Name 
Interviewee Job Title 
Potential seller Masterful Manufacturing  Director of Sales 
Potential seller/buyer Cosco Distributing  Director of Tax 
Potential buyer SuperSport Retail  Coordinating Manager, 
E-Business and Emerging 
Technology 
Retail Matrix 
Nonmember McMurray  Distributing  Vice President of Marketing 
 
Within each organization we interview the person that would know about the 
organization’s participation in the B2B e-marketplace.  Usually, when we speak with 
companies selling over the e-marketplace, we interview national sales managers.  When 
we speak with companies buying over the e-marketplace, we interview procurement 
managers.   
The interviews included high-ranking field experts.  We interviewed a Chief 
Executive Officer named one of the top ten energy industry executives by Energy 
Markets Magazine and a Chief Operating Officer recognized as one of the top 100 
information technology leaders by Computerworld.  Because of the high demand on 
these experts’ time, obtaining interviews was difficult.  The e-marketplaces and member 
organizations were geographically dispersed throughout the United States. 
While in the field, we asked questions, engaged in conversation, and wrote key 
terms down.  We did not use a tape recorder because our prior field experiences indicate 
respondents do not want to be tape-recorded.  Tape recording may also cause the 
respondents to be less forthcoming.   
Upon leaving the field, we immediately typed the field notes.  We used thick 
description (Emerson et al. 1995), writing everything we could remember.  In order not 
to forget anything, we tried to write as much as possible before sleeping.  In nine of the 
interviews, three researchers were present.  In these cases, we all took, compared, and 
discussed the field notes.   
4. 3.   RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
Data analysis occurred throughout the fieldwork.  In the first quarter of 2002, we 
did an initial coding by reviewing collected field notes and seeing what was interesting.  
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This initial coding led to the three research questions and the three preliminary research 
models.  See Chapter V.   
We further investigated these questions and models using theoretical samples 
(Charmaz 1983, pp. 124-125) and interview guides.  The theoretical samples’ and 
interview guides’ aim is facilitating cross-case analysis determining what distinguishes: 
 e-marketplaces with high membership vs. e-marketplaces with 
low membership; 
 e-marketplaces with high use levels vs. e-marketplaces with low 
use levels; and 
 organizations with high use levels vs. organizations with low use 
levels, and nonmember organizations. 
 
In the first half of 2003, after completing most of the field visits and collecting 
nearly five hundred single-spaced pages of field notes, analysis and coding became the 
primary focus.  In coding the data, we analyzed each case (within-case analysis) and 
then compared each case (cross-case analysis) (Eisenhardt 1989).  Within-case analysis 
involved creating case reports and case classifications.  Case reports summarize field 
note responses relevant to the research questions.  This is necessary because we prepared 
the field notes using thick description  (Emerson et al. 1995).  As such, we have much 
more information than is immediately relevant to the research questions and model.  
Case reports on each marketplace and each member organization include responses to 
the interview guide questions.  For each e-marketplace this includes:  
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 number of members, transaction volume, and existence period; 
 responses to categories influencing number of members and use 
level; and 
 e-marketplace inception, business model, value proposition, and 
challenges. 
Organization case reports include: 
 each organization’s marketplace use level; 
 responses to categories influencing an organization’s transaction 
volume; and 
 how the organization joined and how they are using the 
e-marketplace. 
To facilitate cross-case comparison, we classify each e-marketplace and each 
organization as follows: 
 existing vs. closed e-marketplaces 
 buyers vs. sellers 
 members vs. nonmembers 
 high users vs. low users 
 high buyers vs. low buyers 
 high sellers vs. low sellers 
 
To determine what drives B2B e-marketplace membership and use, we review the coded 
data by category and respondent classification.  Like Reich and Benbasat’s (1990) 
Information Systems Research article, we rely on data inspection to determine if and 
how the various categories affect the research questions.   
Because we collected over five hundred pages of single-spaced field notes, we 
use a software package to help organize the coding.  QSR (Qualitative Solutions and 
Research)  N6 (non-numerical data indexing, searching, and theorizing) is the sixth 
version of NUD*IST software (QSR 2002a, QSR 2002b).  In coding the data, we use 
node explorer to set up tree nodes with categories of interest.  The initial categories are 
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based on the research design and the three research models.  We read every interview.  
We code lines of text pertaining to our  research question, research model categories, 
and  research design into the appropriate category.  The interview guides ask 
respondents if the initial research models’ categories affect the number of members 
and/or use.  We consider respondents’ thoughts in the analysis.  Because of the open data 
collection techniques, the field notes include categories not in the original model.  When 
we find this, we create a new category and code related text into the category.   
After coding for a while, at times finer grained category dimensions develop.  
For example, initially marketing and promotion was a category proposed to drive 
e-marketplace membership.  After reviewing the field notes, we found different 
marketing and promotion dimensions.  These include sales representatives with industry 
experience and sales calls involving e-marketplace training. We broke marketing and 
promotion into finer grained categories reflecting these dimensions.  These marketing 
and promotion dimensions were present in the two existing marketplaces and were not 
present in the two shutdown marketplaces. 
The analysis involves comparing responses from different types of respondents 
(e.g., currently existing vs. failed marketplaces; high users vs. low users; members vs. 
nonmembers).  In making these comparisons, sometimes similar respondent types have 
similar responses and contrasting responses exist between respondent types.  As these 
patterns develop, we write memos explaining the category and the category’s effect on 
e-marketplace membership and/or use.  An example is in the marketing and promotion 
category.  The two e-marketplaces still in existence, with the most number of 
transactions and the greatest number of participants, paid considerably less attention to 
traditional  marketing and promotion (e.g., trade shows, media tours, news releases) than 
the two failed e-marketplaces.  In QSR N6, we create and write memos within each 
category.  These memos form the beginning of the written work.   
After coding the data, we revisit what we’ve coded in each category to further 
uncover category dimensions and the category’s effect on the research questions.  
QSR N6 helps with this process.  We can choose a category and hit browse and the 
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program will show everything coded by interview and line.  The program has a “jump to 
original text” feature enabling viewing coded data in its original context.  The program 
also allows sorting category data by respondent type (e.g., existing marketplaces vs. 
shut-down marketplaces; high users vs. low users).  We write discoveries in this phase 
into memos, which form the basis of the final work.   
This process results in three research models.  Each model presents a number of 
factors that answer each research question. Each model is a substantive theory 
Substantive theories explain phenomenon in  particular settings.   
Upon bringing these discoveries into the final work, we compare the work to the 
existing literature.  We first compare what we’ve found to the existing B2B 
e-marketplace literature and the IOIS adoption and diffusion literature.  We also 
compare the findings to relevant organizational theories, including innovation diffusion 
theory, institutional theory, power theory, resource dependency theory, transaction cost 
economics, and the theory of collective action in alliance-based interorganizational 
communication and information systems.  In some cases, our work supported the 
existing literature.  In these cases, our research brings together underlying similarities in 
phenomena normally not associated with one another.  This increases the literature’s 
internal validity, generalizability, and conceptual level.  In other cases, our work 
conflicts with the existing literature.  In these cases, our findings indicate the limitations 
of the existing literature.  Conflicting findings allow further exploration of the conflict 
and offer deeper insights into the emergent theory and the conflicting literature.   
A common concern about qualitative research is that it provides little basis for 
scientific generalization.  A common concern is generalizing from a single case.  This is 
also a concern in experiments.  This research does not involve statistical generalizations 
from a random sample.  Case study work involves analytical generalizations.  This 
research generalizes to theoretical propositions, not to populations or universes  (1994).  
Each theory in Chapter VII, VIII, and IX ties to broader theoretical issues.   
Scientific facts are based on many experiments that replicate the same 
phenomenon under different conditions.  The same is true for case study research.   For 
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these research models to have the overall generalizability of formal theories like 
transaction cost economics or institutional theory,   the research models must be 
evaluated in other situational contexts to see if they hold.  Relevant settings may include 
case studies of the development of other types of industry public goods such as industry 
supply chain initiatives and industry communication and information technology 
initiatives.   
4. 4.   METHOD EVALUATION 
Credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability are the four criteria 
used to judge the soundness of qualitative research.  These criteria are the qualitative 
counterparts to positivist evaluation criteria of internal validity, external validity, 
reliability, and objectivity (Denzin and Lincoln 2001, p. 21).   
The paragraphs below discuss how this research addresses each of these criteria. 
“Credibility involves establishing that the results of qualitative research are 
credible or believable from the perspective of the participants in the research” (Trochim 
2001. p. 162).  We addressed credibility by sharing the results of this research with one 
of our participants as the research unfolded.   Our relationship with this participant began 
nearly three years ago and continues.  We will further address the credibility issue by 
sharing our findings with all of our study participants in the form of a white paper.  We 
plan to then contact each participant to discuss the findings’ credibility.  We are also 
scheduled to present this research to the National Purchasing Institute.  Feedback from 
sharing these results with a large group of purchasing managers will help us assess the 
credibility and believability of these results.   
Transferability refers to the degree to which the results of qualitative research 
can be generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings  (Trochim 2001. p. 162).  
Given that the research design included different types of marketplaces with different 
membership levels, use levels, and existence periods, our findings apply to B2B 
e-marketplaces.  Within each marketplace, the research included buyers and sellers with 
high and low use levels.  The research also included an organization that chose not to 
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join the marketplace.  Given the array of organizations, the research findings apply to 
other organizations participating in B2B e-marketplaces.   
We also compared the research findings to the existing literature.  In many cases, 
theories and research developed in other settings agreed with this study’s research 
findings.  These situations increase our findings’ transferability.   
In addition, the  research findings may apply to other settings.  However, the 
transferability of these results to other settings is the responsibility of the one doing the 
generalizing  (Trochim 2001, p. 162).   
The quantitative view of reliability is based on the assumption of repeatability.  
Repeatability is concerned with whether you would obtain the same results if you could 
observe the same thing twice.  Qualitative researchers reject the idea of repeatability by 
arguing that if you are measuring twice, you are measuring two different things.  The 
qualitative notion of dependability emphasizes that the researcher account for the 
ever-changing context within which research occurs.  With dependability, the researcher 
is responsible for describing the changes that occur in the setting and how these changes 
affect the way the researcher approached the study (Trochim 2001, p. 163).  
In the course of the study several changes occurred.  CSX, the marketplace that 
began this research, folded.  Since we did not have a successful marketplace with high 
membership and high use, we had to add National Trucking Exchange as one of the four 
marketplaces in the study.  The original research design required we interview four 
participant organizations within each marketplace.  Retail Matrix was critical to the 
study because they provided an example of a marketplace that was never functional and 
had a short existence period.  However, no buyers or sellers joined Retail Matrix.  As 
such, we had to modify the research design to include organizations that were close to 
joining.  The two marketplaces still in existence, with high membership and high use, 
changed their value propositions to support electronic procurement of existing contracts.  
This is contrary to the original definition of an open e-marketplace where anyone can 
buy from anyone else.  We collected information on this change because it reflected 
what was occurring in reality.  We incorporated these insights into our research findings.  
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In addition, as Appendix A shows, we were originally investigating what drives critical 
mass. We defined critical mass as a marketplace having enough buyer and seller member 
organizations to sustain.   As we began conducting the field studies, we found our 
informants could not define what critical mass was for their marketplace or how they 
would know when they achieved it.  As such, we changed our first research question to, 
“What drives marketplace membership?”  We suggest using the findings of what drives 
marketplace research as a starting point in an investigation of B2B e-marketplace critical 
mass drivers.   
Confirmability refers to the degree to which the results could be confirmed or 
corroborated by others (Trochim 2001, p. 163).  This execution of this research includes 
several steps enhancing confirmability.  In executing this research, the primary 
researcher conducted field visits, and entered and analyzed the field notes.  In preparing 
the study’s findings, the primary researcher searched the existing data for negative 
instances contradicting the findings.  The primary researcher also searched previous 
research for negative instances contradicting the findings and positive instances 
supporting the findings.  In addition, secondary researchers challenged the primary 
researcher’s results.  The secondary researchers suggested other ways of explaining and 
depicting the findings.  In defending these results, the primary researcher would go back 
to the data and evaluate the alternative explanations.   
4. 5.   CONCLUSION  
The chapter explains how we conducted our research.  This research began in 
August of 2000.  This was the early stage of the EC boom.  While the industry press 
releases indicated industry’s involvement with EC, academics knew little about the 
phenomenon.  As such, a grounded theory approach was the best way to determine and 
investigate the relevant e-marketplace issues. 
The investigation included several stages.  First, we interviewed executives, 
observed meetings, and reviewed documents to understand B2B e-marketplaces.  After 
initially coding the field notes, we determined several pressing challenges facing 
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e-marketplaces.   To further investigate these challenges we developed research 
questions, research models, interview guides, and a research design.  We then reentered 
the field interviewing executives from four B2B e-marketplaces, four organizations 
participating in each e-marketplace, and one organization choosing not to participate in 
each e-marketplace.     
Our investigation involves nearly fifty interviews with B2B e-marketplaces, 
member organizations, and organizations choosing not to join the e-marketplace.  While 
many member organizations are multinational, the field visits were in the United States.   
Chapter VI describes the four B2B e-marketplaces in our study. 
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CHAPTER V 
5 PRELIMINARY RESEARCH MODELS 
This chapter outlines three research models guiding our investigation of this 
study’s three research questions.  
 
 Research Question 1:  What drives business-to-business (B2B) 
electronic marketplace (e-marketplace) membership?  This question 
defines membership as organizations joining a marketplace.  
 
  Research Question 2:  What marketplace characteristics drive 
B2B e-marketplace use?  This question defines use as transaction 
frequency and transaction volume.  It measures use by frequency and 
volume of transactions executed via the marketplaces.   
 
 Research Question 3:  What organizational characteristics impact 
an organization’s B2B e-marketplace use?  This question defines use 
as transaction frequency and transaction volume.  It measures use by 
an organization’s transaction frequency, transaction volume, and self-
categorization.   
 
 
Each research model proposes a research question and several drivers impacting 
different case outcomes on the research question.  Each model is based on findings from 
the initial eighteen months of fieldwork. Complete explanatory models would include an 
unmanageable number of variables.  Therefore, the models’ drivers are the ones that 
repeatedly surfaced in the initial field studies.  After developing the models, we 
reviewed the literature to see if the drivers have been empirically proven in other B2B 
e-marketplace studies or other interorganizational information systems (IOIS) studies.  
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See Chapters II and III.  If the variables have been proven in previous IOIS studies, we 
include them in discussing our model.  Because of the limited empirical research in this 
area, the literature review also includes trade press articles.   
Cavaye and Cragg (1995) and Reich and Benbasat (1990) use the system as the 
unit of analysis.  The preliminary research models, based on research questions 1 and 2 
use the system as the unit of analysis. We define system as the marketplace.  This 
encompasses the technical infrastructure by which marketplace transactions are 
conducted, but does not focus solely on this technical infrastructure.   Research question 
3 uses the organization as the unit of analysis.   
Like Cavaye and Cragg’s and Reich and Benbasat’s work, the models take a 
process view  (Markus and Robey 1988).  Our models recognize that high marketplace 
membership does not guarantee high marketplace use.  The model further recognizes 
that the presence of drivers posited in the model does not guarantee high achievement of 
membership or use. 
5. 1.   WHAT DRIVES B2B E-MARKETPLACE MEMBERSHIP? 
The first research question investigates what drives B2B e-marketplace 
membership.  The initial field research indicates B2B e-marketplaces must achieve 
buyer and seller membership as a first step in achieving marketplace use.  The initial 
field research further indicates attracting marketplace members is a stumbling block.  
The model, Figure 6, posits a number of marketplace membership drivers.   
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Figure 6  Preliminary Research Model 1: B2B E-marketplace Membership Drivers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researchers have not investigated factors influencing marketplace membership.  
However, a number of IOIS studies identify the importance of achieving a critical mass 
of members.   Lee and Clark’s (1996a) electronic markets (e-markets) work explains 
without critical mass usage is unlikely to spread and may end.  Several other IOIS 
studies (Cavaye and Cragg 1995, O'Callaghan et al. 1992, Premkumar et al. 1997, Reich 
and Benbasat 1990, Rogers 1995, Runge 1985, Runge 1988, Tumolo 2001) mention the 
importance of achieving a critical mass of members.   Critical mass theory posits if a 
network cannot obtain an installed base equal to the largest equilibrium network size, it 
will have to exit from the market if it cannot surpass the critical mass and become 
self-sustaining.    
The research measures marketplace membership by asking respondents how 
many organizations are currently part of the marketplace.    
B2B 
 E-MARKETPLACE 
MEMBERSHIP 
Independent 
Ownership 
Structure  
 
Relative 
Advantage 
 
External 
Pressure 
Business 
Partner 
Encouragement
Business 
Environment 
Encouragement
 
Industry 
Support 
System 
Marketing and 
Promotion 
 
Key Player 
Involvement 
    75 
 
 
 
Preliminary research model 1 posits several B2B e-marketplace membership 
drivers.  These include:    
 system marketing and promotion 
 relative advantage 
 external pressure 
o business environment encouragement 
o business partner encouragement 
 key player involvement  
 industry support 
 independent ownership structure.  
 
The paragraphs below define each driver and cite IOIS studies empirically 
linking these drivers to IOIS adoption.   IOIS adoption studies are cited because previous 
IOIS adoption did not require membership as e-marketplace adoption does.  The 
paragraphs below cite drivers proven in an array of IOIS contexts (COSS, EDI, EC) as  
support for the model since a B2B e-marketplace is a type of IOIS and little B2B 
e-marketplace empirical work exists.  Since some drivers can be measured in multiple 
ways, refer to the interview guide in the appendix for more detail on measures for each 
driver.   
Many authors (Cavaye and Cragg 1995, Hope et al. 2001, Iacovou et al. 1995, 
Reich and Benbasat 1990, Runge 1985, Runge 1988)mention system marketing and 
promotion as an adoption facilitator.  System marketing and promotion refers to making 
target organizations aware of the marketplace and aware that the marketplace would like 
these organizations to be a part of the marketplace.   
Several customer-oriented strategic system studies  (Cavaye and Cragg 1995, 
Reich and Benbasat 1990, Runge 1985, Runge 1988)link system marketing and system 
promotion to adoption.  Reich and Benbasat propose customer education, customer 
support, marketing programs, and customer-oriented strategic system support facilitate 
adoption.  Reich and Benbasat (1990) also find lack of sales force training affects 
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marketing efforts and discriminates between high and low adoption rates.  Iacovou et 
al.’s (1995) electronic data interchange (EDI) case studies link promotional efforts to 
small business adoption.  Hope et al.’s (2001) case studies and surveys in the transport 
and logistics industry find that system marketing and promotion facilitates B2B EC 
development.  Hope et al. (2001) propose three B2B EC development stages:   (1) 
adopting/updating internal resources, (2) developing interconnectedness, and (3) 
achieving a virtual corporation.  Hope et al. did not specify in what stage marketing and 
system promotion is important.   
The model posits perceived relative advantage drives marketplace membership.  
Rogers defines perceived relative advantage as “the degree an innovation is perceived as 
being better than the idea it supersedes” (Rogers 1995, p. 213).  Given this definition, we 
also include studies citing perceived benefit as support for the model.  In the model, we 
elaborate Roger’s definition by defining relative advantage as the degree a B2B 
e-marketplace’s value proposition fills a need within organizations or improves existing 
organizational operations. 
Several studies link perceived relative advantage to system adoption (Chwelos et 
al. 2001, Iacovou et al. 1995, Lee and Clark 1996b, O'Callaghan et al. 1992)  and use 
(Grewal et al. 2001, Premkumar et al. 1994).   
Three studies link relative advantage variations to EDI adoption.  O'Callaghan et 
al.’s (1992) EDI adoption decision investigation indicates a significant relationship 
between perceived relative advantage over present systems and EDI adoption decisions.  
Iacovou et al. (1995) find a relationship between perceived benefits and EDI adoption.  
Chwelos et al. (2001) find a significant relationship between perceived benefits and EDI 
adoption intention.     
Two studies link relative advantage to EDI diffusion.  Premkumar et al.  (1994) 
link relative advantage to EDI adaptation and internal diffusion.  Adaptation is the initial 
use of EDI and internal diffusion is the extent of EDI integration into organizational 
activities.  Ramamurthy et al.   (1999) link benefit potential to internal integration.  They 
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define internal integration as “the extent EDI interfaces with other internal IS 
applications and work processes”  (p. 257). 
Studies link relative advantage variations to B2B e-marketplace adoption and 
use.  Lee and Clark (1996b) link increased efficiency and effectiveness to B2B 
e-marketplace adoption.  Grewal et al. (2001) link B2B e-marketplace adoption fueled 
by efficiency motivations to marketplace use.   
Many authors  (Cavaye and Cragg 1995, Chwelos et al. 2001, Crook and Kumar 
1998, Damsgaard and Lyytinen 1998, Grewal et al. 2001, Iacovou et al. 1995, 
Premkumar and Ramamurthy 1995, Premkumar et al. 1997, Ramamurthy et al. 1999, 
Reich and Benbasat 1990) link external pressure to varying IOIS stages.  The model 
defines external pressure as a business environment encouraging B2B e-marketplace 
membership and/or member organizations requesting trading partners participate in the 
marketplace.  We operationalize the business environment encouraging marketplace 
involvement by noting the marketplace’s formation date.  In the few years before the 
January 2001 “dot.com” crash, everyone was enamored with technology and Internet 
capabilities.  As a result, the business environment encouraged organizations’ EC 
involvement.  We further operationalize business environment encouragement by 
looking for comments like “we have to get into marketplaces because everyone else is”  
and “Wall Street favors organizations with e-business strategies.”  We determine the 
presence of trading partner request as a B2B e-marketplace membership  driver by 
looking for comments like “we joined the marketplace because our trading partner 
asked.” 
Two studies (Cavaye and Cragg 1995, Reich and Benbasat 1990) in the COSS 
context link varying external pressure definitions to system development.  These studies 
are relevant to our model because development decisions are similar to adoption 
decisions as they both recognize a system need.   Reich and Benbasat (1990) show 
competitive pressure relates to COSS development.  The authors find systems developed 
in environments where rivalry among competitors is very high, organizations are 
concerned rivals are developing systems, and a strong threat from new entrants exists.  
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Cavaye and Cragg  (1995) find mixed results for competitive pressure as a system 
development facilitator.  The authors define competitive pressure as the extent industry 
leaders are implementing the system and the implementing organization’s realization 
they need to implement a similar system to remain competitive.   
Several EDI studies (Chwelos et al. 2001, Crook and Kumar 1998, Damsgaard 
and Lyytinen 1998, Iacovou et al. 1995, Premkumar and Ramamurthy 1995, Premkumar 
et al. 1997) link varying external pressure definitions to EDI adoption.  Iacovou et al.’s 
(1995) case studies find a significant relationship between external pressure and EDI 
adoption.  In Iacovou et al.’s studies, external pressure refers to organizational 
environment influences, including competitive pressure and trading partner imposition.  
Competitive pressure refers to others in the industry implementing EDI.  Trading partner 
imposition is a function of the trading partners’ potential power and influence strategy.   
Premkumar and Ramamurthy  (1995) find competitive pressure and exercised 
power discriminate between firms with proactive and reactive EDI adoption approaches.  
They find firms with proactive EDI adoption approaches experience greater adaptation, 
more trading partner connectivity, and better EDI integration with internal information 
systems applications.  We include this study as support for our model because it shows a 
link between external pressure components and adoption.   
Premkumar et al. (1997) find competitive pressure discriminates EDI adopters 
from nonadopters.  The authors define competitive pressure as “an environment in which 
there is a constant need for firms to evaluate advances in information technology to gain 
competitive advantage or because of strategic necessity” (p. 110). 
Crook and Kumar’s (1998) grounded theory EDI study shows coercion, in the 
form of large powerful organizations requiring trading partners use EDI, as a strategy for 
achieving EDI use.  Even through Crook and Kumar’s study links coercion to achieving 
trading partner use, we include it as support for our model because an organization has 
to adopt EDI before they can use it.   
Damsgaard and Lyytinen (1998) find the “herd effect,” defined as adopting EDI 
because everyone else is, influences EDI adoption.   
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Ramamurthy et al. (1999) find competitive pressure influences EDI diffusion.  
The authors define competitive pressure as entrenched competition threats.  The authors 
define EDI diffusion as internal and external integration.  Internal integration is the 
extent EDI interfaces with other internal information systems’ applications and work 
processes.  External integration is the extent of EDI use with trading partners in terms of 
scope of services and penetration in these transactions. We include this study as support 
for our model as organizations must adopt EDI for it to be diffused.  
Chwelos et al. (2001) find external pressure facilitates EDI adoption intentions.  
The authors define external pressure as influences arising from the organization’s 
competitive environment.   Of these sources, competitive pressure and enacted trading 
partner power have significant relationships with external pressure.  Chwelos et al. 
define competitive pressure as “EDI’s ability to maintain or increase competitiveness 
within the industry” (p. 307).  The authors define enacted trading partner power as “the 
strength of the influence strategy (e.g., rewards and threats) used to exercise potential 
power” (p. 309).    
In the B2B e-marketplace context, Grewal et al. (2001) find organizations adopt 
B2B e-marketplaces for legitimacy motivations.  They define legitimacy motivations as 
external environment encouragement.   
Our model posits key player involvement drives B2B e-marketplace 
membership.  A standard definition for key player is an organization having more sales 
than most other industry organizations or an organization with few competitors in either 
production or consumption of industry goods.  Tumolo’s (2001) B2B EC exchange 
article explains most exchanges have failed because key industry players were not equity 
members.  In defining key players, we use our informants’ definitions by asking who 
they think the key industry players are and how they define key.   
The model posits industry support drives marketplace membership.  We 
operationalize industry support by trade organization support of the marketplace.  
The model posits independent ownership structure drives B2B e-marketplace 
membership.  We operationalize independent ownership structure as a separate 
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governance process and a management team not currently employed by industry 
organizations.  Memishi (2001) proposes an exchange’s success is contingent on the 
founding companies distancing themselves from the exchange as organizations will be 
hesitant to join competitor-operated exchanges.   
5. 2.   WHAT MARKETPLACE CHARACTERISTICS DRIVE B2B 
E-MARKETPLACE USE?  
The second research question considers B2B e-marketplace characteristics 
driving marketplace use.  This question surfaced in the initial field studies.  We found 
organizations signing up to participate in B2B e-marketplaces, but then not using the 
marketplace because of the marketplace’s characteristics.   
 
Figure 7    Preliminary Research Model 2:  Marketplace Characteristics Driving                 
B2B E-marketplace Use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
System use as a dependent variable has a long history in information systems 
literature;  for a review see Delone and McLean (1992).  We define use as the frequency 
and volume of transactions executed over the B2B EC marketplace.  We also measure 
use by the frequency and volume of transactions executed via the marketplaces.   We use 
cross-case analysis to determine what factors discriminate between high volume and low 
volume marketplaces.   
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Preliminary research model 2, Figure 7, posits three marketplace characteristics 
drive marketplace use.  These include: compatibility, uniform standards, and trust. 
Compatibility is “the degree an innovation is perceived as being consistent with 
potential adopter’s existing values, past experiences, and needs” (Rogers 1995, p. 224).   
We operationalize compatibility as the degree a B2B e-marketplace integrates with 
existing industry operating procedures.  Specifically, does the B2B e-marketplace 
technology integrate with existing systems?  Do the business practices match existing 
business practices? 
Several studies (Han and Noh 1999-2000, Premkumar et al. 1994, Ramamurthy 
et al. 1999, Tumolo 2001) link compatibility to system use.  Premkumar et al. (1994) 
investigate compatibility’s role in varying EDI diffusion stages.  They break 
compatibility into organizational and technical dimensions.  Organizational 
compatibility considers work practices.  Technical compatibility refers to internal and 
external information technology applications.  Considerations include hardware 
platforms and network protocols.  The authors find relationships between compatibility 
and adaptation, with adaptation defined as initial EDI use.  The authors also find 
relationships between technical compatibility and external diffusion, with external 
diffusion the extent the firm successfully links with external partners and converts its 
external transaction documents into electronic form.  Ramamurthy et al. (1999) link 
compatibility to external integration.  The authors define external integration as the 
extent of EDI use with trading partners in terms of scope of services and penetration in 
these transactions. 
Han and Noh (1999-2000) find systems that are inconvenient to use discourage 
EC growth.  We include this study in the model because inconvenient use fits with the 
definition of compatibility.  Tumolo’s (2001) thoughts further support technical 
compatibility as a marketplace use facilitator.  Tumolo comments the ability to integrate 
a company’s back office system seamlessly with exchanges is a  critical success factor. 
We define uniform standards as having a standard way of describing products.  
Several authors (Krovi 2001, Lee and Clark 1996a, Memishi 2001) note that currently 
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each company and each industry has a unique way of describing products.  Since B2B 
e-marketplaces are based on purchasing products without physical sight,  uniform 
standards would make marketplace product purchases less risky.  
The model posits trust drives marketplace use.  Trust refers to a reliance that 
promises made by the marketplace will be kept.  These promises include on time 
delivery, adequate product quality, and privacy.  This definition of trust is derived from 
Hart and Saunders (1997), who explain trust is anticipated optimistic behavior of other 
parties,  and Ring and Van de Ven  (1994), who explain trust is confidence in the 
goodwill of others.   
Hart and Saunders (1997) provide a theoretical framework and use a case study 
illustrating the importance of trust in whether and how EDI is used.  The authors 
hypothesize firms using persuasive mechanisms to influence their trading partners to 
adopt EDI achieve higher trust and integration levels. 
In the context of EC, Rosenbaum (2000) mentions trust’s importance and the 
need for technical and social means to build and maintain relations.  Using a case study 
and questionnaires, Tabor (2001) links trust to EC success in the context of an 
early-adopter airline.  Given that Tabor defines success as use, we include this study as 
support for the model. 
Several authors (Lee and Clark 1996a, Tumolo 2001) link trust with B2B 
e-marketplaces.  Lee and Clark posit having a trusted third party for product evaluations 
as a critical success factor.  Tumolo  explains exchanges need to ensure participating 
suppliers are able to supply the quality and quantity of goods demanded and have the 
integrity to fulfill contracts.   
5. 3.   WHAT ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS IMPACT AN 
ORGANIZATION’S B2B E-MARKETPLACE USE? 
The third research question addresses organizational characteristics impacting an 
organization’s B2B e-marketplace use.  This question evolved from the initial field 
    83 
 
 
 
research, where we found seemingly similar organizations adopting the same B2B 
e-marketplace and achieving different use levels.  Some organizations were heavy users 
and some hardly used the marketplace.   
 
Figure 8    Preliminary Research Model  3:  Organizational Characteristics 
Impacting an Organization’s B2B E-marketplace Use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research model 3, Figure 8, posits a number of factors impact an organization’s 
e-marketplace use.  We define use as transaction volume and transaction frequency.  We 
measure use by an organization’s marketplace transaction frequency, transaction 
volume, and self-categorization.  We define a member organization as an organization 
that has agreed to buy products, sell products, and provide or gather information via the 
marketplace.  Since this section focuses on a particular organization’s marketplace use, 
we expand the literature review to include single organization systems, as well as IOIS.  
We use within-case analysis to determine organizational factors discriminating between 
high and low volume users within the same B2B e-marketplace.   
Preliminary research model 3, Figure 8, posits three organizational characteristics 
impact an organization’s B2B e-marketplace use.  These include top management 
support, champion existence, and adequate resources.   
Top management support refers to whether, in the period after deciding to 
participate in the B2B e-marketplace, a member organization’s management favors the 
organization using the marketplace.    
AN ORGANIZATION’S B2B 
E-MARKETPLACE USE 
Top 
Management 
Support 
Champion 
Existence 
Adequate 
Resources 
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Several studies link top management support to system adoption.  Reich and 
Benbasat’s (1990) case study indicates a relationship between top management support 
and COSS development and adoption.  Surveying executives, Grover (1993)finds top 
management support a strong COSS adoption facilitator.   
Premkumar and Ramamurthy’s (1995) EDI decision-making field survey links 
top management support to proactive system adoption and finds proactive system 
adoption leads to increased use.  Premkumar et al.’s 1997 EDI field study links top 
management support to system adoption. 
Several studies link top management support to varying aspects of diffusion.  In a 
study of Materials Resource Planning implementation, White (1980) links top 
management support to successful implementation and use.  Roberts and Barrar’s (1992) 
Materials Resource Planning implementation case studies find a strong relationship 
between top management support and implementation.  Ruppel and Howard’s survey 
(1998) finds top management support a facilitator of telework adoption and diffusion. 
Cox and Ghoneim’s (1996) survey and case study finds top management support 
influences the degree of EDI integration into internal business processes.  Ramamurthy 
et al.’s (1999) field surveys link internal support to EDI diffusion, defined as internal 
and external integration.  The authors define internal support as senior management 
support and information technology function support.   Using case studies and a brief 
survey, Hope et al. (2001) find top management support a strong B2B EC success 
facilitator.  In Hope et al.’s mapping of factors to system stages, top management 
support is highly correlated with developing system interconnectedness.  Tabor’s (2001) 
EC success case study and survey finds management commitment strongly affects 
system use aspects. 
The model posits champion existence drives an organization’s B2B 
e-marketplace use.  Champion existence refers to someone in the organization 
consistently pushing for the organization to use the B2B e-marketplace.   
Using a case approach to study telecommunication-based system adoption, 
Runge’s (1985, 1988) field notes mention champion existence a number of times.  
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However, he was unable to correlate champion existence with adoption. Reich and 
Benbasat’s (1990) case study indicates a relationship between champion existence and 
COSS development and adoption.  Using surveys, Grover (1993) finds champion 
existence a strong COSS adoption facilitator.  Using case studies, Cavaye and Cragg 
(1995) find mixed support for champion existence facilitating designing and building 
customer-oriented interorganizational systems. 
Ruppel and Howard’s (1998) telework survey finds a significant relationship 
between champion existence and technology adoption and diffusion.   
The model posits adequate resources impact an organization’s B2B 
e-marketplace use.  We define adequate resources as dedicating time and money to 
incorporate the marketplace into the organization’s existing processes.   
Using case study and ethnography, Kautz (1996) finds a relationship between 
resource allocation and an electronic mail system implementation.  In small business 
EDI adoption case studies, Iacovou et al. (1995) find a relationship between financial 
and technological assistance and adoption.  Financial and technological assistance refers 
to whether EDI initiators provide their trading partners these resources.  Eze and Seong 
(2001) find a relationship between adequate resources and EC deployment for Singapore 
enterprises.   
Some references link top management, champion existence, and adequate 
resources to system adoption.  We agree there is a relationship between these facilitators 
and adoption, but the initial field data and several of the studies listed above link these 
facilitators to system use.  As such, the model proposes a relationship between an 
organization’s B2B e-marketplace use and top management support, champion 
existence, and adequate resources. 
5. 4.   CONCLUSION 
This chapter discusses preliminary research models guiding the field research 
inquiries into three research questions.   
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 Research Question 1:  What drives B2B e-marketplace 
membership? 
 Research Question 2:  What marketplace characteristics drive 
B2B e-marketplace use? 
 Research Question 3:  What organizational characteristics impact 
an organization’s B2B e-marketplace use? 
 
These models are based on eighteen months of unstructured interviews, participant 
observations, and document reviews.  This phase spanned from August 2000 until 
January 2002.  After developing the questions and models, we reviewed the literature to 
see if the research questions had been investigated and if so what were the outcomes.  
The review indicated limited B2B e-marketplace literature exists.  Since an 
e-marketplace is a type of IOIS, we expanded the review to include IOIS literature.  
Because question three is at the organizational level, we also reviewed organizational 
level information system studies.   
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CHAPTER VI 
6 BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS  
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE DESCRIPTIONS 
A business-to-business (B2B) electronic marketplace (e-marketplace) is a 
network facilitated by telecommunications created to enable multiple buyers and sellers 
to exchange information and complete transactions (Zwass 1999) for goods and services 
in virtual locations.  Each B2B e-marketplace has business models and value 
propositions.  Business models address how marketplaces generate revenue  and include 
(Robinson 2003):  products and services offered, activities performed to deliver products 
and services, members, revenue collection strategies, technology, and strategic partners.  
Value propositions address what benefits marketplaces provide to members and 
stakeholders.   
In the paragraphs below we discuss the four B2B e-marketplaces in the study, 
including their inception, business model, value proposition, and evaluation.  Data from 
this discussion comes from the field visits and external document reviews, which 
occurred primarily between May and November 2002.   
Table 7 shows evaluation criteria for each marketplace in the study.  Existence 
period begins when the marketplace announces its existence and begins soliciting 
membership.  In most cases, this occurs before the marketplace is incorporated and open 
for business.   Operation period ends when the marketplace shuts down, as indicated by 
marketplace publications or court proceedings.  Number of members identifies how 
many organizations are part of the marketplace.   A corporate e-marketplace membership 
decision can encompass a corporation’s many affiliates.  For example, Gulf Coast Oil 
Corporation’s decision to become a member of C-Store Exchange (CSX) added one 
member with 3,500 users to CSX’s marketplace.  For the first two cases, we measured 
use with transaction volume.  The other two marketplaces never conducted transactions.  
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CSX measured use by the number of stores using the e-marketplace daily.  Retail 
Matrix’s marketplace was never functional.  As such, the e-marketplace was never used.   
 
Table 7  B2B E-marketplace Evaluation 
 NATIONAL 
TRUCKING 
EXCHANGE (NTX) 
PEGASUS C-STORE 
EXCHANGE  
(CSX) 
RETAIL 
MATRIX 
Existence 
Period 
1995- 
present 
June 2000- 
present 
March 2000- 
October 31, 2002 
April 
2000-June 
2002 
No. of  
Members 
Over 2,500 Over 400 4 3 
Use Over 10,000 
transactions/day 
Around 1,000 
transactions/day 
3,500 Gulf Coast Oil 
convenience stores 
use daily 
0 transactions 
 
Table 8 categorizes each B2B e-marketplace in the study based on each 
marketplace’s intended business model and value proposition. Chapter II presented an 
array of B2B e-marketplace categorization schemes.  Since no scheme has yet achieved 
dominance, we categorize the four marketplaces using each scheme.  The table’s author 
proposed scheme column notes the categorization scheme and the author proposing the 
scheme.  The value range scheme column shows the different values within the author 
proposed scheme.  The table shows that in some cases, a marketplace did not fit into any 
of the proposed schemes.  In other cases, an e-marketplace fit into multiple schemes.   
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6. 1.   NATIONAL TRUCKING EXCHANGE (NTX) 
While working for a logistics company shipping McDonald’s supplies, Gary 
Roag noticed as trucks delivered products along their routes, their remaining trailer 
capacity went unused.  Solving this unused capacity problem led Gary Roag and a group 
of venture capitalists to form NTX in 1995.   
NTX developed slick technology to help shippers and carriers make use of 
unused capacity.  Marketing NTX involved presenting shippers and carriers the idea and 
technology.  However, these presentations had little success in achieving shipper and 
carrier adoption.  After going nowhere for five years, NTX changed marketing 
strategies, hiring sales representatives who were already working in the transportation 
industry.   This group knew how the transportation industry worked at the street level 
and conveyed to technology designers industry operations and industry needs.  Having 
industry contacts and presenting NTX in terms understandable to shippers and carriers, 
this group was effective at attracting potential shippers and carriers and influencing them 
to join and use NTX.  
6.1.1. Value Proposition and Business Model 
NTX sells unused truck capacity.  Diesel trucks (carriers) pick up products 
(loads) at one point and deliver them to another.   The load may not fill the truck’s entire 
trailer.  After delivering the load, the truck could return to its origination empty.  Both of 
these scenarios result in unused truck capacity.  If the truck were full, there would be 
less waste and the carrier’s profits would increase.  NTX is a B2B e-marketplace 
addressing this problem. 
NTX connects carriers and shippers using technology.  NTX allows businesses 
with loads to ship by diesel transport to post their needs on NTX’s website.  These 
people are called shippers.  NTX helps diesel transport carriers find these loads.  In 
posting a load to ship, a shipper enters shipment information including pick up time, 
delivery time, weight, refrigeration needs, and amount the shipper is willing to pay for 
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the load’s transport.  The load posts to NTX’s website immediately.  Carriers view the 
website by geographic region.  After evaluating load criteria, they can accept loads 
meeting their specifications.  In most cases, carriers have a central dispatch that finds 
loads.  When a carrier is sent to pick up a load, central dispatch views NTX’s website to 
see loads available along the carrier’s route.  If the existing load does not fill the truck, 
central dispatch can find other loads on NTX to fill the truck.  Central dispatch also 
looks for loads to fill the truck once it delivers its original load and needs to return to its 
origin.  This is called a backhaul.  Once the carrier or central dispatch finds the load, 
they click the NTX screen to accept.  NTX immediately sends email notification of the 
load’s acceptance to the shipper.  The shipper then prepares the load for pick up.   
Miles traveled drives shipping costs.  When a shipper has to ship less than a 
truckload of freight, the shipping price must still cover the miles the truck and driver 
travel. Engaging an entire truck to move less than a truckload full of product is 
expensive.  NTX is helpful in these situations.  By bringing together shippers, NTX 
allows carriers to consolidate a number of loads into one truck.  Having one full truck 
lowers shipper costs, spreading mileage and driver costs over a number of shipments.  
Carrier profits increase as once costs are covered additional loads on the truck are profit.  
One company in the study uses NTX to move all of their less than truckload freight.  
NTX offers them better shipping rates than they could achieve by negotiating shipping 
with carriers directly.     
 In transporting products, most companies have prenegotiated contracts with 
carriers routinely transporting their products.  However, non-routine shipments, either 
occasional shipments or shipments falling outside their carrier’s shipping areas, requires 
examining alternative shipping methods.  This process involves calling shippers, giving 
load information, and requesting prices.  Because of quote variations and carrier 
availability, this process is time-consuming and requires calling a number of carriers.  
NTX replaces calling multiple carriers, enabling shippers to post load criteria on a 
website for carriers to view and accept.  In addition, by providing a mechanism to post 
bid loads and minimum prices, NTX lowers shipper transportation costs and increases 
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carrier profits.  NTX lowers shipper transportation costs as shippers experiment with the 
system, posting the lowest price possible to move the freight.  For carriers, with the same 
route as the shipper’s load, a low price is better than an empty truck.   
One company in the study developed an excel spreadsheet for all transactions 
completed over NTX.  The spreadsheet listed by load their usual shipping costs, costs 
using NTX, and savings.  The company’s savings were substantial.  However, their 
spreadsheet did not include labor savings from improving the request for price process.   
Most carriers try and fill unused truck capacity by having a number of 
prenegotiated contracts in a region and using broker services like “dial-a-truck.”   In the 
“dial-a-truck” model, carriers call a number to see if there are shipments to fill their 
unused truck capacity in the area.  These mechanisms are not as efficient, dynamic, or 
timely as NTX’s internet-based model. 
NTX’s core value proposition offers several by-product value propositions, 
including  simplifying accounting practices and improving reports.  When a shipper uses 
NTX to ship products, the shipper gets one monthly invoice from NTX.  Not using NTX 
and purchasing freight from a variety of carriers, involves processing billing statements 
for each load and each carrier.   NTX provides each shipper a report showing savings 
from using NTX.  The report compares the shipper’s expected price to NTX’s transacted 
price.  NTX reports also allow load tracking down to the stock keeping unit (SKU) level.   
NTX helps carriers manage accounts receivable by reducing the number of accounts 
carriers have to collect.  Carriers receive bi-monthly checks from NTX for all NTX 
tendered shipments.   
Unlike many other B2B e-marketplaces, NTX does not charge shippers or 
carriers membership fees.  Joining NTX is free.  NTX makes money by taking a 
percentage of each tendered load’s cost.  For example, a shipper may post a load they are 
willing to pay a carrier $1,000 to transport.  When carriers view the load on NTX’s 
website, they do not see the $1,000 the shipper is willing to pay, but a shipping price 
reduced by NTX’s fee.  This mechanism allows both parties to obtain what they consider 
the load’s market price, while allowing NTX to receive their fee. 
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Joining NTX requires carrier certification.  Passing certification requires 
maintaining insurance and current inspection.  Carriers and shippers must also follow 
NTX’s business rules.   Carriers must pick up and deliver loads on time and in good 
condition.  Shippers must have loads ready for pick up at the specified time.  Violating 
these business rules results in a $200 NTX imposed fine.  NTX also has a “three strikes 
you’re out” rule.  If a party violates these business rules three times, NTX bans further 
participation. 
Based on the Internet, anyone with an Internet connection and a portable 
computer can access NTX.   
6.1.2. Evaluation 
Operating since 1995, NTX has over 2,500 shippers and carriers (NTE 2002a, 
NTE 2002b), tendering over 10,000 transactions daily.  All these tendered transactions 
do not exactly occur in a pure open B2B e-marketplace scenario.  NTX started as a pure 
open B2B e-marketplace matching shippers and carriers.  However, when their 
customers requested using the marketplace to solicit quotes and procure freight from the 
customers’ existing carriers, NTX modified their marketplaces to accommodate this 
request.  Now, a large number of transactions come from firms like Target and Dal-Tile 
who use NTX as an electronic facilitator for their existing carriers.  In this scenario, if a 
firm’s existing carriers aren’t available, the firm uses NTX to procure freight from 
another set of company-selected carriers.  If this tier of carriers is unavailable, firms post 
loads to the open marketplace for pick up by any carrier.   
This changing use and definition of a B2B e-marketplace accounts partially for 
NTX’s success in getting shippers and carriers to join and use NTX.  Early on, NTX had 
a difficult time getting carriers and shippers to join.  Shippers did not want to jeopardize 
their carrier relationships.  Having a long history of doing business together, shippers 
trust their carriers to deliver their products on time and in good condition.  Shippers 
believe these relationships will make the carriers available when the shippers are “in a 
bind” and need to ship something fast and far.  On a personal level, people working for 
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shippers and carriers had gotten to know one another in the freight tendering process.  
They did not want to replace these personal relationships with a computer-facilitated 
process.  
Carriers oppose joining NTX because adding a middleman facilitating easy price 
comparison intuitively lowers carrier profits.  Carriers discourage shipper NTX use 
emphasizing the importance of shipper-carrier relationships, especially when shippers 
need something special.  Carriers also emphasize trust explaining their history in 
delivering products on time and intact. 
NTX began achieving significant shipper and carrier membership after the year 
2000 (Y2K). NTX’s membership doubled to 1,175 companies in the first quarter of 2001 
compared to the first quarter of 2000.  Post Y2K, many corporate information 
technology departments were under pressure to deliver some savings.  Corporations had 
spent lots of money preparing for Y2K, and the mentality in many corporations was that 
all of this money had been wasted as companies and countries that didn’t prepare for 
Y2K had no problems.  Around this same time, NTX had hired sales representatives 
with transportation industry experience and contacts.  These sales representatives 
showed large corporations like Target and Dal-Tile how they could save substantially by 
using NTX to manage freight procurement.  These large shippers told their carriers they 
wanted to do business with them over NTX.  Once these carriers joined NTX to maintain 
their large shippers’ contracts, their excess capacity became available for other shippers 
using NTX.  NTX trained shippers and carriers. 
To NTX’s surprise, less freight capacity has also contributed to their success in 
getting shippers and carriers to join and use NTX.  In the aftermath of September 11, 
2001, companies started reducing the size of their fleets. With less freight capacity 
available, freight rates increased.  Many carriers were in long-term contracts with their 
shippers.  Once the carriers saw freight rates increase, they began breaking their 
long-term fixed price contracts and using NTX because NTX was paying carriers better 
rates.  In addition, shippers started using NTX because finding carriers was so difficult.  
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NTX thought excess freight was their biggest strength.  In retrospect, freight shortages 
helped NTX achieve high membership and use.   
A strategy NTX uses to continue to sell excess freight capacity in 
open-marketplace situations is not disclosing to shippers and carriers one another’s 
identity.  Carriers are only given shippers’ addresses.  From NTX’s perspective, this 
keeps carrier sales people from soliciting this business from shippers.  For carriers and 
shippers,  in an effort to keep relationships from being damaged, this keeps each party 
from knowing the other is doing business over the marketplace.   
6.1.3. Marketplace Categories 
Table 8 shows B2B e-marketplace categories that apply to NTX.  Because 
unused truck capacity can be used across industries, NTX is a horizontal marketplace.  
Since NTX is open to any industry participant, it is a public B2B e-marketplace.  The 
Boston Consulting Group report (Andrew et al. 2000) says industry consortia found 
public e-marketplaces.  Even though venture capitalists founded NTX, we categorize 
NTX as public since being open to any industry participant is the salient characteristic of 
a public e-marketplace.  Categorizing transportation as an operating supply, NTX fits 
Kaplan and Sawhney’s (2000) maintenance, repair, and operation hub and yield manager 
categories.  NTX enables both systematic and spot transportation purchasing.  Public 
bidding electronic marketplaces facilitate supplier identification for asset capacity 
exchanges.  Since NTX facilitates shippers identifying carriers with unused capacity 
from member firms, NTX is a public bidding marketplace.  Owned by venture 
capitalists, NTX is an independently owned marketplace. 
6. 2.   PEGASUS 
In 1999, utility industry deregulation was looming.  Utilities had never faced 
competition.  They were always able to pass expenses along to consumers with rate 
increases.  They knew swift supply chain and purchasing improvements were necessary 
to survive in the approaching competitive environment.  To prepare for deregulation, 
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utilities engaged supply chain consultants.  Six utilities engaged Gary Cowans, a 
Houston, Texas-based Pete Marvick consultant, to help them prepare for deregulation.  
These six utilities supply 60% of North America’s energy.  Cowans realized the utilities 
had similar problems and solutions for one could help another.  He also realized by 
working together streamlining supplier production costs, negotiating pricing, and 
improving purchasing practices, utilities could swiftly reduce operating costs.  Utilities 
had to be careful about collaborating, as they did not want to violate the 
Robinson-Patman Act by being perceived as engaging in anticompetitive actions like 
price fixing.  At this same time, corporate America was enamored with integrating the 
Internet into business practices.  Wall Street was considering Internet initiatives in 
company evaluations.  Many companies were coming together to do business with the 
Internet in B2B e-marketplaces.  All of this led to twenty-one utilities forming a B2B 
e-marketplace for the utility industry -- Pegasus.   
6.2.1. Value Proposition and Business Model 
Pegasus has not emphasized the B2B e-marketplace.  They emphasize several 
value propositions believing marketplace use will result from value proposition 
adoption.   Pegasus’ value propositions include sourcing, auctions, business process 
services, and capital asset services.  Pegasus also offers consulting services that help the 
utilities use the e-marketplace to improve their supply chain.  Table 9 shows Pegasus’ 
value propositions by use level and revenue source.  Pegasus’ business model includes 
an array of revenue sources for each value proposition.   
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Table 9  Pegasus’ Service Offerings:  Volume and Revenue Source 
SERVICE 
OFFERING 
SOURCING 
 
 
 
AUCTIONS BUSINESS 
PROCESS 
SERVICES 
CAPITAL 
ASSET 
SERVICES 
VOLUME Not available Moved over 
$700 million 
in transactions 
3-10 
companies 
use hourly 
5,000 companies 
use daily 
REVENUE 
SOURCE 
Term-based 
commission 
Event-based 
commission 
and base rate 
Not available Commissions, 
transactions, and 
subscriptions 
 
Sourcing refers to purchasing items and includes private and collaborative 
purchases.  Private sourcing involves purchasing specific items for specific companies.  
One example is meters.  A utility that needs to purchase meters can engage Pegasus to 
negotiate the meter contract.  This arrangement occurs under the premise that because 
Pegasus employees have worked for the meter supplier, Pegasus can negotiate better 
pricing than a utility.  Collaborative sourcing occurs when Pegasus works with a number 
of utilities that need the same product or service from the same supplier.  Pegasus works 
with the utilities to streamline their product specifications and works with suppliers to 
reduce supply chain costs.  An example is Pegasus’ work with six utilities and a wood 
pole supplier. All six utilities use wood poles to deliver electricity; however, each utility 
gives the supplier different production specifications.  For example, some want pointed 
poles and some want poles with resin.  Producing this array of specifications increases 
manufacturer production costs.  Pegasus facilitated the utilities and the manufacturer 
coming together to create standardized product specifications for all six utilities, 
reducing supplier production costs, and lowering utility pricing.  For sourcing, Pegasus 
receives a commission based on the utilities’ savings over the contract term.   
Pegasus’ auctions are electronic bidding implementations of traditional auctions.  
Pegasus facilitates several auction types, including  forward, reverse, single, and 
multivariable.  In a typical auction, the utility will notify their suppliers that they are 
looking for bids on producing an item, such as a dragline.  Traditionally, suppliers 
submitted sealed envelope bids.  The utility evaluated the bids and chose a supplier.  
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Using an auction, the utility notifies suppliers about the auction.  The utility and the 
suppliers sign on to Pegasus’ auction system.  Suppliers enter their bids.  Suppliers can 
see their bid and everyone else’s bid.  However, they do not know who is bidding what 
amount.  Suppliers can lower their bid.  After a specified period of time, the auction ends 
and the utility chooses a supplier to manufacture their product.  As of June 2002, 
Pegasus had facilitated several hundred auctions, around 30 per month, moving over  
$700 million dollars in auction transactions.  Pegasus charges for auction facilitation on 
an event basis, but is moving towards charging a monthly fee for auction capabilities. 
Business process services help utilities solve an array of problems including  
virtual inventory, request for proposal, and workforce management.  Virtual inventory 
gives utilities visibility of available inventory in the industry.  This is useful because in 
providing electricity sometimes unforeseen events occur and utilities need electrical 
infrastructure quickly.  For example, in repairing hurricane damage in Florida, the virtual 
inventory service allows Florida utilities to see if other utilities have available electrical 
infrastructure.  Request for proposal automates traditional proposal processes by 
allowing utilities to electronically contact suppliers with business opportunities.  
Suppliers then enter their proposal online for utility evaluation.    Workforce 
management helps utilities manage temporary workers, including  required skills and 
time worked.  Pegasus estimates that between three and ten utilities use business process 
services hourly.    
Capital asset services is similar to virtual inventory, but is used for 
capital-intensive assets.  Utilities use capital asset services when they need something 
and their supplier is unable to produce it in the time period needed.  Often, suppliers 
require several years lead time to produce utility assets like turbine engines.  For 
example, Pegasus helped a utility in Australia in need of a turbine engine secure one 
from a utility in Turkmenistan.  Currently 5,000 companies use Pegasus’ capital asset 
services daily.  Pegasus does not include these companies in their number of 
marketplace members.  Pegasus charges based on commissions, transactions, and 
subscriptions. 
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Pegasus’ value propositions adopt a different view of the traditional B2B 
e-marketplace.  Traditionally, B2B e-marketplaces focus on bringing together 
populations of buying and selling organizations.  B2B e-marketplaces facilitate buyers 
shopping with the entire supplier population, easily comparing prices and products. 
E-marketplaces allow sellers to reach more buyers.  Many companies with professional 
procurement people do not want their procurement people shopping and making 
“maverick purchases.”  They have prenegotiated supplier contracts and want their buyers 
to do business with those suppliers.  This is the case in the utility industry.  Given this, 
Pegasus’ value propositions have developed around B2B e-marketplace implementations 
that allow buyers to see a limited number of suppliers and their company’s prenegotiated 
contract pricing and products. 
In forming Pegasus, the original twenty-one utilities put up $100 million dollars 
in financing.  Pegasus originally planned to charge suppliers a membership fee to join.  
Even though the fee was minimal, the suppliers resented the idea.  As a result, supplier 
membership in Pegasus is free. 
Figure 9 shows Pegasus’ marketplace technology.  Buyers and suppliers can 
connect to the Pegasus marketplace using an array of technologies.  Buyers and suppliers 
do not have to use the same technology.  A buyer can use one type of technology and a 
supplier can use a different type. 
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Figure 9  Pegasus’ Marketplace Technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.2. Evaluation 
Since opening for business January 2001, Pegasus has achieved total deal flow of 
$780 million and over 200,000 transactions (Staff 2002).  During the three months prior 
to our June 2002 field visit, Pegasus was averaging 1,000 transactions/day.  With over 
four hundred buyers and suppliers, Pegasus has achieved some success in attracting 
members.  However, Pegasus is struggling to achieve consistent, repetitive 
e-marketplace use.   
Several factors contribute to Pegasus’ ability to attract members.  First, Pegasus’ 
timing was good.  Pegasus formed in the height of the economic boom.  Utilities had 
money to invest in new projects.  Twenty-one utilities invested $100 million to join 
Pegasus.  Second, Pegasus was seen as a solution to a pressing industry problem—
upcoming deregulation.  Utilities felt they had to join Pegasus to improve their 
procurement practices and prepare for deregulation.  Third, Pegasus formed in the height 
of the EC boom when Wall Street was rewarding companies for EC involvement and 
punishing those without EC strategies.    Utilities saw Pegasus’ membership as a way to 
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develop an EC strategy.  Fourth, since utilities have historically not competed with one 
another, they were comfortable collaborating and had long-term relationships with one 
another.  They did not mind being part of an e-marketplace in which their future 
competitors were participating. 
Even though Pegasus attracted many members in record time, Pegasus has faced 
a number of challenges.  The most recent being the October 2002 resignation of their 
founder and Chief Executive Officer, Gary Cowans (Staff 2002) and the 50% turnover in 
the executive team between June 2002 and March 2003. 
Influencing member utilities to use Pegasus has been a challenge.  When the 
Pegasus marketplace was originally introduced in January 2001, the marketplace was not 
as efficient as the utilities’ existing procurement procedures.  The marketplace’s 
interface was similar to Amazon.com.  This interface required buyers to search for every 
item that they wished to purchase from the marketplace’s online catalogue.  For direct, 
frequently used materials (e.g., transformers and poles) the utilities’ existing systems are 
more automated.  Engineers use computer-aided design/computer-aided manufacturing 
to draw pictures of needed utility infrastructure.  The engineer then hits a button and an 
order to strategic vendors is automatically placed at prenegotiated prices.  For these 
types of products, the utilities’ existing procurement practices were much more efficient 
than Pegasus’ original interface and offerings.    
The other use challenge is utility buying practices.  Because utilities purchase 
many products and services, they have professional procurement shops comprised of 
professional buyers.  Buyers negotiate long-term purchasing agreements with suppliers.  
Purchasing agreements include price, delivery, and quality, but over time also include 
noncontractible services like in-warehouse stocking and supplier innovation on behalf of 
the utility.  The relationships developed as part of these agreements are long-term.  The 
utilities know their suppliers and the suppliers know the utility.  Both feel they can count 
on one another.  The premise of the traditional B2B e-marketplace business model is 
enabling a buyer to compare many suppliers.  Utility suppliers did not like this model as 
it forced them to compete on price alone.  They argued that they currently deliver more  
    102 
 
 
 
value to their customers than can be measured with price.  Utilities also did not want to 
jeopardize their supplier relationships for a cheaper supplier as they realized the 
noncontractible services in their existing supplier relationships were more important than 
choosing the cheapest supplier. 
Given that utility procurement departments preselect suppliers and prenegotiate 
supplier pricing, the concept of an open B2B e-marketplace where any buyer can 
purchase from any seller does not work in most situations.  Utilities want to do business 
with and maintain their long-term relationships with preselected suppliers.  Utilities do 
not want their buyers shopping suppliers to obtain a “better deal.”  Because these 
industry practices conflicted with Pegasus’ open e-marketplace concept, Pegasus had 
difficulty influencing member organizations to extensively use the marketplace.   
Pegasus’ main advantage in overcoming these challenges is the way they 
approached the marketplace.  Unlike many other B2B e-marketplaces, Pegasus did not 
focus on the technology.  They concentrated on solving supply chain problems and 
viewed the e-marketplace as the enabler; the transaction layer.  Pegasus’ staff is 
primarily composed of utility industry people, not technology people.  Pegasus assigns 
representatives to help each utility use Pegasus to solve their supply chain problems.  
Once Pegasus gets the utility working with them on the supply chain problem, 
e-marketplace use follows.  All of this change takes time. Often, Pegasus provides the  
utilities with a supply chain solution, such as streamlining buyer specifications on wood 
poles, and then collects a percentage of the savings on the solution.  The idea is that 
ultimately the utilities will use the marketplace to procure wood poles.  But, in the 
meantime, Pegasus collects a percentage of the savings from the wood pole solution.  
These types of revenue agreements have sustained Pegasus as they struggle with getting 
organizations to use the e-marketplace.  Only time will tell whether Pegasus succeeds.   
6.2.3. Marketplace Categories 
Table 8 shows B2B e-marketplace categories describing Pegasus.  Since Pegasus 
focuses on the utility industry, providing members industry specific products, 
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knowledge, and collaboration opportunities, Pegasus is a vertical marketplace.  Founded 
by an industry consortia and open to any industry player, Pegasus is a public 
marketplace.  Kaplan and Sawhney’s (2000) categories do not describe Pegasus since 
Pegasus does not focus on manufacturing inputs and is a vertical market.  Pegasus 
enables price aggregation since utilities can purchase large quantities and frequently 
ordered items from preselected suppliers and fixed prices.  Pegasus enables private 
negotiation where utilities procure production inputs at dynamic pricing using 
prescreened suppliers.  Pegasus also enables public bidding allowing utilities to identify 
suppliers from member firms for asset capacity exchanges.  Utilities use asset capacity 
exchanges when electricity infrastructure is down in one area because of unforeseen 
circumstances (e.g., tornado).  Formed by twenty-one utilities in the United States, 
Pegasus is partly participant-owned.  Member utilities have stock in and three rotating 
seats on Pegasus’ board. Four board members are not utility representatives.  Pegasus 
has a governance process separate from the member utilities.  
6. 3.   C-STORE EXCHANGE (CSX) 
Gulf Coast Oil’s retail sales manager, Karen Longoria, was struggling managing 
over 8,000 Gulf Coast Oil convenience stores, 1,000 Gulf Coast Oil owned and 7,000 
franchisees.  Some Gulf Coast Oil stores were clean, had in-stock, in-date, nicely 
displayed, and accurately priced products, and friendly clerks, and some were not.   
Longoria’s struggle was communicating timely product, price, promotion, and display 
information to store owners in a cost-effective manner.  Nearly 5,000 of the Gulf Coast 
Oil franchise stores were independently owned, meaning each store had a different 
owner.  In 1998, she toyed with using a company intranet connecting store managers to a 
Gulf Coast Oil home page.  The Gulf Coast Oil home page would include a Gulf Coast 
Oil President’s message, store operation advice, product display information, current 
fuel prices, and product promotions.   
In 1998 Longoria’s group started working on this idea.  In the process of bringing 
these stores together to share information, they realized by representing 8,000 
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convenience stores, they could negotiate better supplier and distributor pricing than any 
store could individually.  The Gulf Coast Oil Retailer’s Alliance formed.  Some of the 
Gulf Coast Oil franchisees owned several convenience stores, each flying different flags 
(e.g., Mobil, Texaco, Phillips 66).  These franchisees wanted to use the Gulf Coast Oil 
tools and pricing in their non-Gulf Coast Oil stores.  Longoria realized the Gulf Coast 
Oil’s Retailer’s Alliance needed to be bigger than Gulf Coast Oil.  It needed to be for the 
entire convenience store industry.  The CSX idea formed. 
At the time Gulf Coast Oil realized the need for CSX, they were also evaluating 
their distributor contract.  Because convenience stores individually buy small amounts of 
a number of products, supplier delivery directly to stores isn’t cost effective.  Suppliers 
deliver products to distributors and distributors deliver products from an array of 
suppliers to convenience stores.  Gulf Coast Oil evaluates their distributor contract every 
three years and, based on price, performance, and fit, selects a distributor to service their 
company-owned and franchise stores.  As retail sales manager, Longoria was also in 
charge of the distributor selection group. 
The 8,000 Gulf Coast Oil stores would represent a significant part of any 
distributor’s business.  The convenience store industry has two primary distributors:  
Cosco Distributing and McMurray Distributing.  Cosco Distributing, Gulf Coast Oil’s 
current distributor, depended on the contract.  McMurray Distributing wanted the 
contract.  At the time the distributors’ were presenting Gulf Coast Oil their bids, Gulf 
Coast Oil was looking for CSX investors and members.  Gulf Coast Oil presented the 
idea to both distributors in 1999, the beginning of the EC boom.  Cosco Distributing had 
cash flow problems and didn’t have money to invest.  McMurray Distributing had 
money to invest.  After hearing the idea, McMurray Distributing’s Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) decided McMurray Distributing would invest millions in CSX becoming 
part owner.  McMurray Distributing also won Gulf Coast Oil’s distributor contract, 
becoming distributor for the 8,000 Gulf Coast Oil stores. 
Since CSX’s goal was being a B2B e-marketplace for the entire convenience 
store industry, they needed to obtain the entire industry’s involvement.  They decided the 
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best strategy was having industry leaders join and lead the industry into the 
marketplace’s use.  McMurray Distributing was on board.  CSX needed a big supplier so 
the marketplace would represent all industry players. Momentum Manufacturing has a 
big name, has cash, and McMurray Distributing is their biggest customer.  McMurray 
Distributing’s CEO called Momentum Manufacturing and asked them to join CSX.  
They agreed.  Momentum Manufacturing was interested in becoming involved in EC 
and in supporting their largest customer.  In March 2000, Gulf Coast Oil, McMurray 
Distributing, Momentum Manufacturing, and Big O announced CSX’s formation. 
CSX was heavily marketed.  Karen Longoria, the President, went on media tours 
and talked to analysts about the marketplace.  Nearly thirty news programs including: 
Bloomberg News, Reuters News Service, Dow Jones, and the Wall Street Journal, 
reported CSX’s formation.  Marketplace board members spoke at conferences, presented 
at trade shows, and visited high-ranking convenience store industry executives.  CSX’s 
President has a notebook three inches high with business cards of executives called on in 
soliciting organizations to join CSX.   
6.3.1. Value Proposition and Business Model 
CSX’s value propositions focused on improving convenience store industry 
business practices through increased Internet-supported communication.  Many 
convenience stores exist.  Many are major oil company (e.g., Gulf Coast Oil, Texaco, 
Mobil) franchisees.  Each store is owned and operated by a single person. The major oil 
companies that own the brand need to communicate retail best practices to each 
convenience store.  Suppliers need to share promotion and optimal product display 
information.  Sharing this information is difficult for both groups because convenience 
stores are geographically dispersed.  Currently, suppliers share this information through 
distributors who then communicate with each convenience store.   
CSX offered ways to cost-effectively communicate information to convenience 
stores, in order to improve operations.  Envisioned as the Yahoo! of convenience 
retailing, CSX was a central website retailers could log on to access  current fuel and 
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product prices, product promotions, new product information, product display advice, 
and order placement screens.  CSX would also collect information helping retail stores 
analyze their business.  The marketplace would allow retail stores to benchmark sales by 
product type and category, for an array of time periods, and productivity measures (e.g., 
fuel sales per hour in June compared to other stores in the same area). 
CSX’s supplier value propositions included lower cost structures, market growth, 
and improved information.  Lower cost structures would come from using the 
marketplace to communicate product and promotion information to convenience stores.  
The Internet is less expensive and more timely than traditional supplier-distributor- 
retailer communication channels (e.g., physical visits, phone calls, mail).   CSX would 
not replace other communication channels, but would supplement and lower their use.  
Currently, in the convenience store industry, convenience store to end consumer sales 
data is unavailable.  CSX planned to capture this data facilitating supplier sales growth 
and decision-making.  Cigarettes are high cost, high profit items.  Manufacturers 
periodically run cigarette promotions, giving retailers money for cigarette cartons sold 
during promotion periods.  Promotions represent substantial retailer profits.  In the 
convenience store industry, currently promotions are handled by sending supplier field 
representatives to each convenience store to count on hand inventory before and after 
promotions.  Promotions are paid by adding physical beginning inventory to purchases 
and subtracting physical ending inventory.  Sending field representatives to each store is 
expensive and presents fraud opportunities by manipulating on-hand cigarette inventory.  
By capturing end consumer sales, CSX would automate and increase promotion 
efficiency.  By gathering information on end consumer sales, CSX would improve 
supplier and distributor information facilitating retail stores product deliveries and 
crafting promotions that increase product sales. 
CSX was a B2B e-marketplace open to the entire convenience store industry.  
Industry organizations could purchase equity ownership and be involved in running 
CSX.  For convenience stores, access to CSX required a monthly per store fee.  For 
example, an owner of seven convenience stores would pay $100 per store per month to 
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access CSX.  Suppliers would pay a monthly fee to access aggregated end consumer 
sales data.  The business model anticipated revenue generation from an array of sources.  
Most of CSX’s revenue would come from fees for content management, transactions, 
cash management, and auctions.  Twenty-five percent of revenue would come from 
providing data aggregation and access services,  retail business operating software, and 
hosting supplier business operating services.  Advertising and consulting fees would 
make up less than five percent of projected revenues.  
CSX intended to use the Internet, portable computers, scanning technology, and 
Big O B2B e-marketplace technology.  CSX had their own technology department and 
would work with customers to customize the marketplace to integrate with their back 
office systems. 
6.3.2. Evaluation 
In March 2000, Gulf Coast Oil, McMurray Distributing, Momentum 
Manufacturing, and Big O announced a joint venture creating a convenience store 
industry B2B e-marketplace. The announcement hit nearly thirty news sources including 
Computerworld, Bloomberg, and the Associated Press.  In October 2002, the CSX 
website read “the CSX team has decided to discontinue software and services on 
October 31,2002.”  A March 2003 Internet search for CSX showed nothing.  A number 
of events contributed to CSX’s collapse. 
Lack of investor commitment resulting in hardly any investor marketplace use 
was a key contributor to CSX’s collapse.  The vision was that McMurray Distributing 
and Momentum Manufacturing would not only invest in, but also use CSX to conduct 
business.  These companies would lead the convenience store industry into using CSX to 
adopt more efficient business practices.  When CSX contacted companies about joining 
the marketplace, these organizations would frequently say, “your investors aren’t using 
the marketplace, why should we?”  Because the investors weren’t using, other 
organizations wouldn’t join, and CSX was never able to attract additional buyers and 
sellers to use the marketplace.   
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McMurray Distributing’s CEO made the decision for McMurray Distributing to 
invest in CSX. This decision was fueled by a desire to win the Gulf Coast Oil service 
agreement and a desire to venture into e-business.  Changing McMurray Distributing’s 
business practices for McMurray Distributing to potentially use CSX required support 
and coordination among a number of McMurray Distributing’s business processes.  This 
depended on buy-in from two of McMurray Distributing’s Senior Vice Presidents among 
others.  Neither of these individuals supported the initial CSX investment.  The Senior 
Vice President who McMurray Distributing’s CSX board member reported to told 
CSX’s President one month into the project, “we have no intention of requiring our 
customers to use CSX.”  Another McMurray Distributing Senior Vice President was 
unwilling to help CSX capture data showing retailer sales to the final consumer.  
Capturing this data was critical to CSX’s value proposition. 
McMurray Distributing and Momentum Manufacturing were both interested in 
CSX as a way to become involved in e-business.  In January 2001, the economy slowed 
and the “dot.com” bubble burst.  When this happened, both companies’ interest 
dwindled further. Neither company wanted to commit too many more company 
resources to CSX.   
Board representation was the final straw leading to CSX’s collapse.  CSX grew 
out of Gulf Coast Oil.  Gulf Coast Oil retail stores were the primary users.  CSX became 
a separate company because Gulf Coast Oil’s competitors would never join a Gulf Coast 
Oil-owned marketplace.  When CSX separated from Gulf Coast Oil, internal Gulf Coast 
Oil champions became CSX’s senior management.  The wall between the Gulf Coast Oil 
retail group that used CSX and CSX widened.  CSX had limited information on what 
was going on in Gulf Coast Oil or what the CSX customers needed.  One member of 
Gulf Coast Oil management was on CSX’s board.  Initially, this board member 
represented the Gulf Coast Oil group using CSX.  Because of something that happened 
with another Gulf Coast Oil marketplace, Gulf Coast Oil decided to separate board 
representation and user representation, so that the group using the marketplace was not 
represented on CSX’s board.   Gulf Coast Oil’s new board representative did not believe 
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in the CSX concept and began making efforts for CSX to stop trying to be a convenience 
store industry e-marketplace.  As a result of this, the board decided to sell CSX.  They 
found a buyer.  When the Gulf Coast Oil retail group using CSX heard the marketplace 
was changing ownership, they said “hold on, we’re not sure we want to do business with 
the new owners.”  The potential owners only wanted to buy CSX because Gulf Coast Oil 
was using it.  This stopped the deal.  CSX’s close became a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Having wind CSX was selling out, the Gulf Coast Oil user group began shopping for 
another company to provide their marketplace services.  Without the Gulf Coast Oil 
contract, no investor wanted to buy CSX. 
6.3.3. Marketplace Categories 
Table 8 shows B2B e-marketplace categories that apply to CSX.  Providing 
specialized products, knowledge, and collaboration opportunities for the convenience 
store industry, CSX is a vertical marketplace.  Founded by leading convenience store 
industry organizations and open to the industry, CSX is a public marketplace.  Since 
CSX does not focus on horizontal markets and does not provide manufacturing inputs, 
Kaplan and Sawhney’s (2000) categories do not apply.  CSX’s vision involves enabling 
buyers purchasing large quantities and frequently ordered items from preselected 
suppliers at fixed prices.  This makes CSX a price aggregation marketplace (Dai and 
Kauffman 2001).  Since CSX’s founders owned CSX, CSX is participant owned. 
6. 4.   RETAIL MATRIX 
Between late 1999 and early 2001, B2B e-marketplaces were very popular with 
organizations exploring e-business opportunities in efforts to stay abreast of current 
trends and remain competitive.  Fueled by an environment pushing e-business, in 
October 1999, the convenience store industry’s trade organization, the United States 
Convenience Store Association, began exploring industry EC opportunities.  At this 
same time, I3 Technologies was helping companies launch industry B2B e-marketplaces 
throughout the United States.  In October 1999,  I3 Technologies  approached the United 
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States Convenience Store Association about forming a convenience store industry B2B 
e-marketplace.  After evaluating the value propositions and considering the 
environmental push toward EC, the United States Convenience Store Association 
partnered with I3 Technologies and Sales Point Ltd. to form Retail Matrix, a B2B 
e-marketplace for the convenience store industry. 
The United States Convenience Store Association began exploring the Retail 
Matrix idea in 1999.  They did not decide to create Retail Matrix until April 12, 2000.  In 
August 2000 Retail Matrix became a legal entity.  Between April and August of 2000, 
the United States Convenience Store Association began sharing the marketplace concept 
with their members. However, official marketing did not begin until Retail Matrix’s 
August 2000 incorporation. 
Retail Matrix used a number of approaches to solicit membership.  On March 30, 
2000, the United States Convenience Store Association held a supplier’s summit, 
marketed as an information conference teaching suppliers about B2B e-marketplaces and 
EC in general.  At this time, businesses wanted to know more about EC, which was a 
“hot topic.”  The United States Convenience Store Association used the summit to 
announce and solicit supplier membership in Retail Matrix. The summit invited only 
suppliers as in the convenience store industry suppliers have more resources than 
retailers to help finance such initiatives.  At the October 2000 United States 
Convenience Store Association trade show, Retail Matrix had a booth with a 
continuously running presentation explaining Retail Matrix.  Other marketing efforts 
included: two workshops; industry trade publication articles; and an ambassador panel, 
comprised of United States Convenience Store Association members. 
Retail Matrix’s envisioned ownership structure was  15% technology partners, 
15% United States Convenience Store Association, 55% industry players, and 15% 
employees.  However, throughout its life Retail Matrix’s founders were the only owners.   
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6.4.1. Value Proposition and Business Model 
Retail Matrix was envisioned as a virtual location for the convenience store 
industry to conduct business and share information.  The convenience store industry is 
fragmented, with 50% of the 124,000 existing convenience stores representing single 
stores each owned by one person.   As such, most manufacturers do not directly 
communicate with convenience store owners.  They depend on a distributor, delivering 
products from an array of manufacturers, to communicate with each convenience store.  
Currently, distributors have sales people physically visiting convenience stores making 
convenience stores aware of new products, prices, and promotions.  Distributor trucks 
then deliver orders to each convenience store.  Retailers place orders a variety of ways 
including giving to a salesman, calling, punching into a telxon unit attached to the 
telephone, faxing, using electronic data interchange, and using the Internet.   
Retail Matrix’s value propositions aimed to make these business practices more 
efficient with the goal of increasing sales and lowering costs.   Transaction data and a 
product analysis database would form the heart of  Retail Matrix.  The marketplace had 
procurement, content, merchandising, and active service provider segments.  Retail 
Matrix offers industry, supplier, and retailer value propositions.  For the industry Retail 
Matrix promised improved integration and tighter alignment, increased collaboration, 
reduced supply chain costs, enhanced growth, and improved financial performance.   
Retail Matrix offered several supplier value propositions.  As a virtual platform 
for all convenience store industry participants, Retail Matrix would increase supplier 
alignment and integration of major business processes with trading partners.  As a 
central portal for the entire convenience store industry, Retail Matrix would help 
suppliers reach new customers and markets more efficiently.  Providing transaction data, 
Retail Matrix will allow suppliers to access aggregated retailer consumption and 
profitability data to support strategic marketing and merchandising decisions.  In the 
convenience store industry, currently, suppliers do not have records of consumer 
purchases from the retail store.  Providing suppliers, data on retail store sales to the 
end-consumer, would support a continuous replenishment loop in the convenience store 
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industry.  Based on preselected stock levels, this would allow automatic order generation 
from the convenience store to the supplier and from the supplier to the real 
manufacturer.   
Retail Matrix’s retailer value propositions would provide retailers information.  
Retail Matrix would offer retailers access to industry expertise and content to better 
manage their business.  One example is providing information on displaying products to 
increase sales.  Retail Matrix also would provide a forum to evaluate products.  This 
forum would be open to all retailers and would give retailers better information to select 
products and services.  Currently, convenience stores have difficulty learning about new 
products and promotions because current business practices do not facilitate 
manufacturers communicating with convenience stores directly.  By bringing retailers 
together to purchase products, Retail Matrix would increase retailers’ buying leverage.  
Retail Matrix would list all the convenience store software providers and provide a 
forum for retailers to download updates to industry software used to run their business.  
The ability to quickly access software updates as opposed to waiting for the newest 
release would improve operating efficiency and reduce information technology costs. 
Retail Matrix’s value propositions hinged on Retail Matrix being an open and 
competitive B2B e-marketplace for the convenience store industry.  The marketplace 
would be a central virtual location providing collaboration, commerce, content, 
community, and connectivity.  A number of items could be traded over Retail Matrix, 
including software, services, and products for the convenience store industry.  However, 
the main focus of Retail Matrix was providing information about industry products and 
services.  Intended participants included all members of the convenience store supply 
chain.  This includes manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and service providers.   
Retail Matrix planned to gain initial funding by selling intended participants 
equity ownership in the marketplace.  Retail Matrix’s business model involved charging 
participants monthly membership fees.  For retailers, fees were tiered contingent upon 
the level of service the retail store wanted from Retail Matrix.  Fees were assessed on a 
per store per month basis.  Manufacturers and distributors would also pay a monthly fee 
    113 
 
 
 
for Retail Matrix’s services.  The fees were contingent on the manufacturer’s volume 
through the subscribed service.  Available services include point of sale aggregation 
services and planning services.  Retail Matrix would also collect marketplace-advertising 
revenues. 
Retail Matrix was based on Commerce Matrix, a B2B e-marketplace technology 
developed by I3 Technologies.  Commerce Matrix is a standard B2B e-marketplace 
customizable by industry.  I3 Technologies has used Commerce Matrix to create over 
forty e-marketplaces in an array of industries.  Retail Matrix was envisioned as a central 
hub that B2B e-marketplace participants could connect to using a combination of their 
existing information systems and Internet technology.  Retail Matrix use requires a 
portable computer, a point of sale scanner, an Internet service provider, and Retail 
Matrix software. 
6.4.2. Evaluation 
Table 7 at the beginning of this chapter shows Retail Matrix was the least 
successful B2B e-marketplace in the study, as measured by existence period, number of 
participants, and use.  The Retail Matrix idea was hatched in late 1999 with the three 
partners deciding to go forward with the marketplace in April 2000.  In August 2000, 
Retail Matrix became a legal entity.  Between April and August, Retail Matrix’s 
founders introduced the marketplace to the industry, but could not sign members since 
Retail Matrix was not yet a legal entity.  The timing hurt Retail Matrix’s membership 
solicitation efforts in two ways.  First, businesses were very interested in EC in 2000.  
However, the tide turned in 2001 when the stock market stopped rewarding “dot.coms” 
for ideas and started evaluating them on traditional financial metrics.  Retail Matrix had 
only a few months of “boom time”  to garner marketplace support before the bottom fell 
out.  Second, CSX, a competing marketplace in the convenience store industry, 
announced their existence in March 2000.  Being the first convenience store industry 
marketplace, CSX had a six-month jump soliciting members.  In addition, both 
convenience store industry marketplaces were trying to garner supplier support for their 
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marketplace.  In the industry, suppliers have more resources to support initiatives.  
Unfortunately, fifty of these suppliers had already invested in Transora, a B2B 
e-marketplace focusing on links in manufacturers’ supply chains.  By the time Retail 
Matrix began soliciting membership, Transora had burned through their initial funding 
and had put out another cash call to the same suppliers Retail Matrix was soliciting.  
Since the suppliers were already involved with Transora, they further funded Transora in 
hopes this would help recoup their initial investment.  
Too many marketplaces in the market space also hurt Retail Matrix’s ability to 
attract members.  Potential members were concerned because two marketplaces claimed 
to be central hubs to conduct all business in the convenience store industry, both 
requiring membership fees.  Suppliers and retailers were confused as to which one 
would be the industry marketplace and did not want to pay to participate in both.  Many 
decided to wait and see which marketplace the convenience store industry was going to 
adopt.   
Two technology companies and the industry trade organization formed Retail 
Matrix.  Retail Matrix was unable to influence any industry suppliers, distributors, or 
retailers to join the marketplace.  Since Retail Matrix did not have any members 
routinely buying and selling convenience store industry products, Retail Matrix was 
unable to conduct any business transactions or leverage any transactional relationships to 
require organizations to join. 
The other problem was influencing industry participants to even be willing to 
participate in an open marketplace.  The convenience store industry is very competitive 
and Retail Matrix found, in many cases, industry organizations did not want to be in the 
same marketplace as their competitors.  In the EC heyday, a number of convenience 
store marketplaces formed along the supply chain.  The marketplaces were supposed to 
be open, but most had traditional business partners:  a few suppliers, one distributor, and 
one retailer.  For distributors, Retail Matrix offered no real value proposition.  The 
distributors saw Retail Matrix as adding yet another way to have to do business with 
their customers.  In addition, increasing retailer awareness of new products would cause 
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distributors to have to carry these products.  Carrying more products raises distributor 
operating costs. As such, distributors prefer to carry fewer products. Suppliers were 
concerned Retail Matrix would upset their industry power.  Suppliers have the power in 
the convenience store industry because they are large corporations and 50% of the 
124,000 existing convenience stores in the United States are one-store one-owner 
operations.  Because of their low purchase volume, convenience stores independently 
have little negotiating power with suppliers.  Suppliers were concerned about Retail 
Matrix facilitating these stores coming together to gain purchasing leverage with them. 
Retail Matrix’s competitive advantage was having the trade organization as an 
equity owner.  In theory, the United States Convenience Store Association’s sponsorship 
should have helped Retail Matrix attract members, since the trade organization has 
relationships with all industry organizations.  In reality, trade organization ownership 
wasn’t enough to achieve membership and actually complicated membership criteria.  
Many industry players, especially industry software providers, opposed Retail Matrix 
offering a platform to rate products and advertise industry services.  These groups 
openly opposed the idea of a trade organization sponsoring a marketplace.  As Retail 
Matrix tried to design a marketplace meeting the varying interests of the trade 
organization’s members, the marketplace’s speed to market was delayed.  In addition, 
incorporating the varying interest of the trade organization’s members eliminated many 
viable marketplace offerings that the powerful trade organization’s members opposed.   
6.4.3. Marketplace Categories 
Table 8 at the beginning of this chapter shows B2B e-marketplace categories 
applying to Retail Matrix.  Retail Matrix focuses on providing the convenience store 
industry specialized products, knowledge, and collaboration opportunities.  This makes 
Retail Matrix a vertical marketplace.  Founded by the United States Convenience Store 
Association and two technology partners, Retail Matrix is open to all industry 
participants, making Retail Matrix a public marketplace.  Since Retail Matrix does not 
focus on horizontal markets and does not provide manufacturing inputs, Kaplan and 
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Sawhney’s (2000) categories do not apply.  Retail Matrix’s pricing practices and 
supplier identification procedures do not fall into any of Dai and Kauffman’s (2001) 
E-marketplace categories. Retail Matrix proposes buyers selecting from all possible 
suppliers and obtaining dynamic pricing.  Retail Matrix intended member ownership. 
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CHAPTER VII 
7 RESEARCH QUESTION 1:  WHAT DRIVES 
BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS  
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE MEMBERSHIP? 
Based on preliminary field observations, Figure 4 presents the original research 
model of what drives business-to-business (B2B) electronic marketplace (e-marketplace) 
membership.  Extensive field research and  field note analysis indicate Figure 4 does not 
explain what drives B2B e-marketplace membership.   This chapter presents and 
discusses the revised research model, Figure 10.  This model is based on field data 
analysis comparing membership levels and drivers:  
 within each of the four B2B e-marketplaces, and 
 between the two higher membership and the two lower 
membership B2B e-marketplaces. 
 
The revised model proposes some different drivers than the original model and 
considers relationships between drivers.  The revised model posits motivating drivers 
and facilitating drivers.  Motivating drivers indicate reasons organizations join 
e-marketplaces.  Facilitating drivers indicate conditions that help with marketplace 
membership.  Motivating drivers include relative advantage, business partner 
encouragement, and business environment change.  If the marketplace offers a relative 
advantage that is currently realizable to “in-power” organizations, these organizations 
will become members and then encourage their business partners to join.  An 
environment change is also a motivating driver of marketplace membership.  An 
environment change facilitates marketplace membership if organizations view 
marketplace membership as  a means of dealing with the environment change.   
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Communication facilitates marketplace membership.  Relationships and two 
marketing and promotion aspects facilitate communication.  Industry competitive nature 
affects relationships. Organizations’ e-marketplace membership and use decisions take 
time.  As such, the e-marketplace’s continued existence facilitates marketplace 
membership.  Complementary services facilitate continued existence.    Table 10 
evaluates the model’s drivers.  Each row in Table 10 corresponds to this chapter’s 
model.  Table 10 also evaluates supplemental dimensions of the model’s drivers.  The 
chapter’s text follows the table. 
The conclusion discusses  drivers in the original model not included in the 
revised model, theoretical implications, practical implications, and future research 
avenues. 
Table 10  Comparison of  B2B E-marketplace Membership Drivers 
DRIVER NATIONAL 
TRUCKING 
EXCHANGE (NTX) 
PEGASUS C-STORE 
EXCHANGE 
(CSX) 
RETAIL 
MATRIX 
NO. OF MEMBERS: Over 2,500 Over 400 4 3 
     
MOTIVATING 
DRIVERS 
    
RELATIVE 
ADVANTAGE  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Substantial to 
organization’s “in-
power” 
Yes Yes No No 
Currently realizable Yes Somewhat For 
corporate-retailer 
communication 
No 
     
BUSINESS 
PARTNER 
ENCOURAGEMENT 
Yes Yes McMurray 
Distributing 
encouraged 
Momentum 
Manufacturing 
No 
     
BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENT 
CHANGE 
    
EC encouragement Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other business Yes Yes No No 
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Table 10 Continued 
 
 
DRIVER NATIONAL 
TRUCKING 
EXCHANGE (NTX) 
PEGASUS C-STORE 
EXCHANGE 
(CSX) 
RETAIL 
MATRIX 
environment change 
     
FACILITATING 
DRIVERS 
    
COMMUNICATION      
Marketing and 
Promotion Level 
High Low High High 
Marketing and 
Promotion’s Effect 
on Membership 
Strong None None None 
Industry sales 
representatives  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education on using 
the marketplace 
Yes Yes No No 
     
Relationships     
Relationships as a 
communication 
driver 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regard for 
maintaining 
existing 
relationships 
Yes Yes Not mentioned Not mentioned 
Marketplace 
adapted to support 
existing 
relationships 
Yes Yes No No 
     
Industry competition Sellers:  competitive; 
Shippers: represent 
different industries 
Buyers:  
regulated; 
sellers: some 
competition 
Competitive Competitive 
Ownership structure Independent 3 of 7 board 
seats owned 
by 
participants 
Participant-owned Participant-owned 
     
MEANS OF 
CONTINUED 
EXISTENCE 
Yes Yes Tried No 
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7. 1.   MOTIVATING DRIVERS 
7.1.1. Relative Advantage and Business Partner Encouragement 
The model posits relative advantage drives B2B e-marketplace membership.  
Rogers (1995, p. 213) defines perceived relative advantage as “the degree an innovation 
is perceived as being better than the idea it supersedes.”  We customize Rogers’ 
definition to B2B e-marketplaces and define relative advantage as the degree a B2B 
e-marketplace’s value propositions fill industry and organization needs or improve 
existing industry and organization operations.  Each B2B e-marketplace in the study had 
buyer and seller value propositions.    However, two of the marketplaces achieved high 
membership and two did not.  In examining relative advantage, whether the marketplace 
offers a substantial, currently realizable, relative advantage to “in-power” organizations 
affects B2B e-marketplace membership.  If value propositions are substantial to 
organizations “in-power” and currently realizable, these organizations encourage their 
business partners to participate and do business with them over the B2B e-marketplace.   
In the transportation industry, large volume shippers have influence over carriers 
because they represent significant revenue.  NTX offers shipping organizations 
substantial savings and more efficient operations by providing means to electronically 
tender freight using the Internet.  Since shipping organizations saw the value 
proposition’s benefits, they decided to participate in NTX.  These organizations 
encouraged and required their carriers to participate.  This is illustrated in the excerpt 
below. 
 
When NTX went to Toshiba to do business with them, we got 
Toshiba and their carriers for the Toshiba business.  But we also 
got the carriers for the marketplace.  
 
A lot of the carriers on the marketplace were brought by 
customers.   
 ---Regional Sales Director, NTX 
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Trying to improve procurement practices, twenty-one utilities formed Pegasus. 
Because utilities purchase many products and services, they represent substantial 
revenue to many suppliers, especially industry suppliers. The utilities were able to 
persuade the suppliers, that depended on the utilities’ business, to consider membership.  
The utilities had difficulty persuading large suppliers with virtual monopolies or 
suppliers with which the utilities were not primary customers (e.g., computer suppliers) 
to join.  The virtual monopoly suppliers already had most of the business and so 
Pegasus’ increased reach value proposition was not substantial.  Furthermore suppliers, 
with which the utilities were not primary customers, did not have a substantial incentive 
to participate since the utilities weren’t a big part of their business.   
Once the utilities had potential commitments from suppliers over which they had 
influence, they still struggled finalizing their membership.  These suppliers did not join 
Pegasus until Pegasus’ value propositions became realizable.  These realizable value 
propositions involve actual transactions in which the utilities and participant suppliers 
could engage in via Pegasus.  Examples of actual transactions include collaborations to 
reduce supply chain costs, reverse auctions, and requests for proposals. These 
transactions were normally preplanned using communication channels outside of the 
e-marketplace (e.g., face-to-face, telephone). 
When CSX formed as a joint venture to improve convenience store industry 
operations, the marketplace’s immediate realizable benefits were improving 
communication between the Gulf Coast Oil Corporation and the Gulf Coast Oil retail 
stores.  While benefits accrue to both the Gulf Coast Oil Corporation and the Gulf Coast 
Oil retail stores, the benefits to the Gulf Coast Oil Corporation were substantial because 
they helped Gulf Coast Oil better control retail store operations.  Since the Gulf Coast 
Oil retail stores each represent a small part of the Gulf Coast Oil Corporation, the Gulf 
Coast Oil Corporation had power over the stores and required the stores adopt the 
marketplace.    
CSX’s communication value proposition between large corporations and retail 
stores was immediately realizable.  However, industry retail competition, and the fact 
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that the marketplace started within Gulf Coast Oil, probably were stronger inhibitors to 
competing retailers’ adoption than the value propositions were as retailer membership 
drivers. In addition, CSX membership requires each retail store pay a per month/ per 
store fee.  Many potential retail members did not see measurable benefits for the up-front 
fees.  
In the convenience store industry, suppliers have power over retail convenience 
stores because suppliers are large corporations with many customers.  Because 
convenience stores sell small product quantities, they do not typically represent a 
substantial part of a suppliers business.  CSX’s immediate value propositions help 
convenience stores obtain better information.  CSX’s long-term value propositions help 
suppliers and distributors obtain better information on retail store sales and communicate 
information to retail stores.  These value propositions require changing industry 
practices to be realizable.  When they become realizable, the improved information will 
not substantially increase supplier sales because of the small quantities convenience 
stores purchase.  In some ways, the marketplace’s value propositions could hurt 
particular suppliers’ sales since the marketplace’s aim is replacing some physical 
supplier contact with electronic contact.  This point is illustrated in the excerpt below. 
 
We worked for 2 years to get Pepsi in the marketplace.  And I got 
to meet with the ranking lady at Pepsi.  You know what she told 
me?  She said, “Karen we don't want to be part of the 
marketplace; there is no advantage to us.  We want our people in 
the stores.  If our people are in the stores they can set our product 
up and put our product in places where our competitor's product 
is.  We want our people there.”  This is the way the whole 
industry operates.   
 ---President and Chief Operating Officer, CSX 
 
For distributors, negative effects accompany realization of CSX’s distributor 
value proposition.  Currently distributors control supplier-retailer information flow.  
CSX’s value proposition improves supplier-retailer communication, taking some of the 
distributor’s power away.  Operationally, improved communication allows retailers to 
learn about and request new products.  This causes distributors to have to stock the 
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products.  Distributors prefer to carry fewer products as carrying additional products 
increases distribution costs.  This idea is illustrated in the excerpt below. 
 
Having the retailers know about these things like green Pringles 
makes them want to order them and makes the distributor have to 
carry them.  This is more work for the distributor.   
 ---Senior Vice President of Strategic Alliances,  
 United States Convenience Store Association 
 
Given the negative effects of CSX’s distributor value proposition, why did 
McMurray Distributing encourage their biggest customer, Momentum Manufacturing, to 
join?  The field notes indicate that initially McMurray Distributing did not fully examine 
the potential impacts of CSX’s value propositions.  McMurray Distributing’s desire to 
win the Gulf Coast Oil contract and the electronic commerce (EC) hype were stronger 
membership drivers than CSX’s value propositions.  Winning the Gulf Coast Oil 
contract made all 3,500 Gulf Coast Oil convenience stores McMurray Distributing’s 
customers for the next three years.  With the Gulf Coast Oil contract in hand and the 
burst dot.com bubble, the desire to encourage others  to join and the desire to continue 
membership lessened.  
Retail Matrix’s value propositions focus on improving convenience store 
industry operations.  This includes improving supplier–retailer information flow and 
helping retailers come together to negotiate better supplier pricing.  Individually, 
retailers have no leverage with suppliers because they represent such a small portion of a 
supplier’s business.  In the industry, the suppliers have the power and the money.  Retail 
Matrix could not influence suppliers to join because the value propositions did not 
represent substantial value to suppliers since convenience stores are such a small portion 
of supplier business.  The excerpt below illustrates this. 
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The manufacturers were used to defining the terms of the playing 
field and the marketplace would shift that power. 
 --Senior Vice President of Strategic Alliances  
 United States Convenience Store Association 
 
Many studies link perceived relative advantage to system adoption (Chwelos et 
al. 2001, Iacovou et al. 1995, Lee and Clark 1996b, O'Callaghan et al. 1992).  This study 
indicates perceived relative advantage is not enough to achieve marketplace 
membership.  B2B e-marketplace membership hinges on relative advantage being 
immediately realizable to “in-power” organizations.   If these conditions are present, “in-
power” parties will join the marketplace and then encourage their business partners’ 
membership. 
Relative advantage as a B2B e-marketplace membership driver is in line with 
previous IOIS research.  Three electronic data interchange (EDI) studies (Chwelos et al. 
2001, Iacovou et al. 1995, O'Callaghan et al. 1992) link relative advantage and EDI 
adoption.  Two EDI studies (Premkumar et al. 1994, Ramamurthy et al. 1999) link 
relative advantage and EDI diffusion.  In B2B e-marketplace contexts, Lee and Clark  
(1996b) link increased efficiency and effectiveness to B2B e-marketplace adoption. Lee 
and Clark also explain that firms adversely affected by electronic markets will resist 
implementation.  This is in line with our finding that the marketplace must offer the “in-
power” organizations a relative advantage.  Grewal et al. (2001) link B2B e-marketplace 
adoption fueled by efficiency motivations to marketplace use.   
Previous interorganizational information systems (IOIS) research has not 
qualified relative advantage.  This is the first study where current realizability of 
relative advantage has surfaced.  This may be because previous IOIS were operational 
when organizations were soliciting participation.  Therefore it was assumed that the 
relative advantage was realizable.  However, many B2B e-marketplaces solicited 
membership before the marketplace was operational.  The data contrasts currently 
realizable vs. non-realizable relative advantage.  We therefore posit that realizable 
relative advantage drives B2B e-marketplace membership. 
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Several EDI studies (Chwelos et al. 2001, Crook and Kumar 1998, Iacovou et al. 
1995, Premkumar and Ramamurthy 1995)  corroborate our finding that powerful 
companies encourage their less powerful trading partners to join B2B e-marketplaces.  
However, the study is the first in a B2B e-marketplace context recognizing that business 
partner encouragement drives B2B e-marketplace membership.  In addition, previous 
IOIS studies do not recognize that for business partner encouragement to occur, relative 
advantage must be currently realizable to “in-power” organizations. 
7.1.2. Business Environment Change 
Viewing B2B e-marketplaces as a mechanism for dealing with business 
environment changes drives organizations to join B2B e-marketplaces.  The “dot.com” 
boom and bust illustrates this.  In the late 1990s corporate America discovered the 
Internet and became enamored with Internet applications improving business practices.  
Wall Street was rewarding Internet initiatives despite underachievement in traditional 
performance metrics (e.g., profit) and was penalizing traditional companies without EC 
strategies.  Three of the four B2B e-marketplaces formed during the height of the EC 
boom--2000.  All four marketplaces cited the need to use EC in order to stay abreast of 
current business trends as a marketplace membership driver.  The quotes below illustrate 
this point. 
 
The mentality before NTX took stock of the need for hiring 
people that knew the marketplace from the ground level was that 
B2B was growing so fast that these organizations had to join it to 
get in the game.   
 ---Regional Sales Director, NTX 
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The precursor to all of these utilities joining the marketplace is 
that the marketplace formed in the midst of the “dot.com” buzz.  
All of the analysts were saying, “You need to get into 
e-commerce”.   
 ---President and Chief Executive Officer, Pegasus 
 
They believed in the potential of the Internet and felt they needed 
to reinvent themselves. 
 ---President and Chief Operating Officer, CSX 
 
 
Since the study began during the early stages of the EC boom, endured the bust, 
and continued through stabilization, we saw how business environment changes affect 
membership.  When the environment changed and Wall Street was no longer pushing 
EC, organizations were no longer dealing with the need to do EC.  As such, marketplace 
membership, which had been viewed as a mechanism for dealing with the environment 
change towards EC lessened.  The quotes below illustrate this point. 
 
Most people were thinking of joining in late 2000, in the new year 
of 2001 when there started being “dot.com” failures, the people 
who were planning on joining weren't as keen on it. 
 --- Senior Vice President of Strategic Alliances, 
 United States Convenience Store Association   
 
In January 2001, the Internet bubble burst.  When I met with Earl 
originally (Earl is the Chief Executive Officer of McMurray 
Distributing),we had dinner together and here's what he told me. 
This is a quote, “I don't know what my business is going to look 
like in the next few years but I know it is going to be 
fundamentally different.” This was in the midst of the Internet and 
during the “dot.com” boom.  When the bubble burst, he moved 
from a proactive industry leader approach to an option approach, 
with the idea of we invested in this marketplace but let's just hold 
it and see what happens.   
 ---President and Chief Operating Officer, CSX 
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Really, we were in the right place at the right time.  It was right in 
the middle of all of the “dot.com” hype and organizations wanted 
to form marketplaces.  Now no one is forming marketplaces.  
 --President and Chief Executive Officer, Pegasus 
 
 
Given that each marketplace recognized that organizations joined their 
marketplace because they viewed marketplace membership as a mechanism for dealing 
with the environment change toward electronic business, why did two marketplaces 
achieve high membership and two not?  Two of the marketplaces were in industries that 
saw the marketplaces as a mechanism for dealing with other business environment 
changes.  After the “dot.com” bust, utilities were still facing industry deregulation and 
saw Pegasus as a way to deal with deregulation.  
 
The utilities were faced with deregulation and they knew they 
needed to do something about it.  
 --President and Chief Executive Officer, Pegasus 
 
 
Since NTX started in 1995 they had a base of business to sustain them through 
the “dot.com” bust.  After September 11, 2001 shippers saw NTX as a mechanism for 
dealing with freight shortages.  Post September 11,  companies contracted and pulled 
excess freight off the road.  For shippers freight became difficult to find, so shippers 
started using NTX to find trucks. Freight prices skyrocketed and carriers in long-term 
contracts could obtain much better rates on NTX.  Excess freight was what NTX thought 
was their biggest strength, but freight shortages were their biggest strength.  The 
following quote illustrates this. 
 
To date, we've tried a number of ways to get success.  On 9/11 
when capacity dried up we started going crazy with people joining 
to find freight.  We are still growing and we have funding for 2 
more years.  
 --Regional Sales Director, NTX 
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The existing IOIS research supports our finding that organizations join B2B 
e-marketplaces when they view the marketplace as a mechanism for dealing with a 
business environment change.  Many IOIS studies  (Cavaye and Cragg 1995, Damsgaard 
and Lyytinen 1998, Ramamurthy et al. 1999, Reich and Benbasat 1990) link 
organizational IOIS adoption to competitor IOIS adoption.  We include these studies as 
support for our finding because they discuss industry leaders implementing IOIS.  
Industry leader IOIS implementation causes the environment to change.  This in turn 
leads other organizations to implement similar IOIS because they think they have to 
keep pace with the changing environment and the industry leaders.   
Customer-oriented strategic systems (COSS) (Cavaye and Cragg 1995, Reich 
and Benbasat 1990) studies link competitive pressure to COSS development.  EDI 
studies (Damsgaard and Lyytinen 1998, Iacovou et al. 1995, Premkumar et al. 1997, 
Ramamurthy et al. 1999) link competitive pressure to EDI adoption.  Grewal et al.’s 
(2001) survey of B2B e-marketplace members finds that some organizations join 
e-marketplaces because everyone else is and because the organizations think they should 
in order to gain legitimacy.   
The finding that viewing the e-marketplace as a mechanism for dealing with a 
business environment change drives e-marketplace membership is similar to our original 
proposition that business environment encouragement drives e-marketplace membership.  
In addition, organizations using the B2B e-marketplace can cause the business 
environment to change.  This can lead to other organizations viewing joining the 
e-marketplace as a mechanism for dealing with the change.   
7. 2.   FACILITATING DRIVERS 
7.2.1. Communication 
Communication is a facilitating driver of B2B e-marketplace membership.  The 
model defines communication as making intended members aware of the B2B EC 
marketplace, its value propositions, and its membership criteria.  The paragraphs below 
discuss B2B e-marketplace communication drivers.   
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7.2.1.1.   Marketing and Promotion 
The model defines system marketing and promotion as making target 
organizations aware of the B2B e-marketplace and aware that the marketplace would 
like these organizations to participate in the marketplace.  Our data indicate who is doing 
the marketing and promotion and how it occurs affects B2B e-marketplace membership.     
NTX, CSX, and Retail Matrix all did considerable marketing and promotion in 
terms of trade shows, media tours, conferences, and press releases.  Pegasus did not.  
Pegasus, CSX, and Retail Matrix indicate this type of marketing and promotion does not 
affect membership.  NTX’s data indicate a high marketing and promotion level and a 
strong effect on membership.  CSX and Retail Matrix paid the most attention to this type 
of marketing and promotion and were least effective in gaining membership.  Based on 
these results, system marketing and promotion does not seem to have a strong effect on 
B2B e-marketplace membership.  This is contrary to much of the IOIS work  (Cavaye 
and Cragg 1995, Hope et al. 2001, Iacovou et al. 1995, Reich and Benbasat 1990, Runge 
1985, Runge 1988), which links systems marketing and promotion to IOIS adoption. 
Looking deeper into marketing and promotion, we found who is doing the 
marketing and promotion is important.  All of our marketplaces have sales 
representatives from the industry.  However, NTX originally did not.  In the excerpt 
below, NTX’s Regional Sales Director explains the importance of sales people with 
industry experience. 
 
A few years ago, NTX decided that if they were going to go 
anywhere they needed to hire people with a knowledge of 
transportation at the street level.  Hiring people that were already 
in the transportation industry and getting them to go out and 
present the idea to the customers was better.  Street level people 
don't overpower the potential customers with language.  They 
don't come up with a solution and say here use it.  They work with 
the customer to educate them on the technology.  
 
The type of marketing and promotion is important.  NTX’s marketing and 
promotion consists of training sessions on how to start using NTX.  Originally, Pegasus’ 
marketing and promotion was at a visionary level, explaining how the marketplace 
    131 
 
would work in theory.  With this approach, utilities had difficulty using Pegasus.  
Pegasus and member utilities had difficulty influencing suppliers to join.  Later, Pegasus 
had buyer development managers help utilities and suppliers execute agreements and do 
business over the marketplace.  When Pegasus started doing this, suppliers started 
participating.  Retail Matrix’s and CSX’s marketing and promotion focused on 
presenting the vision of how the marketplace would work at trade shows, media tours, 
conferences, press releases, and site visits.  Neither Retail Matrix’s nor CSX’s marketing 
and promotion included education on how to use the marketplace.  Marketing and 
promotion that includes education on how to use the marketplace drives B2B 
e-marketplace membership.   
The existing IOIS literature does not link industry sales representatives and 
educating potential members on how to use the IOIS to IOIS adoption.    
7.2.1.2.   Relationships 
Relationships facilitate and inhibit communication, and ultimately e-marketplace 
membership.  We define relationships as knowing people within the organizations the 
marketplace is intended to serve.  Relationships provide a means for communicating the 
marketplace.  However, the desire to maintain relationships makes industry players 
reluctant to join marketplaces.  Industry players fear B2B e-marketplaces will replace 
their personal relationships based on trust and noncontractible services with electronic 
relationships based on price alone.  In this sense, relationships hurt marketplace 
membership. 
Relationships as a facilitator of communication, and ultimately marketplace 
membership, are evident in each of our four marketplaces. 
Venture capitalists formed NTX.  For several years NTX went nowhere as they 
needed a means of communicating their marketplace to the industry.  NTX’s 
membership increased as a result of hiring sales people from the transportation industry.  
These people had industry relationships, which gave them entrée to communicate the 
marketplace to potential member organizations.    
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Pegasus’ Chief Executive Officer was a consultant helping six of the founding 
Pegasus’ utilities deal with supply chain issues.  He had strong relationships with 
executive management at all six utilities.  Having a history of regulation, utilities know 
one another and have a history of sharing information and working together to solve 
problems.  Relationships facilitated communicating Pegasus to executive management of 
the six founding utilities.  Relationships enabled the founding utilities to communicate 
Pegasus to the remaining industry utilities.  The utilities then organized a meeting 
discussing Pegasus.   
The convenience store industry is very competitive.  As such, relationships form 
along supply chains.  Retailers have strong relationships with their distributors and 
distributors have strong relationships with manufacturers.  Competitors do not develop 
close relationships.  Retailers do not form relationships with most manufacturers because 
they purchase most products through distributors. When Gulf Coast Oil decided to form 
a convenience store industry marketplace they needed an organization with strong 
industry relationships to help communicate the marketplace to the industry.  Gulf Coast 
Oil encouraged their distributor to help form the marketplace.  Having an industry 
distributor with well-developed industry relationships enabled CSX to communicate the 
marketplace to potential members.   
CSX became a separate company from Gulf Coast Oil in an effort to increase 
retailer membership.  Unfortunately, retailers still recognized the initial Gulf Coast Oil 
relationship and were skeptical about joining a competitor-formed marketplace.  The 
Gulf Coast Oil separation caused CSX’s Gulf Coast Oil relationship to weaken.  CSX’s 
relationship with Gulf Coast Oil further deteriorated when Gulf Coast Oil replaced their 
original CSX board member, who represented the internal Gulf Coast Oil group CSX 
serviced, with a Gulf Coast Oil executive from another Gulf Coast Oil group that was 
not involved with CSX. 
The convenience store industry trade organization formed Retail Matrix.  The 
United States Convenience Store Association has relationships with most industry 
retailers, distributors, and manufacturers.  These relationships gave Retail Matrix a 
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means of communicating the marketplace to the industry.  As the trade organization, 
Retail Matrix does not buy or sell anything.  Because of an array of reasons, Retail 
Matrix was unable to influence any organization that conducted convenience store 
industry transactions to join.  This hurt their ability to influence other organizations to 
join. 
While relationships facilitate communication about the marketplace and 
ultimately marketplace membership, potential members’ desire to maintain existing 
relationships inhibits organizations’ marketplace membership.  In both NTX and 
Pegasus, suppliers told buyers that marketplace membership would hurt their 
relationship.  Suppliers explained that they provide many value-added services to their 
customers and that marketplaces focus primarily on price.   
Relationships did not discriminate between high membership marketplaces and 
low membership marketplaces.  All four marketplaces use relationships to facilitate 
marketplace promotion.   The two high membership marketplaces repeatedly mention 
participants’ desire to maintain industry relationships as a membership inhibitor.  The 
two low membership marketplaces did not mention this.  This is counter intuitive, but 
may be because the two low membership marketplaces didn’t make it this far.  In 
addition, the two high membership marketplaces adapted to support existing industry 
relationships.  NTX modified their software to enable shippers to procure freight from 
their existing carriers.  Pegasus realized utilities want to use the marketplace to facilitate 
procurement from existing suppliers with prenegotiated contracts rather than seeing the 
entire population of suppliers and products.  Pegasus modified their marketplace to 
support this. 
The existing IOIS literature does not mention relationships between industry 
organizations and between the people in these organizations as an IOIS adoption 
facilitator.  We conjecture that this is due to the following fact.  Previous IOIS were 
formed within industry organizations.  These organizations had existing and ongoing 
relationships with their trading partners.  Therefore, the “existing industry relationship” 
was not a factor in previous studies.    
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7.2.1.3.   Industry Competition 
The marketplace membership process section explains some organizations 
participate in B2B e-marketplaces because their competitors are and they feel they have 
to participate to remain competitive.  Competitive environment as an adoption facilitator 
is documented in the IOIS literature.  However, the field data indicate competition works 
another way.  Comparing competition within the industries the four marketplaces 
represent, shows competition affects relationships, which in turn affect communication.   
The more intense industry competition is, the less likely industry organizations are to 
have relationships with one another, and thus participate in the same marketplace as their 
competitors.  The less competitive the industry, the more likely organizations are to have 
relationships with and join the same marketplace as their competitors facilitating an 
industry marketplace.  The case studies illustrate this.   
Until the past few years, utilities were regulated.  They did not compete with one 
another.  Since the utilities did not compete, they had relationships and a long history of 
sharing ideas.  Utilities had no problem participating in a marketplace their competitors 
were in because they had never competed with these companies.  Within two weeks of 
Pegasus’ formation, most North American utilities were participating in the marketplace. 
In the convenience store industry, intense competition exists at each level of the 
supply chain.  In the EC heyday, competitor marketplace membership drove other 
industry players to consider marketplace membership.  However, industry players were 
hesitant to participate in the same marketplace as their competitors, undermining the 
vision of a convenience store industry B2B e-marketplace. Part of the problem was that 
industry participants did not have relationships with their competitors.  In the EC 
heyday, two convenience store industry marketplaces formed.  Each had potential 
participants along a supply chain (e.g., retailer, distributor, manufacturer).  This situation 
hurt both marketplaces’ membership solicitation efforts because potential members: did 
not want to be in a marketplace with their competitors, did not want to invest in both, 
and wanted to wait and see which one would become the convenience store industry 
B2B e-marketplace.   
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One solution to getting the industry to come together and form a marketplace is 
having the industry trade organization found a marketplace.  The United States 
Convenience Store Association had relationships with all the retailers, distributors, and 
manufacturers.  Unfortunately, even with the trade organization’s ability to bring the 
industry together, competition controlled potential members’ thinking.   They did not 
want an open marketplace in which all organizations were equal.  They insisted on tiers 
and preferential treatment for industry players with more money.  The trade organization 
had to incorporate all these views in shaping their marketplace since they depend on the 
industry for existence. As such, Retail Matrix’s envisioned marketplace was no longer 
open.  In this sense, Retail Matrix became like CSX.  Several months before, Retail 
Matrix would not endorse CSX because their marketplace was not open.  Then, after the 
industries’ input, Retail Matrix’s envisioned marketplace was not open either.  The 
following quote illustrates competition in the convenience store industry. 
 
In the case of the marketplace for the industry, we were working 
with organizations that try desperately to differentiate themselves.  
They could never get over trying to get a bigger piece of the pie 
and understand that we are going to make a bigger pie. 
 ---President and Chief Operating Officer, CSX 
 
 
We ultimately decided not to be a part of it (CSX) because it was 
never going to be open.  For us to join a marketplace it had to be 
an open marketplace and theirs was never going to be open. 
 
Being a trade organization we wanted to restrict everyone so they 
had the same level of participation.  They all paid a price and it 
was egalitarian.  With them being naturally competitive they 
didn't want that.  They wanted different levels of participation 
based on what they pay.  It goes to the issue of control, power, and 
influence.  So, we did a compromise and structured the 
marketplace so they could have different levels of participation. 
  --- Senior Vice President of Strategic Alliances, 
 United States Convenience Store Association   
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Why did NTX achieve high membership when the transportation industry is also 
competitive?  NTX overcame carrier competition as a membership inhibitor by having 
an independent ownership structure and being buyer driven.  Venture capitalists 
forming NTX facilitated membership as it overcame the problem of potential 
participants not wanting to participate in a competitor-formed marketplace.  This is in 
line with Memishi’s work (2001), which proposes marketplace success is contingent on 
the founding companies distancing themselves as organizations will be hesitant to 
participate in competitor-operated marketplaces.   Also, NTX membership is shipper 
driven.  Shippers represent an array of industries.  The carrier side is the competitive side 
not the shipper side.   
Competition works both ways. Competition can be the impetus for organizations 
participating in a marketplace as we saw in the “environment change” section.  However 
competition can also prevent the formation of truly open industry marketplaces.  
Competitive organizations have no relationship on which to build a marketplace and do 
not want to participate in a marketplace with one another.  Competition was one of the 
main marketplace membership inhibitors in the convenience store industry. 
The existing IOIS literature does not mention competition’s effect on 
relationships.  This may be because existing IOIS were implemented between an 
organization and its trading partners and did not focus on bringing competitors together.  
7.2.2. Continued Existence 
Change takes time.  Even if a marketplace offers relative advantage to “in-
power” players and the environment encourages marketplace membership, attracting 
members takes time.  Therefore, the model proposes continued existence drives 
marketplace membership.   
How do marketplaces achieve continued existence?  The data indicate 
marketplaces providing complementary services to potential participants can achieve 
continued existence.  Complementary services provide a revenue stream until the 
marketplace is up and going.  They also build relationships with the marketplaces and 
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move the organizations in a direction culminating in marketplace use.  The cases below 
provide an illustration. 
NTX started as a pure marketplace with the vision of matching buyers and sellers 
of excess freight.  They struggled for several years to achieve membership.  Shippers 
needed a way to automate their existing freight procurement processes.  NTX adapted by 
letting shippers use their software as a means to electronically facilitate existing freight 
agreements.  This allowed NTX to sustain themselves until the marketplace took off.  In 
addition to a revenue stream sustaining NTX’s existence, this move got shippers using 
NTX’s technology and using the marketplace to procure loads without existing carrier 
agreements.  Shippers requiring their carriers’ participation got carriers used to the 
technology and made their capacity available to other shippers.  The following quote 
illustrates this. 
 
We still do pure marketplace transactions but we had to move to 
this electronic facilitation of existing agreements while we got the 
marketplace up and running.  
 ---Regional Sales Director, NTX 
 
Pegasus had the same situation.  They started as a marketplace for the utilities to 
conduct business.  When the marketplace’s technology was not as efficient as the 
utilities’ existing technologies and the utilities struggled to change their existing business 
practices to incorporate the marketplace,  Pegasus developed complementary services to 
stay afloat and to move the industry in the direction of marketplace use.  The quotes 
below illustrate the importance of continued existence. 
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Getting up and going has still been like trench warfare.   
 ---President and Chief Executive Officer, Pegasus 
 
During the “dot.com” craze everyone thought you had to be the 
first to market.  Being the first to market is not the key, hanging in 
there for another day is the strategy.  Pegasus has been successful 
because we have a multi-faceted business model.  Enough has 
worked to give us continued existence.   
 ---Sales Vice President, Pegasus 
 
CSX also struggled to attract members.  To sustain until the industry adopted the 
marketplace, CSX became a software company.  They sold their extranet software to one 
retailer.  Adopting the extranet software moved the one retailer in the direction of 
marketplace use.  However, this was not enough to sustain them.     
Retail Matrix did not have the funds to support an alternative strategy while their 
marketplace struggled to attract members. 
The IOIS literature does not mention that continued existence drives IOIS 
adoption or membership.  The IOIS literature also does not mention the importance of 
offering complementary services in order to continue to exist and move organizations 
toward e-marketplace membership and use.  This is probably because previous IOIS 
were hatched and supported within organizations.  Continued existence is critical to B2B 
e-marketplace membership because marketplaces must sustain in order to attract 
members.  Complementary services provide financial resources to sustain the 
e-marketplace until a critical mass of organizations join and begin using the marketplace.    
7. 3.   CONCLUSION 
This chapter posits a model explaining several factors driving B2B e-marketplace 
membership.  See Figure 10.  The revised model is based on extensive fieldwork and 
intensive field note coding. The revised model is the result of cross-case driver and 
membership level comparisons between the four marketplaces and between the two high 
membership (NTX and Pegasus) and the two low membership (CSX and Retail Matrix) 
marketplaces. 
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7.3.1. Comparison to Original Model 
Some drivers in the original model, Figure 4, are not present in the revised 
model. Some drivers are present in an underlying dimension of the revised model.   
The original model posits external pressure consisting of business 
environment encouragement and business partner encouragement drives B2B 
e-marketplace membership.  The revised model includes business environment 
encouragement as part of the business environment change discussion.  The revised 
model posits that if the marketplace offers a currently realizable relative advantage to 
“in-power” organizations, they will then encourage their business partner to join. 
The original model posits key player involvement drives B2B e-marketplace 
membership.  We define key players as organizations having more sales than most other 
industry organizations or as organizations with few competitors in either production or 
consumption of industry goods.  The revised model does not have key player 
involvement as a direct B2B e-marketplace membership driver.  However, key player 
involvement surfaces in the relative advantage discussion.  In discussing relative 
advantage, the model explains marketplace membership hinges on offering organizations 
“in-power” a relative advantage.  The model further explains, given currently realizable 
relative advantage to “in-power” organizations, they will join the marketplace and 
encourage their trading partners’ membership.   
The original model posits industry support drives B2B e-marketplace 
membership.  The model operationalizes industry support as trade organization support.  
The data did not show a link between industry support and marketplace membership.  
Retail Matrix, formed by a trade organization, had the fewest participants.  NTX had the 
most participants.  NTX did not have trade organization support and explain that the 
trade organization fears them and wants them to go out of business.  Trade organization 
support was not critical to Pegasus.  In the interview, the Buyer Development Manager 
was unsure whether Pegasus had trade organization support.  CSX tried to merge with 
Retail Matrix because they thought trade organization support drove marketplace 
membership.  When we asked CSX’s President and Chief Operating Officer about the 
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importance of trade organization support to organization marketplace membership, she 
explained that the industry which the trade organization represented did not want the 
trade organization participating in a for profit venture.  She was also quick to point out 
that the marketplace with trade organization support was the first to fold. 
7.3.2. Research Implications  
This chapter’s findings offer insights to the existing IOIS literature as well as to a 
number of theories underpinning this literature. In this section, we discuss the IOIS 
literature implications as well as the theoretical implications of our study.   
7.3.2.1.   Interorganizational Information Systems (IOIS) Literature Implications 
 As we discussed each of our study’s findings in the chapter, we compared each 
finding with the existing IOIS literature.  In the comparison, we recognized and cited 
other IOIS studies which agree with the particular individual findings in our study.  Our 
literature comparison expanded to the IOIS literature, because very little e-marketplace 
research exists.   
 Our study is one of the first to recognize three IOIS adoption motivations.  The 
existing IOIS studies typically link one of the motivations in our findings to IOIS 
adoption.  A few studies (Chwelos et al. 2001, Crook and Kumar 1998, Grewal et al. 
2001, Iacovou et al. 1995, Ramamurthy et al. 1999, Williams 1994) link two of the 
motivations in our study to IOIS adoption.  Only one study (Premkumar and 
Ramamurthy 1995) recognizes three motivational drivers for IOIS adoption.  This study 
is a survey in an EDI context.  
The existing IOIS literature’s lack of recognition of multiple IOIS adoption 
motivations may be because the literature that formed most of the previous IOIS 
research involved soliciting information based on previous findings and preexisting 
theoretical frameworks. Because our research was grounded in the experiences of 
e-marketplace makers and organizations implementing e-marketplaces, we were able to 
uncover an array of motivations for e-marketplace membership. 
In addition, our research recognizes both motivating and facilitating drivers of 
e-marketplace membership.   
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The existing IOIS literature does not mention continued existence as a facilitator 
of IOIS adoption.  Nor does the literature mention the need to offer complementary 
services in order to survive.  Most IOIS were formed and supported within 
organizations.  The group implementing the IOIS could depend on their organization’s 
resources for survival.  The group could also depend on the relationship between the 
implementing organization and its trading partner in order to achieve IOIS adoption and 
use.   
Most e-marketplaces and the e-marketplaces in this study are stand-alone 
ventures.  As a result, these e-marketplaces do not have the same organizational resource 
support that IOIS created within and protected by organizations have.  As such, the 
e-marketplace’s continued existence is critical to achieving membership.  The 
e-marketplace has to survive in order for organizations to become members.  Offering 
complementary services is critical to an e-marketplace’s continued existence.  
Complementary services give the e-marketplace a way to exist, while organizations 
consider joining and move toward using the e-marketplace.    Complementary services 
move some organizations toward using some e-marketplace offerings and to influencing 
their trading partners to join and use the e-marketplace. 
The IOIS literature does not recognize that communication facilitates IOIS 
adoption.  This may be because most IOIS connect an organization to its trading 
partners.  As such, learning about the IOIS only requires the initiating organization 
communicate with the trading partners they want to do business with over the IOIS.  
E-marketplaces require the membership and use of a critical mass of buyers and sellers. 
As such, soliciting this critical mass of members requires communication to all the 
intended participants.   
The IOIS literature links marketing and promotion to IOIS adoption (Cavaye and 
Cragg 1995, Hope et al. 2001, Iacovou et al. 1995, Reich and Benbasat 1990, Runge 
1985, Runge 1988).  The two e-marketplaces in our study that did the most traditional 
marketing and promotion were the least successful in attracting members.  However, our 
study indicated two aspects of marketing and promotion facilitate e-marketplace 
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membership:  having industry sales representatives and having these sales 
representatives educate organizations on how to use the e-marketplace.   The existing 
IOIS literature does not recognize the importance of industry sales representatives.  
Again, this may be because the other IOIS were formed within industry organizations.  
As such, people from the initiating organization had industry experience and industry 
relationships.  The dynamics behind previous IOIS implementation may not have 
provided a comparison between people with industry experience and relationships and 
those without.    
Finally, the existing IOIS literature does not mention competition’s effect on 
IOIS relationships.  This is probably because previous IOIS studies focus on linking an 
organization and its trading partners.  They do not focus on bringing entire industries, 
including competitors, together to do business.   
7.3.2.2.   Theoretical Implications 
In addition to providing implications to the existing IOIS literature, this study 
also provides implications to a number of theories underpinning the existing IOIS 
literature.  
Innovation diffusion theory (Rogers 1995) posits users’ technology adoption 
decisions as rational choices based on technology characteristics.  The theory posits 
users adopt technology they perceive offers greater:  relative advantage, compatibility, 
trialability, observability, and less complexity.  Rogers  (1995, p. 213) defines relative 
advantage as “the degree an innovation is perceived as being better than the idea it 
supersedes.”  This study’s findings support innovation diffusion theory by proposing 
relative advantage in terms of a marketplace’s value proposition drives marketplace 
membership.   
This study’s findings qualify relative advantage, explaining that the 
e-marketplace must provide a relative advantage to “in-power” organizations. While 
innovation diffusion theory does not make this qualification,  Lee and Clark’s  (1996b) 
e-marketplace study supports the “in-power” relative advantage qualification.  The 
authors find lack of market power to enforce the change is a barrier toward 
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e-marketplace adoption.   Lee and Clark explain that firms adversely affected by an 
electronic market will resist and oppose the system.  CATS, one of the failed 
e-marketplaces in their study, lacked the market power to persuade industry 
organizations to use the e-marketplace. 
Innovation diffusion theory does not specify that relative advantage must be 
currently realizable.  This may be because the innovations used to develop innovation 
diffusion theory were functional.  The innovations were actual systems that could be 
used.  This study included several e-marketplaces that were at some point not functional.  
These innovations were ideas and presentations, not actually usable systems.  This 
allowed the study to contrast currently realizable vs. anticipated relative advantage.   
Malone et al.’s (1987) electronic markets hypothesis posits that buyers and 
suppliers have different motives for joining electronic markets.  Suppliers join electronic 
markets because they want buyers to purchase their products rather than their 
competitors.  Buyers join electronic markets to increase the number of alternative 
suppliers and better compare prices.  This research supports and contradicts the 
electronic markets hypothesis.  We found one supplier that joined the e-marketplace 
because they wanted buyers to purchase their products instead of their competitors’ 
products.  The other suppliers in our study joined the e-marketplace because their trading 
partner encouraged them to join.  The suppliers joined because they wanted to retain 
their existing business relationships.  In fact, once members of the e-marketplace these 
suppliers used the e-marketplace to do business only with the business partner that 
encouraged them join.  The suppliers did not venture into making their products 
available to other e-marketplace buyers. 
The findings offer several contrasts to the electronic markets hypothesis.  Many 
of the buying organizations in the study joined e-marketplaces because they felt they had 
to in order to stay abreast of the business environment push toward EC involvement. 
This is not mentioned in the electronic markets hypothesis.  In addition, one of the 
e-marketplaces in the study, NTX, changed the market structure and allowed sellers to 
compare prices and alternatives, but did not allow buyers to electronically compare 
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prices or alternatives.  The electronic markets hypothesis predicts that buyers will use 
e-marketplaces to compare prices.   
Power theories  (Emerson 1962, Pfeffer 1988, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, 
Thompson 1967) explain organizations depend on other organizations to the extent that  
an organization needs resources or performances from the other organizations, and in 
inverse proportion to the extent that others can provide the same resource or 
performance.  An implication of power theory is that powerful organizations can 
influence activities of organizations that depend on them.  This supports the business 
partner encouragement discussion in the research model.  The research model posits that 
there must be a relative advantage to “in-power” organizations, as these organizations 
will then encourage their less powerful trading partners to participate in the marketplace.  
The less powerful trading partners will participate because they depend on their 
powerful trading partners.   
The data indicate that power may be a stronger explanation for e-marketplace 
membership than relative advantage.  Two selling organizations explained that they 
joined the e-marketplace because of business partner encouragement.  Both of these 
organizations stated that they did not perceive a relative advantage from e-marketplace 
membership.   
The study finds that buyers’ and suppliers’ desire to maintain their existing 
relationships hinder marketplace membership.  This finding supports incomplete 
contracts theory.  Incomplete contracts theory (Hart and Moore 1990) posits that 
certain things such as supplier innovativeness are observed by parties in relationships, 
but are not verifiable by third parties (e.g., courts or arbitrators).  These things cannot be 
contracted for ahead of time, but must be bargained for later.  The buying organizations 
in our study recognized that their existing suppliers provided many value-added services 
that could not be contracted for through an e-marketplace.  The buying organizations did 
not want to compromise the supplier relationships that they had worked for years to 
develop.  Furthermore, selling organizations were reluctant to join marketplaces because 
the current marketplace models evaluated them on price alone and did not recognize the 
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many value-added services they provide to their customers.  Marketplace membership 
increased when marketplaces customized their offerings to support these existing 
buyer-seller relationships. 
Institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977) 
suggests organizations adopt rules and practices that may not necessarily increase 
technical efficiency, but increase legitimacy in external stakeholders' eyes.  The model’s 
business environment change section supports institutional theory.  The findings indicate 
that the “dot.com” boom and the fact that everyone was getting involved in e-business 
accounted partially for organizations joining B2B e-marketplaces.  The data further 
illustrate this point with the difficulty in attracting marketplace members once 
marketplaces went out of fashion. 
The discussion above shows that in some cases the existing literature and 
theories support our findings.  These situations increase our findings’ validity and extend 
the IOIS literature and theories to a different context, B2B e-marketplaces.  In other 
situations, our findings conflict with the existing literature and theories.  This section 
identifies and examines these situations, offering greater insight both to our study’s 
findings and the existing literature and theories. 
7.3.3. Practical Implications 
Organizations forming a B2B e-marketplace should consider these findings. 
First, consider the industry the marketplace represents and which organizations have 
power.  Make sure the marketplace offers these organizations value propositions.  If the 
marketplace does offer these organizations value propositions and the propositions are 
currently realizable, they have a greater likelihood of joining and encouraging their 
trading partners’ membership.  When “in-power” organizations’ trading partners join 
and use the marketplace, the business environment changes and other organizations 
recognize the importance of doing business over the marketplace.   
While perceiving the marketplace as a mechanism for dealing with a business 
environment change drives marketplace membership, make sure EC involvement is not 
the primary motivation for e-marketplace involvement.  If it is, when the environment 
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changes the other way, organizations will lose interest and others will not want to 
participate. 
Achieving enough marketplace membership and use for the marketplace to reach 
financially sustainability takes time.  Marketplaces must have another way to financially 
sustain while this is happening, preferably offering services complementary to 
marketplace use.  NTX and Pegasus both offered services that sustained their 
marketplaces, while leading their industries slowly to marketplace use.   
Obtaining entrée to potential participants to tell them about marketplace benefits 
is difficult.  Marketplaces need promoters with industry relationships.  Relationships 
help promoters obtain entrée to tell potential participants about the marketplace.  Once 
in, the best approach is education, showing potential participants how to use the 
marketplace and the benefits.  Often organizations would like to adopt a marketplace to 
improve business practices, but they don’t know how to change their business practices 
to do so.  Pegasus’ Buyer Development Manager discusses the importance of education 
in achieving marketplace membership and use.   
 
I can sit in a room and say I want to fly but unless I am given the 
tools I will not be able to fly. 
 
 
Marketplaces must be aware of industry competition.  In very competitive 
industries, competitors may not have cooperative relationships with one another.  
Relationships help communicate the marketplace’s relative advantage and the 
marketplace as a mechanism for dealing with a business environment change.  Without 
this foundation, establishing this communication is difficult.  Even if communication can 
be established, strong competitors may not want to participate in a marketplace with one 
another.   
This study also provides insights into qualifiers for and losers of marketplace 
membership.  Qualifiers denote the minimum criteria necessary for a marketplace to 
attract members.  This includes reasonable value propositions and continued existence.  
Value propositions that do never become realizable are marketplace membership losers.  
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“Vaporware” is a word that surfaced early in our field studies.  Vaporware describes 
e-marketplaces that have an idea of how business will be conducted over the 
e-marketplace but no existing technology that allows idea execution.    
7.3.4. Future Research 
This chapter is one of the first in-depth inquiries of B2B e-marketplace 
membership.  While we answered a number of questions, a number still remain.   
How does the model hold up with other B2B e-marketplaces?  We develop a 
model of B2B e-marketplace membership drivers based on four marketplaces.  The 
model is based on a theoretical sample with marketplaces with different membership 
levels, in different industries, and with different existence periods.  However, the model 
will be stronger if compared to other marketplaces including other B2B e-marketplaces, 
consumer E-marketplaces, and non-electronic marketplaces.   
How do competitors overcome competition and form an industry marketplace 
with all industry participants?  The cases reveal competitive organizations do not have 
strong relationships, limiting their ability to establish communication soliciting 
marketplace membership.  Even with communication, competitors cannot overcome 
distrust and participate in a B2B e-marketplace together.  Action research or case studies 
of competitor-formed marketplaces will shed light on this question.   
Public goods theory (Fulk et al. 1996, Monge et al. 1998) grapples with 
achieving collaborative action among self-interested organizations sharing a common 
goal.  This chapter grapples with the same problem.  Based on public goods theory, 
Monge et al.  (1998) develop the theory of collective action in alliance-based 
interorganizational communication and information systems.  Monge et al.’s theory 
describes the process of producing multi-firm, alliance-based interorganizational 
communication and information public goods.  B2B e-marketplaces are examples of 
value chain alliances.  Future theoretical insights can be obtained by exploring insights 
Monge et al.’s theory can provide to achieving B2B e-marketplace membership and 
insights this research can provide to Monge et al.’s theory. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
8 RESEARCH QUESTION 2:  WHAT MARKETPLACE 
CHARACTERISTICS DRIVE BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE USE? 
Chapter VII explores business-to-business (B2B) electronic marketplace 
(e-marketplace) membership drivers.  It distinguishes membership as the decision to join 
a B2B e-marketplace and emphasizes that marketplace membership may not necessarily 
lead to marketplace use.  This chapter and the following chapter explore marketplace use 
drivers.  We define use as access frequency and transaction volume.  This chapter 
examines marketplace characteristics driving marketplace use.  Similar organizations 
with different use levels in the same marketplace form the impetus for Chapter IX.  
Chapter IX investigates organizational characteristics driving a particular organization’s 
marketplace use.   
For a marketplace to be used, there must be a significant number of members to 
do business over the marketplace and the marketplace’s value propositions must be 
realizable.  With these conditions in place, some marketplaces achieve high transaction 
volume and repeated use and others do not.  What marketplace characteristics drive B2B 
e-marketplace use?  To examine this question, we compare the four marketplaces’ use 
levels.  We also compare National Trucking Exchange (NTX) and Pegasus at their 
inception when they struggled to achieve use to most recently when their marketplaces 
have achieved higher utilizations.  We then compare each marketplace’s characteristics 
to determine that factors that distinguish high use from low use marketplaces.  The field 
notes from marketplace and member organization interviews provide the basis of this 
comparison.   
The paragraphs below discuss the model. The table supplements the discussion 
by evaluating the model’s drivers.  The conclusion discusses drivers in the original 
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model not included in the revised model, theoretical implications, practical implications, 
and future research avenues. 
8. 1.   RESEARCH MODEL 
Figure 11 shows marketplace characteristics driving B2B e-marketplace use.  
The model illustrates perceived realizable relative advantage drives marketplace use.  
We define perceived relative advantage as the marketplace’s value propositions being 
better than the processes they replace.  Whereas Chapter VII explains that organizations 
may join B2B e-marketplaces for an array of reasons, this chapter shows marketplace 
use will not occur without a perceived relative advantage. The model further posits that 
investor commitment and support drive perceived relative advantage and marketplace 
use.  We define investor commitment as the founding organizations making efforts to 
use the marketplace and or providing the marketplace feedback to improve the 
marketplace’s relative advantage so they can use the marketplace.  We define support as 
working with member organizations to understand the marketplace’s relative 
advantages, and ultimately use the marketplace.  The two-sided between perceived 
relative advantage and marketplace use illustrates that the more a marketplace is used, 
the higher the marketplace’s perceived relative advantage.  Customizing to existing 
industry practices, supporting low-leverage procurements, fee structures, and  benefits 
drive perceived relative advantage, which then drives marketplace use.   
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Figure 11  Marketplace Characteristics Driving B2B E-marketplace Use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 compares the four marketplaces’ use levels and characteristics driving 
use.  We measure use by the frequency and volume of transactions executed via the 
marketplace.     Table 11  shows NTX has the highest use level, followed by Pegasus, C-
Store Exchange (CSX), and Retail Matrix.  We obtained use levels during field visits.  
Pegasus’ and NTX’s field visits occurred between May 21, 2002 and July 9, 2002.  We 
verified NTX’s and Pegasus’ use levels with data published on their websites.  While 
CSX’s field visit occurred   November 20, 2002, the use level was based on use prior to 
CSX’s  October 31, 2002 shut-down.  Retail Matrix never achieved use. 
CUSTOMIZING 
TO EXISTING 
INDUSTRY 
PRACTICES 
REPORTING 
PRICE/SALES 
BENEFITS 
 
FEE  
STRUCTURES 
SUPPORTING 
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B2B 
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PERCEIVED 
RELATIVE 
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 Training 
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Table 11  Comparison of  Marketplace Characteristics Driving  
B2B E-marketplace  Use 
 NATIONAL 
TRUCKING 
EXCHANGE (NTX) 
PEGASUS C-STORE 
EXCHANGE 
(CSX) 
RETAIL 
MATRIX 
USE Over 10,000 
transactions/day 
Approximately 
1,000 
transactions/day 
3,500 Gulf 
Coast Oil 
convenience 
stores use daily 
0 transactions 
USE DRIVERS     
PERCEIVED 
RELATIVE 
ADVANTAGE 
Initially for shipments not 
covered by prenegotiated 
contracts, later as a 
facilitator for 
prenegotiated shipping 
contracts 
None initially, 
later yes 
Only by Gulf 
Coast Oil 
Not 
applicable 
Customizing to 
existing industry 
practices 
Used to facilitate 
prenegotiated freight 
contracts 
Used to negotiate 
supplier contracts 
and purchases 
from existing 
contracts 
Tried 
 
 
 
Not 
applicable  
Supporting low-
leverage 
procurements 
Yes Yes Not applicable Not 
applicable  
Fee Structures No membership fee, 
members are unaware of 
the amount of NTX’s 
transaction fees 
Membership fees, 
use fees, costs as 
a percentage of 
savings 
Monthly 
membership fee 
and transaction 
fees 
Not 
applicable  
Reporting 
Price/Sales 
Benefits 
Yes Yes Not applicable Not 
applicable 
INVESTOR 
COMMITMENT 
Unavailable Some utilities No Unavailable 
SUPPORT Yes Yes For retail stores Not 
applicable 
 
 
While we would like to compare transaction volume across all four marketplaces, 
Gulf Coast Oil Corporation only used CSX for communicating pricing and store 
operation information with 3,500 Gulf Coast Oil stores.   We include Retail Matrix in the 
table.  However, Retail Matrix’s marketplace characteristic drivers do not add to this 
discussion, since  Retail Matrix was unable to attract any members to conduct business 
over its marketplace before closing.  As such, most of the cell entries for Retail Matrix 
are not applicable.  Unavailable appears in a few of the table’s cells.  This indicates that 
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the field notes did not provide information for a particular driver in a particular 
marketplace.   
8.1.1. Perceived Relative Advantage 
A B2B e-marketplace’s perceived relative advantage drives marketplace use.  
The two-sided arrow connecting perceived relative advantage and use indicate that the 
more a marketplace is used, the greater the marketplace’s perceived relative advantage.  
We define perceived relative advantage as a marketplace’s offerings or value 
propositions “being better than the ideas they supersede” (Rogers 1995, p. 212).   
Chapter VII finds that perceived relative advantage drives marketplace 
membership.  Chapter VII finds perceiving the marketplace as a mechanism for dealing 
with an environment change also drives marketplace membership.  Whereas 
organizations may join an e-marketplace for an array of reasons, they will not use the 
marketplace unless the marketplace offers a relative advantage.  The paragraphs below 
discuss each marketplace’s perceived relative advantage and how the marketplace’s use 
increased its perceived relative advantage.   
NTX brings together shippers and transportation carriers.  NTX’s relative 
advantage is transaction cost reduction.  Posting loads on NTX’s Internet website is 
more efficient than contacting carriers individually.  In addition, pricing may be lower as 
carriers can increase capacity utilization by assimilating shipments into their routes and 
filling backhaul movements.  In the transportation industry, companies frequently 
shipping to the same destination often have prenegotiated carrier contracts.  Carriers 
strive to develop business in particular regions to optimize freight capacity.  NTX offers 
a relative advantage in situations not covered by a preexisting arrangement.  While this 
leads to some marketplace use, preexisting contracts cover most freight arrangements. 
As such, often shippers would post a load that was not picked up by a carrier or carriers 
would look for loads in an area and none would be available.   
 As discussed later, NTX modified their marketplace to facilitate preexisting 
carrier arrangements.  With increased carrier and shipper marketplace utilization, 
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perceived relative advantage further increased.  As with more organizations using the 
marketplace, the likelihood of tendering and finding relevant loads increased.   
Pegasus opened for business January 2001.  The participating utilities planned to 
transact all their procurement activities through Pegasus.  The utilities believed 
transacting business over Pegasus would lead to lower prices due to electronic 
cataloging, facilitating easy supplier price comparisons, and streamlining existing 
procurement practices.  Rather than doing business in a variety of ways (e.g., 
face-to-face, telephone, fax, e-mail, printed catalogues, electronic data interchange) all 
transactions would occur over the marketplace.   
With Pegasus’ initial release, the utilities realized that Pegasus’ marketplace 
business practices did not offer a relative advantage.  Whereas most North American 
utilities were Pegasus’ members, few suppliers joined Pegasus.  Furthermore, the 
participating suppliers did not list their lowest pricing with the marketplace.  Several 
utilities had better contracts with their preexisting supplier arrangements.  In addition, 
Pegasus’ purchasing user interface was less efficient than the utilities’ existing 
purchasing interfaces.  For example, in utility industry operations, 
computer-aided-design and computer-aided-manufacturing applications are common.  
Engineers lay out new utility infrastructure with computer-aided-design and 
computer-aided-manufacturing programs.  Once the design is complete, a materials list 
(e.g., poles, transformers, wires) is automatically created for later submission to 
preferred suppliers.  Pegasus’ initial user interface was a catalogue based 
business-to-consumer interface similar to Amazon.com.  Pegasus’ interface required 
utilities search online catalogues to procure products.    
Even though the utilities’ decision to participate in Pegasus was partly fueled by 
Pegasus’ perceived relative advantage, Pegasus did not originally achieve use because 
the perceived advantage did not materialize.  Pegasus’ later offerings did provide 
members a perceived relative advantage.  With these offerings, member use increased.  
With more members using and reporting success, the perception of Pegasus’ relative 
advantage further increased.   
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CSX proposed a variety of value propositions offering all members of the 
convenience store industry supply chain relative advantages.  CSX’s communication 
offerings were immediately realizable.  CSX increased communication between 
convenience store owners (e.g., corporate offices) and their retail convenience stores.  
This allowed corporate offices to share current prices, proper product display, and store 
operation advice.  CSX enabled retail stores to communicate sales back to their owners.  
CSX did not originally achieve use by marketplace members because CSX did not offer 
members an immediately realizable relative advantage.  However, as the investor 
commitment section will discuss, even when CSX did offer an immediately realizable 
and quantifiable relative advantage, the investors still would not use the marketplace.  
Two of CSX’s investors joined for the wrong reasons and as a result would not perceive 
the marketplace’s relative advantage.  McMurray Distributing joined CSX primarily to 
secure the Gulf Coast Oil service agreement.  Momentum Manufacturing joined CSX 
because McMurray Distributing, their largest customer,  requested their membership.  
Given that the environment was encouraging organizations to explore e-business, both 
McMurray Distributing and Momentum Manufacturing were interested in e-business 
endeavors.  When the environment stopped encouraging e-business endeavors, these 
investors’ interest lessened.  
The finding that perceived relative advantage drives B2B e-marketplace use 
supports previous interorganizational information systems (IOIS) studies.  Premkumar et 
al.’s  (1994) EDI research links relative advantage to adaptation, internal diffusion, and 
external diffusion.  Tabor’s (2001) study links relative advantage to B2B EC use. 
This section explains that member perceptions of the marketplace’s relative 
advantage drives marketplace use.  However, several factors drive marketplace 
members’ perception of the marketplace’s relative advantage.  The sections below 
discuss each of these.  
8.1.1.1.   Customizing to Existing Industry Practices 
B2B e-marketplaces were originally designed to bring together buyers and 
suppliers electronically to do business.  The goal was allowing buyers to become aware 
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of all the suppliers and shop the different suppliers and suppliers having access to more 
buyers.  In most cases, business does not work this way.  Buyers have prenegotiated 
contracts with preferred suppliers.  Buyers like dealing with their existing suppliers 
because they know the suppliers will deliver the right product, on time, and in good 
condition.  Because they have a relationship, suppliers will help buyers when they are in 
a pinch.  Suppliers cultivate buyer relationships to achieve consistent, predictable sales.  
Suppliers and buyers spend years cultivating relationships.  These relationships lead to 
synergies.  Suppliers develop innovations that help their buyers.  Buyers share 
information to help their suppliers predict sales and forecast production.  Free, open 
marketplaces that allow any buyer to purchase from any supplier at anytime undermine 
these relationships.   
The two marketplaces with higher use levels were initially positioned as free, 
open marketplaces.  After struggling to achieve marketplace use, both marketplaces 
customized their offerings to accommodate the relationships inherent in existing 
business practices.  We define customizing to existing industry practices as changing the 
marketplace to be consistent with existing industry operations.   
NTX’s founders understood technology, but did not understand transportation 
industry operations.  NTX’s initial marketplace was founded on shippers posting their 
loads and carriers looking at the website and accepting loads.  This works well for loads 
not covered by preexisting contracts (e.g., independent carriers, small businesses, and ad 
hoc loads).  Preexisting shipper-carrier contracts cover most loads.  Shippers negotiate 
long-term contracts with carriers.  Contracts consider price and delivering products on 
time and in good condition.  In bidding shipper contracts, carriers try to develop high 
utilization transport lanes both on the front and the backhaul.   
To achieve enough transaction volume to survive, NTX had to modify their 
marketplace’s business model to accommodate existing business practices.  NTX made 
their software available to shippers to manage their existing freight contracts.  Using 
NTX to execute existing carrier contracts led to shippers using NTX for loads not 
covered by preexisting contracts.  In executing existing freight contracts using NTX, 
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shippers required their carriers to use NTX.  This expanded the carrier base using NTX 
for all shippers.  The following quote illustrates this. 
 
When the marketplace didn't take off, we went after 
customer-automated solutions that the customers needed with 
their existing carriers.  This was facilitated over the marketplace’s 
technology but not quite the original marketplace conception. 
 ---Regional Sales Director, NTX 
 
Pegasus’ original vision of an open marketplace for utility procurement 
conflicted with utility industry practices.  Many items that utilities purchase are 
customized to that particular utility.  For example, if a buyer purchases wood poles over 
an open marketplace, the wood poles will probably not meet the utilities’ specifications 
(e.g., pointed vs. flat tops, resin treatment vs. no treatment).  In addition, at times utilities 
have to rebuild utility infrastructure because of inclement weather (e.g., tornado, ice 
storm).  Because of this, utilities value long-term supplier relationships as they depend 
on their suppliers to provide emergency materials to rebuild the infrastructure.  Given 
this scenario, for the bulk of utility purchases, utilities do not want buyers shopping from 
the population of suppliers.  Rather, utilities want buyers to do business with 
preapproved “channel partners.”  For repetitive purchases, utilities negotiate contracts 
with these preferred suppliers.  In developing these contracts, utilities consider price, 
specifications, quality, and noncontractible services.  They procure products based on 
prenegotiated supplier contracts.   
To achieve member use, Pegasus modified their original vision of their open 
marketplace business process to accommodate these industry practices.  Pegasus 
customized their marketplace to help utilities negotiate supplier contracts. Periodically, 
utilities put supplier contracts out for bid.  In doing this, utilities request different 
suppliers submit proposals for evaluation.  The utility then evaluates the supplier 
proposal on price, capacity, reputation, and other criteria.  Based on the proposals, the 
utility selects a supplier and enters into a long-term contract.   
Pegasus developed a request for quote (RFQ) function to automate this process.  
The function allows utilities to electronically communicate available business to 
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suppliers.  The function allows utilities to post a request for quote form soliciting 
information from suppliers (e.g., pricing, capacity, replenishment frequency).  Suppliers 
enter their information on the request for quote form and the utilities can then choose a 
long-term supplier.  For the contract term, utilities purchase items from the selected 
supplier at prenegotiated prices.  For the purposes of achieving marketplace use,  utilities 
would then purchase these items over Pegasus’ marketplace.   
Pegasus has developed a number of value propositions similar to the request for 
quote function.  These value propositions accommodate existing industry practices by 
facilitating periodic evaluation of supplier contracts.  The value propositions also 
recognize that on a daily basis utilities purchase products based on prenegotiated 
contracts with preapproved suppliers.  Utilities do not want their buyers shopping and 
purchasing products from the entire population of suppliers.  The following quote 
illustrates this. 
 
Large organizations with trained procurement people do not want 
their employees to shop.  They aren't interested in price 
comparisons.  They want their employees purchasing off of 
negotiated contracts.  Large organizations want to limit their 
employees’ field of view.  They don't want a place to compare 
prices in professional procurement shops.  They want to keep 
people away from maverick procurement processes. Our 
marketplace is not really for shopping and comparing prices.  The 
idea of shopping online and comparing is dead.  Now, a 
marketplace is a way of accessing an organization's own 
negotiated contracts and integrating with suppliers. 
 ---Sales Vice President, Pegasus 
 
CSX tried to customize their marketplace to accommodate convenience store 
industry business practices.  Both industry investors (McMurray Distributing and 
Momentum Manufacturing) provided industry experts to explain convenience store 
industry operations to the marketplace designers from the distributor’s and 
manufacturer’s perspective.  As part of this, CSX developed an offering called 
SmartPromo. SmartPromo was a software package designed to improve the product 
promotion process for the entire industry.  However, even with this offering, neither 
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McMurray Distributing nor Momentum Manufacturing would admit that marketplace 
use would help their business.   
 
I swear it was just like a poker game with each company holding 
their cards.  They didn't want to admit it was valuable to them or 
give too much information because if it was valuable to them then 
they might have to pay for it.  When we started it they said we'll   
participate in the collaboration but we're not going to buy it.  
 ---President and Chief Operating Officer, CSX 
 
Two IOIS studies (Grover 1993, Ramamurthy et al. 1999) find that IOIS that are 
similar to existing practices facilitate IOIS adoption and use.  These studies are in 
customer-based IOIS adoption and electronic data interchange diffusion contexts. This 
study is the first to link customizing the e-marketplace to existing industry practices to 
e-marketplace perceived relative advantage and ultimately e-marketplace use.  This is 
probably because our data provided a contrast of e-marketplaces that originally did not 
fit with industry practices and that then later customized their offering to support the 
industry practices.   
8.1.1.2.   Supporting Low-leverage Procurements 
Supporting low-leverage procurements drives marketplace perceived relative 
advantage, which then drives marketplace use.  We define low-leverage procurements as 
situations where individual marketplace members represent a low volume and or 
non-repeat business to suppliers.  In these situations, individual marketplace members do 
not have leverage to negotiate pricing.  Because buyers do not repeatedly purchase these 
items, they also do not have efficient systems to support procurement in these situations.  
Indirect materials procurement usually represents a low-leverage procurement situation.  
Indirect materials are not used in the direct production or delivery of an organization’s 
goods or services.  Examples of indirect materials for the four e-marketplaces in this 
study include office supplier and cellular phones. 
Marketplaces can support low-leverage procurements by developing strong 
vendor relationships.  Marketplaces are able to do this because the aggregation of all 
marketplace members represents substantial business to the supplier.  Representing a 
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group of members, the marketplace can negotiate supplier pricing.  The supplier will 
give the marketplace member better pricing than the member could attain individually.  
Marketplaces further support low-leverage procurements by designing efficient systems 
to accommodate these situations.  As such, supporting low-leverage procurements drives 
marketplace perceived relative advantage.   
In NTX’s case, members use the true, open marketplace feature to procure 
freight not covered by existing freight arrangements.   Shippers post loads when they 
have shipments that are non-repetitive and/or less than a truckload of freight.  Without 
the marketplace, these situations require calling an array of carriers for freight quotes.  
Carriers will not give their best price because this is non-repeat and/or low volume 
business.  Using NTX makes the procurement process more efficient, and since NTX 
represents substantial repeat business, carriers offer lower prices.  The following quote 
illustrates this. 
 
If a small mom and pop called and wanted us to haul for them 
they wouldn't get a discounted price because they don’t represent 
very much business.  When these mom and pops go through a 
broker or something like NTX they can get a better price because 
NTX represents a lot of business.   
 ---Low seller, NTX 
 
A carrier is in a low-leverage procurement situation when their truck is empty through 
some portion of a route.  Filling empty truck capacity increases profits.  Carriers use 
NTX in these situations.   
Since Pegasus has worked to develop strong supplier relationships that the 
utilities individually could not develop, it offers a relative advantage in procuring 
indirect materials.  To suppliers, Pegasus represents substantial repeat business from an 
entire industry, whereas each utility does not.  In these situations, Pegasus has negotiated 
better pricing than the utilities could negotiate.  In addition, low-leverage product 
purchases occur only occasionally so the process is manual.  Pegasus’ systems increase 
efficiency in low-leverage procurement.  The following quote illustrates this. 
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Pegasus has had some success in indirects:  cellular phones, 
wireless service, office supplies.  They have found fertile ground 
in indirects.  While we buy a lot of indirects we are not the 
indirect suppliers’ biggest customer and so we don't get the best 
pricing in indirects.  Pegasus is able to leverage the buying power 
of all the utilities to get better pricing on indirects.  
 ---High buyer, Pegasus 
 
Marketplaces offer more value in the procurement of indirects. 
The need is unexpected.  When you buy something you don't buy  
everyday you need to go through the catalogue, find what you 
want and hand it over to a buyer.  With indirects there are not 
prenegotiated contracts. Studies have been done that show in 
indirect procurement a $17 product can end up costing $120 to 
own and use.   
 ---Sales Vice President, Pegasus 
 
The following quote illustrates that indirect material suppliers participate in 
marketplaces because marketplaces give access to an entire industry.   
 
We got involved in this marketplace because we wanted to do 
business with the utility industry.  Pegasus would introduce us to 
the utilities at a higher level and make them take a serious 
consideration in doing business with us.   
 ---High seller (office supplies), Pegasus 
 
The existing IOIS literature does not link supporting low-leverage procurements 
to IOIS relative advantage or IOIS use.  This may be because e-marketplaces are actually 
competing with existing IOIS such as electronic data interchange.  Years ago 
organizations implemented IOIS systems to make their existing business processes more 
efficient.  These IOIS were normally implemented to streamline the procurement of 
frequently used products (e.g., direct materials).  In evaluating how to use B2B 
e-marketplaces, organizations are comparing the e-marketplace to their existing IOIS.  
Since the organizations have worked for years to cultivate relationships with their 
existing trading partners and to develop interorganizational information systems 
supporting this relationship, e-marketplaces do not offer a relative advantage in these 
situations. Since organizations do not have the same trading partner relationships or 
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automated processes for indirect materials, e-marketplaces that support these situations 
offer a perceived relative advantage. 
8.1.1.3.   Fee Structures 
The fees associated with B2B e-marketplace use and how the fee structures are 
communicated drives marketplace perceived relative advantage, which then drives 
marketplace use.  We define fee structures as the financial amount the marketplace 
charges members for its services.  The higher the marketplace’s fees and the less certain 
the marketplace’s benefits for the fees, the lower the marketplace’s relative advantage.  
Communicating fees where member organizations see an immediately realizable 
quantifiable benefit in excess of the fees drives marketplace relative advantage. 
Organizations pay nothing to participate in NTX.  NTX charges a transaction fee 
on every load tendered through NTX’s marketplace.  However, carriers and shippers 
never see the fee.  Shippers post what they will pay for a carrier to haul a load.  NTX 
then deducts its fee and posts the load at shipper’s price less its fee.  Carriers see the 
reduced price and can choose to accept the load.  The load is tendered at acceptable 
prices for both parties.   
Pegasus’ twenty-one founding utilities put up a $105 million dollar investment in 
Pegasus.  Pegasus also charges utilities an annual membership fee.  When Pegasus 
facilitates a contract, it charges utilities a percentage of the savings over the contract 
term.  For auctions Pegasus charges an event fee.  Pegasus originally charged a $2 
transaction fee to both buyers and suppliers for every purchase order executed through 
the marketplace.   
In marketplace use decisions, utilities consider Pegasus’ fees.  On one hand, the 
magnitude of each utility’s investment drives the utilities to continue to explore ways of 
using Pegasus.  On the other hand, utilities consider the fees vs. the relative advantage 
before using Pegasus’ offerings.  The following quote illustrates this. 
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We are developing cost models to determine whether to buy 
things from Pegasus or to use another option.   
 ---Low buyer, Pegasus 
 
When Pegasus started, it had trouble attracting suppliers.  Part of the suppliers’ 
reluctance was that Pegasus was charging $2 per purchase order to both buyers and 
sellers for transactions executed over the marketplace. Pegasus was also charging 
suppliers a membership fee.  Pegasus’ marketplace was not used extensively until the 
marketplace waived up-front supplier membership fees and  supplier purchase order 
fees.  The quotes below illustrate this point. 
 
The suppliers were very opposed to Pegasus at the time, because 
Pegasus was charging huge fees to do business over the 
marketplace.   
 ---Nonmember, Pegasus 
 
Originally they (suppliers) were going to have to pay.  But 
Pegasus has found out that they will not be able to get vendors on 
if they make them pay.  So they have waived the fee for the first 
year. They are likely to waive the fee for the years to come.   
 ---Low buyer, Pegasus   
 
We couldn't play when marketplaces were charging suppliers so 
much.  But now that the marketplaces aren't charging suppliers to 
participate we go after it. 
 ---High seller, Pegasus   
 
Pegasus’ offerings with the most use are offerings where Pegasus’ fee is a percentage of 
the savings earned by the buyer or seller.  With this approach, utilities compare their 
current pricing to Pegasus’ pricing.  Pegasus’ fee is a percentage of the savings. 
CSX requires members pay up-front fees to use CSX’s marketplace.  Each retail 
convenience store pays $100/month to participate in CSX’s marketplace.  Suppliers pay 
a monthly fee to access aggregated end consumer sales data.  CSX also charges fees for 
transaction processing.  Since CSX’s fees were up-front and not tied to a quantifiable 
benefit, CSX’s target members had trouble perceiving CSX’s relative advantage.  As 
such, most did not join or use the marketplace.  The following quote illustrates this.   
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If you look at what the marketplace wanted to charge us for 
joining $250 /store* 2,200 stores*12 months, that is $6.6 million 
dollars. We could build stores for that.   
 ---Nonmember, CSX   
 
Premkumar et al.’s (1994) electronic data interchange work provides some 
support for our finding that fee structure drives perceived relative advantage, which 
ultimately drives e-marketplace use.  Premkumar et al. find low cost facilitates 
adaptation, internal diffusion, and external diffusion. 
8.1.1.4.   Reporting Price/Sales Benefits 
Both high use marketplaces measure each member organization’s transactions 
and calculate each member’s price or sales benefits from conducting transactions via the 
marketplace.  The marketplace then reports these benefits to each marketplace member.  
The marketplace reports usual price less marketplace price to organizations purchasing 
items via the marketplace.  The marketplace reports sales volume to organizations 
selling products or services via the marketplace.  As such, the model proposes reporting 
price/sales benefits drives marketplace perceived relative advantage.  We define 
reporting price/sales benefits as providing marketplace members documentation showing 
cost savings from procuring goods and services via the marketplace and/or 
documentation showing increased sales from marketplace use.    
Unfortunately, the data does not allow a contrast between reporting price/sales 
benefits and not reporting these benefits.  NTX and Pegasus reported transaction results 
and had higher use levels.  CSX was only used for corporate communication to Gulf 
Coast Oil retail stores, and therefore had no transaction results to report.  We include 
reporting price/sales benefits as a perceived relative advantage driver because the 
participants repeatedly referred to these reports as an indicator of the marketplace’s 
relative advantage and their marketplace use. 
Shippers calculate price benefits from using NTX in two ways.  Some shippers 
provide NTX the price they usually pay a carrier to deliver a load.  NTX then posts the 
load at a price, reduced by NTX’s fee, to its website for carriers to view.  When a carrier 
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accepts the load, NTX reports to the shipper the savings from using NTX to tender the 
load.  NTX calculates shipper savings by the shipper’s usual load price less the carrier’s 
accepted price reduced by NTX’s transaction fee.  Some shippers enter the price they are 
willing to pay a carrier to deliver a load.  In these cases, the shipper maintains a 
spreadsheet showing the usual shipping price for the load.  Shippers calculate their 
savings by taking what they usually pay for the load less what they paid via NTX.  In 
these cases, carriers see what the shipper is willing to pay to tender the load less NTX’s 
fee.  Carriers receive reports showing the number of loads tendered via NTX and the 
price per load.  
NTX’s use results in substantial efficiency benefits.  Before NTX, when shippers 
had a load that was not covered by an existing carrier arrangement, the shipper had to 
call different carriers to obtain prices and availability for hauling the load.  Depending 
on availability, carriers’ freight quotes varied substantially.  As such, securing a carrier 
for a load at a reasonable price could take hours.  While the respondents recognized the 
process improvement, they spoke of and reported the marketplace’s benefits only in 
terms of freight price reductions. 
Pegasus struggled to achieve marketplace use.  Once some members began doing 
business over the marketplace, Pegasus documented the results and provided reports 
showing utility savings and supplier sales from marketplace use.  Industry participants 
began seeing Pegasus’ relative advantage and marketplace use increased.   The following 
quote illustrates this. 
 
Getting data about their successes with Pegasus helps companies 
get more involved with Pegasus. Suppliers love analytics.  This 
gives them more information.  Analytics helps facilitate 
marketplace use. 
 ---President and Chief Executive Officer, Pegasus  
 
Like NTX, Pegasus’ reports focus on decreased prices for buyers and increased sales for 
suppliers.  Pegasus’ value propositions included efficiency improvements.  However, 
neither the utilities nor Pegasus included this in a report of marketplace benefits.  The 
following quote illustrates this.  
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In evaluating Pegasus, the company isn't looking at the total cost 
of ownership for products.  Pegasus has knocked 2 weeks off of 
some procurement processes.  In evaluating Pegasus, we have to 
consider the total cost and benefits of ownership.   
 ---Low buyer, Pegasus   
 
While NTX and Pegasus’ use increased efficiency and improved business 
practices, both marketplaces only reported benefits in terms of price reductions and sales 
increases.  This is ironic since these marketplaces and their members emphasized 
marketplace efficiency value propositions, and yet even with efficiency improvements, 
the marketplaces and their members did not measure these results.  As such, the model 
proposes reporting price/sales benefits, not entire marketplace benefits, drives 
marketplace use. 
 The marketplace participants’ incentive systems may explain why the 
marketplace and marketplace members only measured benefits in terms of price 
reductions and sales increases.  Organizations and employees typically track results 
based on their incentive systems.  Procuring products at lower prices is a typical 
performance metric for procurement personnel.  Increased sales is a typical performance 
metric for sales people. 
The existing IOIS literature does not recognize reporting price/sales benefits as a 
driver of perceived relative advantage or IOIS use.    Previous IOIS value propositions  
were to develop closer business partner links and increase efficiency.  The value 
proposition of e-marketplaces is reduced prices and increased sales.  Since 
e-marketplaces have intended benefits different than the other IOIS, their relative 
advantage drivers will also differ.  In addition, our study is grounded in the experiences 
of organizations actually implementing e-marketplaces, whereas much of the existing 
IOIS literature is grounded in the previous literature and interpretations of preexisting 
theories.    
    166 
 
8.1.2. Investor Commitment  
At the beginning of this study, B2B e-marketplaces were new.  Marketplaces and 
member organizations were both learning how to make marketplaces work.  We were 
involved with Pegasus and CSX during both marketplaces’ inception.  Both 
marketplaces envisioned themselves as open marketplaces for their entire industry to 
conduct business.  Investor commitment was critical as both marketplaces struggled to 
achieve marketplace use.  We define investor commitment as the founding organizations 
making efforts to use the marketplace and/or providing the marketplace feedback to 
increase the marketplace’s relative advantage in order for  the marketplace to be used.   
When Pegasus went live in January 2001, most of its investors tried to use the 
marketplace.  When the marketplace didn’t provide a relative advantage over the 
investing utilities’ existing business practices, the utilities notified Pegasus.  As Pegasus 
improved the marketplace by introducing new offerings, the utilities would evaluate and 
try to use the offerings.  These efforts show that at least some of Pegasus’ investors were 
trying to use the marketplace.  By struggling through and giving feedback, the investors 
helped Pegasus design offerings that provided the utilities a relative advantage.  As part 
of investor commitment, the investors influenced select suppliers to conduct business 
with them over the marketplace.  This component of investor commitment increased 
marketplace use.  Investors and select suppliers conducting business over the 
marketplace signaled that the marketplace was a viable business option, further driving 
marketplace use. 
CSX’s original value proposition was helping corporate offices communicate 
with their retail convenience stores.  CSX envisioned themselves as becoming a 
marketplace for the entire convenience store industry.  To do this, CSX needed their 
investors to use the marketplace’s offerings and then require their business partners’ 
marketplace use.   
CSX’s initial offerings did not provide an immediately realizable relative 
advantage to the two industry investors.  However, CSX improved and offered a value 
proposition streamlining the industry promotion process. Periodically, manufacturers run 
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product promotions to increase sales.  The promotion process involves the manufacturer 
communicating the promotion to the distributor and the distributor then communicating 
the promotion to the retailer.  Retailers are paid a certain amount for every promotion 
item sold during the promotion period.  Most retailers do not scan sales to the end 
consumer.  In this type of promotion, manufacturers do not have records of retail store 
purchases since promotion items are sold through a distributor.  As such, calculating 
each retail store's promotion sales during the promotion period involves manufacturer 
field representatives visiting each store and counting inventory before and after the 
promotion period.  The distributor supplies the manufacturer each store’s purchases 
during the promotion period.  CSX simplifies the promotion process.  CSX allows 
manufacturers to communicate promotion information directly to retail stores.  Since 
CSX includes scanning technology, CSX allows promotion sales to be communicated 
back to the manufacturer.  CSX pilot tested the effect of using CSX to communicate 
product promotions to retail stores.  The pilot tests indicated that when promotions were 
announced over CSX, sales of the promotion product increased earlier and sustained 
longer compared to traditional product promotion communication channels. 
Given that CSX’s offerings included a realizable relative advantage for each 
member organization, why were the Gulf Coast Oil stores the only users?  Why did Gulf 
Coast Oil only use the marketplace for communication?  CSX’s other members joined 
for the wrong reasons and therefore were not committed investors.  McMurray 
Distributing joined CSX primarily to secure the Gulf Coast Oil contract.  Their 
secondary purpose was to become involved in EC.  Momentum Manufacturing joined 
because their largest customer, McMurray Distributing, asked them to join.  Momentum 
Manufacturing was also interested in learning about EC.  Since neither organization 
joined the marketplace because of the marketplace’s relative advantage to business 
operations, they were not committed investors and would not perceive CSX’s relative 
advantage to their business operations.  In addition, they made no efforts to use the 
marketplace.  The quotes below illustrate this. 
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The companies openly said they were going to make no efforts to 
adopt the technology of the marketplace or integrate it into their 
business.  
 ---President and Chief Operating Officer, CSX 
 
Big companies like Momentum Manufacturing get involved 
because we ask them to and then they just charge their investment 
to advertising expense.  They get involved but don't really care 
what happens. 
  ---Low seller and buyer, CSX 
 
 Gulf Coast Oil still does their business the same way they have 
always done business with EDI and telxon units.  When 
McMurray Distributing got involved in CSX, McMurray 
Distributing assumed Gulf Coast Oil wanted to do business via 
CSX, but they have not moved that direction.  
   ---Low seller and buyer, CSX 
 
I came home and realized early on that we were going to have 
problems because McMurray Distributing did not plan to use the 
exchange for their invoices or reorders.  They made a commitment 
to join and contribute cash and intellectual capital.  It was a 
self-fulfilling prophecy if they didn't use it then no one was going 
to use it.  
 ---President and Chief Operating Officer, CSX 
 
When RJR saw that Momentum Manufacturing was moving slow 
they said why bother.  This should have worked.  It was 
dependent on the shareholders.  The investors must be passionate 
customers.  The viability of the marketplace depends on it. 
 ---President and Chief Operating Officer, CSX 
 
Several IOIS studies have linked investor commitment to IOIS use.  Tabor’s 
(2001) work links management commitment to B2B EC use.  Crook and Kumar (1998) 
link senior management commitment to electronic data interchange use.   Ramamurthy 
et al. (1999) link internal support and customer support to electronic data interchange 
diffusion.  This is the first research in an e-marketplace context linking investor 
commitment to e-marketplace use.   
Our findings also indicate investor commitment drives perceived relative 
advantage.  The existing IOIS research does not link investor commitment to perceived 
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relative advantage.  This may be because the previously studied phenomena did not 
provide a contrast of an IOIS without a perceived relative advantage and then the 
committed investors providing feedback to develop the IOIS’ perceived relative 
advantage.  Our data did.  In addition, the previous research may not have been designed 
to capture such a phenomena.  Much of the previous research is based on testing 
preconceived relationships instead of discovering relationships.  Our research was 
grounded in the experiences of the organizations implementing e-marketplaces so our 
research captured this.   
8.1.3. Support 
Support drives perceived relative advantage and marketplace use.  We define 
support as helping marketplace members identify situations in which marketplace use 
can provide benefits, training marketplace members to use the marketplace, and 
answering questions associated with marketplace use. 
NTX did not originally have sales representatives supporting member 
organizations’ use efforts.  During this period, NTX struggled to achieve use.  NTX later 
added sales representatives.  NTX’s sales representatives help potential members 
identify situations in which using NTX can reduce freight costs, train members to use 
NTX, and answer questions associated with using NTX.  When NTX began supporting 
member use, NTX’s marketplace use substantially increased.   
Pegasus did not originally have many people dedicated to supporting the utilities’ 
marketplace use efforts.  At the start, Pegasus introduced offerings to the utilities without 
the utilities’ input and without helping the utilities understand or use them.  The 
following quote illustrates this. 
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At first Pegasus had this attitude of “throwing over the fence” and 
a desire to be on the leading edge.  As such they were coming up 
with these solutions that the utilities didn't need and just throwing 
them over the fence at them.  
 ---Low buyer, Pegasus 
 
With the utilities struggling to use and see Pegasus’ value, Pegasus introduced buyer 
development managers.  Buyer development managers help the utilities identify areas 
where Pegasus’ use can offer benefits and train utilities to use Pegasus.  With the 
introduction of buyer development managers, more utilities started using Pegasus more 
often.   
Pegasus’ members also helped one another with marketplace use.  Pegasus 
introduced some suppliers to the marketplace.  Once Pegasus negotiated agreements 
with these suppliers, the suppliers called on the utilities to do business with them over 
Pegasus.  These suppliers trained the utilities to do business over the marketplace.  In 
one example, Office Plus  installed icons on the utilities’ computers and explained how 
to use Pegasus to purchase office supplies from their company. 
In other situations, utilities use of Pegasus was contingent on the utilities’ 
supplier membership and use.  Many member utilities influenced their suppliers to join 
Pegasus, and with Pegasus’ support, helped these suppliers do business with them over 
Pegasus.  The quotes below illustrate support as a marketplace use driver.   
 
We prefer to team up with marketplaces that have an external 
sales force like Pegasus.  That way they get it going once the 
organization has decided to join.  That way we don't have to be 
the bad guy and say, hey you wanted to do business this way and 
had us invest in all of this and now you aren't using it.  That way 
the marketplace can work with them to use it.   
 ---Low seller, Pegasus 
 
Originally, Pegasus devoted no effort to getting utilities to change 
to use the marketplace.  
  ---Low buyer, Pegasus 
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You may have the best value proposition in the world, but if they 
don't understand it they will not adopt and use it.   
 ---Buyer Development Manager, Pegasus 
 
CSX had a support center to help retail stores with the marketplace.  CSX did not 
have field representatives helping member organizations understand or learn to use the 
marketplace.   
Crook and Kumar’s (1998) finding that implementation support drives EDI use 
supports our finding.  However, our study is the first to link support to use in an 
e-marketplace context.  In addition, our study is the first in an IOIS context to link 
support to perceived relative advantage.  This may be because our study was grounded in 
the experiences of organizations implementing e-marketplaces.  As such, the data 
provided a contrast of organizations’ e-marketplace use perceptions before and after 
e-marketplace support.   
8. 2.   CONCLUSION 
This chapter explores marketplace characteristics driving marketplace use.  This 
chapter is based on in-depth field interviews and document reviews.  The field research 
includes four B2B e-marketplaces, buyer and supplier member organizations within each 
marketplace, and a non-member organization within each marketplace.  We compared 
the four marketplaces’ use levels.  We also compared Pegasus and NTX when they were 
struggling with use and once they achieved use.  By analyzing the field notes, we found 
several characteristics distinguish high use and low use marketplaces.  See Figure 11 and 
Table 11. 
This chapter finds that perceived relative advantage drives marketplace use and 
the more a marketplace is used the higher the marketplace’s perceived relative 
advantage. The chapter further finds that investor commitment and support drive both 
marketplace use and marketplace perceived relative advantage.  Customizing to existing 
industry practices, supporting low-leverage procurements, fee structure,  and reporting 
price/sales benefits drive perceived relative advantage. 
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Chapter VII shows that organizations join marketplaces for three reasons:  
relative advantage, business partner encouragement, and to deal with business 
environment change.  This chapter shows that while organizations may join 
marketplaces for an array of reasons, extensive marketplace use is contingent upon the 
marketplace offering a currently realizable relative advantage.   
8.2.1. Comparison to Original Model 
The original model, Figure 7, posits compatibility, uniform standards, and trust 
drive B2B e-marketplace use.  The interview guides used in the field visits specifically 
solicited information about these drivers.  The field note data analysis showed specific 
characteristics of compatibility drive marketplace use.  It did not indicate that uniform 
standards or trust were major marketplace use drivers. 
The original model defined compatibility as “the degree an innovation is 
perceived as being consistent with potential adopter’s existing values, past experiences, 
and needs” (Rogers 1995, p. 224).   We operationalized compatibility as the degree a 
B2B e-marketplace integrates with existing industry operating procedures.  Specifically, 
does the B2B e-marketplace technology integrate with existing systems?  Do the 
business practices integrate with existing business practices? 
The field notes indicate that the two marketplaces that achieved use (NTX and 
Pegasus) were originally not compatible with most industry practices.  The marketplaces 
were based on the idea of shopping different suppliers and getting the best price.  The 
industries these marketplaces were introduced in are characterized by long-term 
procurement agreements and automated systems supporting these agreements.  As such, 
in most situations the marketplaces were not compatible with existing industry practices.   
NTX and Pegasus were made compatible with low-leverage procurement 
situations.  In low-leverage procurements, organizations shop and compare prices.  The 
procurement process is manual.  The model proposes supporting low-leverage 
procurements drives marketplace relative advantage.   
Since NTX and Pegasus serve industries characterized by long-term procurement 
agreements and prenegotiated pricing, industry organizations have automated 
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procurement systems.  When the marketplaces customized their offerings to support 
procurement from preselected suppliers, the marketplaces achieved more use.  As such, 
we narrowed compatibility to how the marketplace became compatible:  customizing to 
existing industry practices.  NTX achieved higher use because many organizations fully 
integrated NTX into their organizations, using NTX to facilitate all of their carrier 
agreements.  Pegasus achieved less use because utilities adopted it to support 
procurement of some existing contracts.  Pegasus also struggled with technological 
integration within adopting organizations. 
The model approaches compatibility different than the literature.  The model 
links two compatibility dimensions (customizing to existing industry practices and 
supporting low-leverage procurement situations) to relative advantage.  The model 
proposes that these compatibility dimensions drive a marketplace’s perceived relative 
advantage, which then drives use.  Previous IOIS research (Han and Noh 1999-2000, 
Premkumar et al. 1994, Ramamurthy et al. 1999, Tumolo 2001) links compatibility to 
IOIS use.  This may be because this research did not observe incompatible or partially 
compatible systems and then system modification to increase compatibility.   
The original model posits uniform standards drive marketplace use.  We define 
uniform standards as having a standard way of describing products and services sold 
over the marketplace.  In each marketplace we studied, we inquired about uniform 
standards.  Every marketplace, except Pegasus, had uniform standards for describing 
products.  Pegasus’ members were working towards uniform standards.  Currently in the 
utility industry, many variations of the same product exist.  For example, when 
purchasing a wood pole the current product descriptions do not distinguish wood poles 
with pointed tops from those with flat tops or poles with resin from those without.   
Uniform standards did not seem to be a marketplace characteristic driving 
marketplace use.  One high use and both low use marketplaces had uniform product 
description standards.  In all four marketplaces, prices for the same product vary by 
situation.  Participants in all four marketplaces recognize that the marketplaces do not 
measure the value of noncontractible services. 
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The original model posits trust drives marketplace use.  Trust refers to a reliance 
that promises made by the marketplace will be kept.  These promises include on time 
delivery, adequate product quality, and privacy.  The field notes did not provide enough 
information to determine whether trust drives marketplace use.  One of the high use 
marketplaces, NTX, has trust assurances.  The other high use marketplace, Pegasus, does 
not.  The two low use marketplaces didn’t have enough information on trust as a 
marketplace use driver. 
NTX ensures trust in two ways.  NTX requires carriers using NTX be certified.  
Certification involves maintaining current insurance and inspection.  NTX also has a 
“three strikes you are out” rule for both carriers and shippers.  If either party is late 
preparing, picking up, delivering, or receiving a load three times, they can no longer 
participate in NTX.  NTX also fines members $200 each time they break the rule. 
Pegasus does not have trust assurance.  When we asked Pegasus about trust and 
whether Pegasus made sure products sold over the marketplace are the right products, 
delivered at the right time, and of the appropriate quality, they said this was the 
marketplace members’ responsibility.  When we inquired about trust with member 
organizations, they had some trust concerns.  Members were concerned about the 
marketplace having access to their data.  Members were also concerned that the 
customer would blame them if something went wrong in transacting over the 
marketplace.  The following quote illustrates this concern from a seller’s perspective. 
 
We worry about them taking our intellectual capital.  They say 
they can take all of our items and scrub them so they are available 
on a catalogue.  Well, we really don't want them to know all that 
information about our business.  That is our intellectual capital.  
Also, marketplaces are so new, if we let them handle our items 
and something goes wrong when the customer orders the item, the 
customer blames us.  
 ---Low seller, Pegasus 
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8.2.2. Research Implications 
This chapter’s findings offer insights to the existing IOIS literature, as well as to 
a number of theories underpinning this literature. In this section, we discuss the IOIS 
literature implications, as well as the theoretical implications of our study.   
8.2.2.1.   Interorganizational Information Systems (IOIS) Literature Implications 
 As we discussed each of our study’s findings in the chapter, we compared each 
finding with the existing IOIS literature.  In the comparison, we recognized and cited 
other IOIS studies which agree with the particular individual findings in our study.  Our 
literature comparison expanded to the IOIS literature, because very little e-marketplace 
research exists.   
As a whole, our research finds customizing to existing industry practices, 
supporting low-leverage procurements, cost, reporting transaction benefits, investor 
commitment, and support drives perceived relative advantage.  Our research finds 
perceived relative advantage, investor commitment, and support drive e-marketplace 
use.   The e-marketplace literature does not recognize these drivers.  In addition, very 
few of the IOIS studies recognize any of these drivers.  Finally, neither the existing IOIS 
nor the e-marketplace literature links these drivers to perceived relative advantage.  The 
few studies that do recognize these drivers link them to use.   
Several reasons potentially explain the difference between our study and the 
previous literature.  First, e-marketplaces are a unique type of IOIS that has not been 
investigated very extensively.  Second, much of the previous research is grounded in the 
ideas of existing literature and theories.  Our research allows new ideas and relations to 
emerge because it is grounded in the perceptions and experiences of organizations 
implementing e-marketplaces.  Finally, because our research is longitudinal, we were 
able to contrast the absence vs. the presence of several factors that would not have 
emerged in investigations that were shorter. 
8.2.2.2.   Theoretical Implications 
In addition to offering insights to the existing IOIS literature, this study also 
provides implications to a number of theories underpinning the IOIS literature.  These 
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include:  innovation diffusion theory, institutional theory, transaction cost economics, 
and the electronic markets hypothesis. 
Innovation diffusion theory (Rogers 1995) identifies innovation attributes 
influencing technology adoption and continued use.  Innovation diffusion theory posits a 
user’s technology adoption and continued use decision as rational choices based on the 
technology’s characteristics.  The theory posits decision makers adopt technology they 
perceive has greater relative advantage, compatibility, trialability, and observability; and 
less complexity.  Innovation diffusion theory posits that the relative advantage of an 
innovation, as perceived by members of a social system, is positively related to its rate of 
adoption.  The theory identifies “degree of economic profitability, low initial cost, 
decrease in discomfort, social prestige, savings in time and effort, and immediacy of the 
reward as subdimensions of relative advantage” (Rogers 1995, p. 216).   
Innovation diffusion theory supports this chapter’s finding that an 
e-marketplace’s perceived relative advantage drives e-marketplace use. By identifying 
subdimensions of relative advantage, the theory further supports the finding that fee 
structure, reporting results, and supporting low-leverage procurements drive perceived 
relative advantage.   
Innovation diffusion theory defines compatibility as “the degree to which an 
innovation is perceived as being consistent with the existing values, past experiences, 
and needs of potential adopters” (Rogers 1995, p. 224).  Our findings support innovation 
diffusion theory’s proposition that compatibility is positively related to adoption.  The 
B2B e-marketplaces in our study had difficulty achieving use. Two of the 
e-marketplaces modified their offerings to support existing business practices.  When 
they did this, their members perceived that marketplace use could offer them a relative 
advantage and they then began using the marketplace.   
The previous chapter supported institutional theory by showing that 
organizations joined e-marketplaces because they viewed the marketplace as a means of 
dealing with the business environment change toward EC.  This chapter shows that an 
e-marketplace will not achieve significant use unless its members perceive the 
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marketplace offers a relative advantage over existing business practices.  This extends 
institutional theory by showing institutional theory partially explains marketplace 
membership, but does not explain marketplace use.  
Transaction cost economics (Williamson 1979, Williamson 1982, Williamson 
1985, Williamson 1994, Williamson and Ouchi 1981) explains the difficulty 
marketplaces originally had influencing member use.  Transaction cost economics 
recognizes that there are costs associated with procuring goods and services.  These 
costs include the costs of negotiating, monitoring, and governing exchanges between 
people.  The magnitudes of these costs determine whether goods and services are 
produced in-house or are purchased through a market. Transaction cost theory posits that 
organizations will choose the structure that minimizes these transaction costs.   
B2B e-marketplaces were originally based on the notion of buyers using the 
marketplace to shop different sellers and compare prices in order to obtain the lowest 
price.  This marketplace model did not consider the transaction costs associated with 
doing business this way.  Having professional procurement people shop sellers on a 
regular basis takes time.  This increases the transaction cost of product procurement.  For 
standard, repetitive purchase products, most organizations have prenegotiated supplier 
contracts and automated purchasing systems.  Organizations do not want their 
procurement people shopping suppliers on a daily basis.   
Some marketplaces tried to assess up-front fees for each transaction conducted 
over their marketplace, regardless of benefit.  This increased buyer and supplier 
transaction cost, and thus inhibited use. 
The original marketplace model of shopping and comparing an array of sellers 
did not consider the uncertainty associated with doing business over an open 
marketplace.  Are the products the quality the buying organization needs?  How does the 
buying organization know the products will be delivered on time and in good condition?  
How does the selling organization ensure payment?  Many organizations chose not to 
use marketplaces because the costs of managing the uncertainty associated with 
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purchasing products over a marketplace was greater than any potential cost savings from 
shopping suppliers and obtaining lower prices.   
Marketplaces were originally envisioned as a place all sellers could list their 
products and prices.  Marketplaces did not recognize that supplier pricing for the same 
product often varies by customer.  Suppliers could not list their best prices on the open 
e-marketplace.  This would cause the supplier to have to offer every customer this 
pricing, which would then hurt profit margins.  In addition, long-term customer 
relationships would be damaged when existing customers saw that their supplier was 
offering the e-marketplace a better price. 
Transaction cost economics also explains why some of the modifications the 
marketplaces made increased marketplace use.  Both high use marketplaces in our study 
customized their marketplaces to support existing industry practices.  Both marketplaces 
allowed buyers to use the marketplace to procure products from existing prenegotiated 
supplier contracts.  This reduced transaction costs as buyers were not shopping and there 
was less uncertainty associated with managing preexisting supplier contracts.  The 
marketplaces also tied their marketplace use costs to member benefits in excess of these 
costs.  The marketplaces also found a niche in supporting low-leverage procurement 
situations.  In low-leverage procurement situations, buyers and sellers do not frequently 
purchase from one another so automated processes and strong relationships do not exist.  
Marketplaces can improve the efficiency in these situations, reducing transaction costs. 
One area that is contrary to transaction cost economics is the way marketplace 
member organizations report their benefits from marketplace use.  Currently, 
organizations purchasing over the marketplace report what they usually paid for the 
product, less what they paid over the marketplace.  In these situations, the marketplace 
also offered substantial efficiency benefits, such as reducing the labor involved in 
searching and comparing alternative suppliers.  While the organizations in our study 
recognized this, they did not quantify it and only mentioned it in passing.  
Based in transaction cost economics, Malone et al. (1987) developed the 
electronic markets hypothesis.  The electronic markets hypothesis predicts that, with 
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the presence of electronic communication technologies, electronic markets will become 
the favored mechanism for coordinating material and information flows among 
organizations.  The electronic markets hypothesis is based on conceptual analysis rather 
than systematic empirical studies.  Our research provides empirical insight to the 
electronic markets hypothesis. 
The crux of the electronic markets hypothesis is the move toward electronic 
markets from hierarchies.  Malone et al. (1987) explain that markets coordinate the flow 
through supply and demand forces and external transactions between different 
individuals and firms.  Hierarchies coordinate the flow of materials through adjacent 
steps by controlling and directing material flow at higher levels in the managerial 
hierarchy.  When a buyer uses a single supplier, the relationship is hierarchical.  When a 
buyer uses multiple suppliers, market forces govern the relationship.   
Malone et al. (1987) explain that characteristics of the traded product affect 
whether the product will be traded over a market or governed by a hierarchy.  The 
authors explain that products low in asset specificity and with simple product 
descriptions will be traded over electronic markets.  Products with high product 
complexity and high asset specificity will be governed by hierarchy relationships in 
which buyers and suppliers are very tight. 
Our finding that low-leverage procurement situations drive an e-marketplace’s 
relative advantage and ultimately e-marketplace use supports Malone et al.’s (1987) 
proposition regarding the relationship between product characteristics and organizational 
form.  The e-marketplaces in our study started out trying to be open e-marketplaces for 
all industry procurement.  However, after member resistance, the e-marketplaces had to 
modify their business model.  E-marketplace members have been using e-marketplaces 
in low-leverage procurement situations.  Products purchased in these situations are not 
specific to the particular buyer-seller relationship and have standard product 
descriptions.  Cellular phones, office supplies, and nonperishable freight are examples of 
items traded in these situations.   
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Our data also contradicts Malone et al.’s (1987) proposition.  To date, even in the 
low-leverage procurement situations, e-marketplaces have not yet developed where 
buyers are routinely shopping and comparing suppliers.  In Pegasus, the e-marketplace 
makers evaluate multiple suppliers and then establish a preferred relationship with one 
supplier for a particular product (e.g., office supplies).  The e-marketplace participants 
then use the e-marketplace to procure products from that supplier.  In NTX the 
e-marketplace changed the structure of the market, allowing sellers to choose from 
multiple buyers. 
The data both support and contradict Malone et al.’s (1987) proposition that 
hierarchies will be used for products that are asset specific with complex descriptions.  
In the utility industry, buyers have strong relationships with suppliers of industry 
specific products like transformers and wood poles.  Some of the industry specific 
products have many variations contingent on the particular utility’s requirements.  For 
these types of products, the utility and its suppliers have developed long-term 
relationships supported by automated procurement practices.  Malone et al.’s proposition 
explains why open e-marketplaces did not work in these situations. 
The data contradicts the electronic markets hypothesis as the e-marketplaces in 
our study have also been used to procure asset specific and complex products.  
Periodically, utilities purchase draglines.  A dragline is a very large, custom designed, 
complex piece of equipment used in mining.  A utility in our study used the 
e-marketplace to select a company to manufacture draglines.  The utility supplemented 
the price information compared over the e-marketplace with manufacturer visits and 
product specification information.  Further contradiction arises with industry vendor 
assessment.  The utility industry periodically assesses their industry vendor contracts.  
The utilities are using e-marketplaces to assess industry vendors.  Once the vendor is 
chosen, on a daily basis, products are usually repetitively purchased from the given 
vendor outside the e-marketplace infrastructure.  
As part of the electronic markets hypothesis, Malone et al. (1987) posit the 
electronic brokerage effect.  The electronic brokerage effect means that since electronic 
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marketplaces electronically connect many different buyers and suppliers through a 
central database, e-marketplaces can fulfill the same function as a broker.  Malone et al. 
further posit that the electronic brokerage effect will “(1) increase the number of 
alternatives that can be considered, and (2) decrease the cost of the entire product 
selection process” (p. 488).  Malone et al. also explain that buyers will establish 
e-marketplaces in order to maximize the number of alternative products and services 
available and the ease of comparing them. 
Our findings in the “Customizing to Existing Industry Practices” section 
contradict this.  The e-marketplaces in our study were originally based on the idea of an 
open e-marketplace where buyers compared suppliers.  For frequently purchased items 
such as direct materials, the buying organizations in our study have resisted the 
e-marketplace benefit of routinely comparing alternatives. The e-marketplaces that have 
been successful in terms of attracting members and being used had to move their 
e-marketplace away from the idea of an open marketplace, facilitating routine supplier 
comparison, to an e-marketplace supporting existing supplier relationships.  The buying 
organizations in our study explained that they have worked for years to develop 
relationships with their suppliers.  They believe that their suppliers provide many more 
benefits than what can be measured on an e-marketplace (e.g., price).  They believe their 
supplier relationships are important and the e-marketplace concept of routinely 
comparing alternatives damages the relationship.  Furthermore, these organizations 
usually have infrastructure supporting their existing relationships.  Current 
e-marketplaces are not as efficient as most of the infrastructure supporting long- 
standing buyer-supplier relationships.  
Based on the electronic markets hypothesis, Bakos (1998) identified product, 
price, and transaction cost benefits associated with using electronic markets.   
Bakos’(1998) recognition that electronic market use would lower search costs for 
buyers shopping for products may explain “low-leverage procurements” as a driver of 
marketplace relative advantage, and ultimately marketplace use.  The B2B 
e-marketplaces in this study were intended to replace traditional business practices, 
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many of which are based on long-term contracts and automated procurement practices.  
Since organizations do not routinely shop and compare vendors in these situations, the 
idea of using an e-marketplace to compare prices increases search and transaction costs.  
However, in low-leverage procurement situations organizations do shop and compare 
and they do not usually have automated procurement practices.  In these situations, 
e-marketplaces lowered search costs.   
Bakos (1998) posits that because electronic markets facilitate increased 
information sharing and communication between buyers and sellers, they enable 
charging different prices to different consumers in different situations.  This holds for 
the electronic hierarchies that preceded B2B e-marketplaces (e.g., electronic data 
interchange).  However, charging different customers different prices actually hindered 
the original vision of open B2B e-marketplaces.  E-marketplaces were originally 
envisioned as sellers listing their available products and prices and buyers shopping 
seller listings.  The industries in which the marketplaces in our study were implemented 
had been doing business with point-to-point electronic connections, such as EDI, for 
years.  As such, charging different consumers different prices was common.  The 
original implementation of electronic markets did not support this.  Suppliers did not 
want to join e-marketplaces and publish their best price.  B2B e-marketplaces use 
increased when marketplaces customized their offerings to support pricing privacy and 
different prices for different customers. 
The discussion above shows that in some cases the existing literature and 
theories support our findings.  These situations increase our findings’ validity and extend 
the IOIS literature and theories to a different context, B2B e-marketplaces.  In other 
situations, our findings conflict with the existing literature and theories.  This section 
identifies and examines these situations, offering greater insight both to our study’s 
findings and the existing literature and theories. 
8.2.3. Practical Implications 
Marketplaces cannot rest once organizations join a B2B e-marketplace.  Many 
organizations pay huge investment fees to join B2B e-marketplaces and then never use 
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them. What characteristics should marketplaces consider in designing marketplaces that 
will be used? 
In situations where marketplace investors will also be marketplace members, 
make sure these investors are joining because they perceive the marketplace’s value 
propositions offer their organization a relative advantage.  If they are not, other 
organizations will not join or use because the investors aren’t.  In addition, marketplaces 
face challenges at inception.  If the investors are not committed, they will be unwilling to 
try the marketplace’s offerings and provide feedback to help the marketplace offer a 
relative advantage.  This is in line with Grewal et al.’s (2001) work, which posits 
organizations that join marketplace for legitimacy motivations are less likely to use the 
marketplace.   
Be aware of the practices within the industry in which the marketplace operates.   
Don’t build a marketplace and then try to change the industry to suit the marketplace.  
Organizational change is hard but industry change is even harder.  Find out where the 
pain points are in the industry and build the marketplace to accommodate the industry.  
In many industries, existing procedures are automated and purchases are prenegotiated.  
Market makers need to customize their marketplace to support these practices. On a 
daily basis, organizations do not want their buyers shopping.  They want them 
purchasing from preapproved contracts at prenegotiated prices.  Understand the 
situations in which member organizations do shop and build the marketplace to 
accommodate these situations.  For example, most organizations periodically evaluate 
their supplier contract. Marketplaces are ideally suited for automating and streamlining 
this process.   
Design the e-marketplace to support low-leverage procurement situations.  
Low-leverage procurement situations occur when organizations purchase items they do 
not purchase ever day (e.g., indirect items such as cellular phones or office supplies).  
These situations are not automated.  In addition, organizations have little negotiating 
leverage because they do not have strong relationships with these suppliers and they do 
not represent substantial, repeat business to these suppliers.  Marketplaces can establish 
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relationships with these suppliers because they represent all of their members’ 
purchasing power.  By establishing these relationships and automating the procurement 
process, marketplaces can achieve a relative advantage for their members. 
To stay in business, marketplaces need a means of generating revenue. 
Marketplace members do not want to pay up-front fees, as they perceive that these fees 
reduce profits.  Marketplaces will be more likely to influence organizations to join and 
use the e-marketplace by tying fees to quantifiable benefits.  By tying fees to a 
percentage of savings or increased profit, marketplace participants see the costs small in 
relation to the benefits.   
In addition, marketplaces should report results from using the marketplace to 
participants.  By seeing the relative advantage, members will continue to use the 
marketplace.  These results need to be in cost savings or increased profit.  Even in 
situations where marketplace use resulted in increased efficiency and reduced labor 
costs, marketplace members had little regard for this type of savings. 
Finally, marketplaces must help their members use the marketplace.  
Marketplaces should conduct training sessions and have a support line for organizations 
struggling to use the marketplace. 
8.2.4. Future Research 
This chapter is one of the first in-depth inquires of marketplace characteristics 
driving B2B e-marketplace use.  While we answered a number of questions, a number 
still remain. 
Does the model hold in comparisons with other B2B e-marketplaces?  We 
intended to compare marketplace use drivers across four marketplaces.  However, Retail 
Matrix was never used.  This forced a comparison between three marketplaces.  
Comparing the model to other marketplaces will increase the model’s insights and 
generalizability.  
When we began investigating marketplace characteristics driving marketplace 
use, we expected technology characteristics to drive marketplace use.  However, 
technology rarely surfaced in the field notes. In addition, when we began contacting 
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organizations and asked to talk with the person in the organization that knew about the 
marketplace, we were rarely directed to information technology people.  When we were 
conducting field visits with the marketplaces, we usually spoke with executives.  When 
we were interviewing member organizations buying over the marketplace, we were 
directed to procurement people. When we interviewed marketplace suppliers, we were 
directed to sales people.  What is technology’s role and an information technology 
department’s role in marketplace use? 
In some areas, marketplace use lead to substantial business operation 
improvement.  However, in reporting marketplace results, these benefits were not 
quantified.  Marketplaces and member organizations reported reduced prices and 
increased sales.  In some cases, efficiency benefits may result in more industry benefits 
than reduced costs or increased sales.  How do marketplaces and members measure and 
communicate all the true benefits of marketplace use?  Why do marketplaces and 
members that recognize efficiency increases not recognize them as a key benefit to 
marketplace use? 
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CHAPTER IX 
9 RESEARCH QUESTION 3:  WHAT ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS IMPACT AN ORGANIZATION’S  
BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE USE? 
Almost a year into the case studies, we were eating at a College Station, Texas 
BBQ stand with Mark, a utility Procurement Manager helping us with the study.  Mark 
drew this picture (Table 12) on a napkin. 
 
Table 12  Utility Marketplace Use Levels 
TOP   BOTTOM 
 
3-4 4-6 5-7 2-3 
 
 
He explained that ten months into Pegasus’ “go live” date, Pegasus’ participating 
utilities had different use levels.  Three or four of the utilities were using Pegasus’ 
marketplace heavily.  Two or three utilities weren’t using Pegasus’ at all despite their 
$85,000 investment and marketplace membership.  This made us wonder why similar 
organizations using the same marketplace achieve different use levels?  This forms the 
last research question and this chapter’s discussion.  What organizational characteristics 
impact an organization’s business-to-business (B2B) electronic marketplace 
(e-marketplace) use? 
To investigate this question, we interview buyers and sellers participating in each 
of the three functional marketplaces.  We then code the data into categories for analysis.  
We compare use levels and organization characteristics for high users vs. low users in 
each of the three marketplaces.  Since Retail Matrix was unable to solicit member 
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organizations that could conduct transactions to join their marketplace, Retail Matrix is 
not included in this analysis.  The paragraphs below discuss the model. See Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12    Organizational Characteristics Impacting an Organization’s B2B 
E-marketplace Use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model proposes membership motivation, perceived value from marketplace use, and 
user buy-in affect an organization’s marketplace use.  The model indicates membership 
motivation, perceived value from marketplace use, and user buy-in can overlap.  We 
observed three cases in which the organization’s motivation for joining the marketplace 
was the marketplace’s relative advantage.  Because the users perceived a value from 
marketplace use, the users bought in to the concept.  In all three situations, the 
organizations immediately began using the marketplace.  The model further proposes an 
organization’s capabilities affect perceived value from marketplace use.  The better an 
AN ORGANIZATION’S 
B2B 
E-MARKETPLACE 
USE 
 
PERCEIVED VALUE 
FROM 
MARKETPLACE USE
MEMBERSHIP 
MOTIVATION 
 
 Relative Advantage 
 Environmental 
Change 
 Business Partner 
Encouragement 
ORGANIZATIONAL
CAPABILITIES 
 
 Relationships 
 Automation
USER BUY-IN 
 
 
 Decision Maker 
 Performance Metrics 
-
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organization’s supplier or customer relationships and the more automated the 
organization’s processes are, the less likely an organization is to perceive value from 
marketplace use.   
The conclusion discusses drivers in the original model not included in the revised 
model, theoretical implications, practical implications, and future research. 
9. 1.   AN ORGANIZATION’S MARKETPLACE USE 
This chapter investigates what drives an organization’s e-marketplace use.  
System use as a dependent variable has a long history in information systems literature.  
For a review see (Delone and McLean 1992).   We define an organization’s 
e-marketplace use as how many transactions the organization conducts over the 
e-marketplace and how often the organization accesses the e-marketplace.  During the 
field visits, we collected data on the organizations’ transaction volume, use frequency, 
and organizational self-categorization for the three months prior to the field visit.  Based 
on this information, we categorize organizations as high or low users. See Table 13.  All 
of the field visits to the organizations that were conducting transactions over the 
marketplace occurred between May and August 2002.  As such, marketplace use levels 
were reported for about the same three-month period. 
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Transaction volume is the number of purchases or sales either conducted over or 
facilitated by the marketplace in the three months prior to the field visits.  Because 
different industries and marketplaces have different transaction volumes, we compare 
organization transaction volume within each marketplace to categorize marketplace 
members as high or low.  Some organizations measure transaction volume differently 
than other organizations.  However, each type of organization within each marketplace 
measured transaction volume the same, so we were able to compare high and low 
volume users even though they measured transaction volume in units other than 
transactions.  For example, National Trucking Exchange’s (NTX’s) members discuss 
bids and shipments.  Carriers bid business.  One bid can cover a number of loads or 
shipments.  Since both carriers measures transaction volume in bids, we were able to 
distinguish high sellers from the low sellers.   
Use frequency, how often the organization interacts with the marketplace, is 
measured along the following dimensions:  more than 10 times per day, daily, a few 
times a week, weekly, monthly, hardly ever, and not at all.   
Organizational self-categorization is how organizations categorize themselves.  
The study included organizations of a variety of sizes.  Because of the transaction 
volume in large organizations, the transaction volume of a large organization that uses 
the marketplace minimally may exceed the transaction volume of a small organization 
that uses the marketplace extensively.  As such, organizational self-categorization help 
classify organizations as high or low users.  In addition, in evaluating the transaction 
volume and use level, determining the cut-off point between high users and low users 
can be difficult.  An organization’s self-categorization helps.  During each field visit, we 
asked, “What organizations really use the marketplace?  What organizations don’t use 
the marketplace very much?”  These responses helped select high users, low users, and 
nonmembers to participate in the study.   
While not immediately relevant in the table, organizational self-categorization 
helps in situations where an organization is really using the marketplace, but because of 
their organization’s size, transaction volume would not depict that the organization was 
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using the marketplace for everything.  A small organization could conduct all their 
business transactions via the marketplace and not achieve the volume of a large 
organization that considers themselves a low user and only does business with one 
customer via the marketplace.  Since the purpose of this question is investigating what 
organizational characteristics drive an organization to really use a marketplace, we 
consider the organization’s self-categorization in how we categorize an organization. 
Low users include organizations that do not use the marketplace very much in 
relation to the other marketplace participants and organizations that joined, but never 
conducted a transaction over the  marketplace.   
Several points in the table warrant clarification.  We categorize Synergy as a high 
user, but we do not have the organization’s transaction volume or use frequency.  We 
interviewed Synergy’s manager responsible for Synergy’s involvement in Pegasus.  She 
was able to answer all of the questions except Synergy’s transaction volume and use 
level in the past three months.  She had left Synergy in the previous year and was not 
privy to this information.  We still categorized Synergy as a high user because three 
sources confirmed Synergy was one of the top two Pegasus users.  The table includes 
Gulf Coast Energy (regulated) and Gulf Coast Energy (unregulated).  Industry 
deregulation led to utility companies breaking up their business into regulated and 
unregulated sides.  Gulf Coast Energy (regulated) and Gulf Coast Energy (unregulated) 
are two separate companies.  Each company uses Pegasus differently.  Each company 
has different people in charge of Pegasus.  Each company has different users of Pegasus.   
McMurray Distributing, Inc. is a distributor.  Distributors buy and sell.  As such, 
McMurray Distributing fell into both seller and buyer categories. To date, we have been 
unable to interview a representative from Momentum Manufacturing.  The information 
in the table regarding Momentum Manufacturing comes from Retailer Market 
Exchange’s (CSX’s) President and McMurray Distributing.  McMurray Distributing, one 
of Momentum Manufacturing’s largest customers, asked Momentum Manufacturing to 
join CSX.   
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9. 2.   MEMBERSHIP MOTIVATION 
The model finds membership motivation drives an organization’s B2B 
e-marketplace use.   This means that the reason the organization joined the marketplace 
affects how much they use the marketplace.  Chapter VII indicates membership 
motivation drivers include relative advantage, perceiving the marketplace as a 
mechanism for dealing with a business environment change, and business partner 
encouragement.  Membership motivations are not exclusive.  Organizations may join 
marketplaces for any or all of these reasons.   
In Table 14, we categorized the participant organizations in the field studies by 
their motivations for joining the marketplace.  For the categorization, we used the 
participant organization’s responses to the question,  “Why did your company join X 
marketplace?”   As we probed deeper in the interviews asking about particular 
motivations for marketplace membership, the organizations would usually say, “yeah, 
there was a little of that.”  However, for the categorization, we’re using the main reason 
they joined the marketplace, which was their response to the open-ended question. 
When motivations have subdimensions such as relative advantage, which has two 
types (strategic vs. operational), we categorize organizations into relevant 
subdimensions.  We note each organization by  their use level (high vs. low) and how 
they used the marketplace (buyer vs. seller).  The study included one distributor. The 
distributor fell into both buyer and seller categories. 
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Table 14  Organizational Marketplace Membership Motivations  as 
  Drivers of an Organization’s Marketplace Use   
 NATIONAL TRUCKING 
EXCHANGE (NTX) 
PEGASUS C-STORE 
EXCHANGE 
(CSX) 
RELATIVE 
ADVANTAGE 
   
Strategic  LB  
(Lone Star Utilities) 
 
Operational HB, LB    
 (Texas Plastics,  
Leading Edge Brands) 
HS (Office Plus) LB  
(Gulf Coast Oil) 
    
BUSINESS PARTNER 
ENCOURAGEMENT 
   
Encourages Joining Only   LB, 2 LS 
(McMurray 
Distributing, 
McMurray 
Distributing, 
Momentum 
Manufacturing) 
Encourages Joining and 
Doing Business Via the 
Marketplace 
HS, LS                    
(R.E. Transport, 
Southwestern Trucking, Inc.) 
2 LS               
(Mining 
Manufacturing, 
Bearing Point 
Manufacturing,) 
 
    
BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENT 
CHANGE 
Need to do EC 
 2 HB, 3 LB 
(Synergy, Gulf 
Coast Energy 
(unregulated), Gulf 
Coast Energy 
Regulated, Lone 
Star Utilities, U.S. 
Electric and Power) 
LB, 2 LS 
(McMurray 
Distributing, 
McMurray 
Distributing, 
Momentum 
Manufacturing) 
Key:  The table categorizes user organizations by their use level (high vs. low) and how 
they use (sell vs. buy).  This results in the classifications below. 
HS-high seller, LS-low seller, HB-high buyer, LB-low buyer 
 
The paragraphs below discuss Table 14 and organization marketplace 
membership motivation as a driver of the organization’s marketplace use.  The table and 
discussion illustrate joining a marketplace for relative advantage motivations leads to 
marketplace use.  Operational relative advantage motivations lead to more immediate 
and higher use than strategic relative advantage motivations. Business partner 
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encouragement as a marketplace membership motivator is contingent upon the extent the 
requesting business partner wants to do business with the requested business partner 
over the marketplace.  When organizations join marketplaces to deal with the business 
environment change, organizations later evaluate the marketplace’s offerings.  They 
choose to use offerings that provide their organization value.   
Two studies (Grewal et al. 2001, Premkumar and Ramamurthy 1995)  
corroborate our finding that an organization’s e-marketplace adoption motivation affects 
their e-marketplace use.   Premkumar and Ramamurthy posit interorganizational 
information systems (IOIS) adoption decisions as proactive or reactive.  In an IOIS 
adoption, usually one firm proactively initiates the action for IOIS adoption with another 
firm, and the other firm reactively decides to adopt the IOIS based on the proactive 
firm’s initiatives. Premkumar and Ramamurthy’s survey results indicate that proactive 
firms better integrate their EDI systems with other internal applications and more 
aggressively expand their external connectivity.   
Grewal et al. (2001) investigate firm e-marketplace adoption motivations as 
predictors of the firm’s ultimate e-marketplace use.  The authors find emphasizing 
efficiency motivations and deemphasizing legitimacy motivations leads to firms 
achieving expert state in marketplaces.  In expert state, firms have substantial knowledge 
about their marketplaces and procedural knowledge about doing business on the 
marketplace.   
9.2.1. Relative Advantage 
We define relative advantage as a marketplace’s offerings or value propositions  
“being better than the ideas they supersede” (Rogers 1995, p. 212).  Organizations that 
join the marketplace because of the marketplace’s relative advantage believe using the 
B2B e-marketplace will reduce product or service costs, increase product or service 
sales, and/or improve procurement practices.  Relative advantages may be strategic or 
operational.  Operational relative advantage is immediately realizable and achievable by 
one person. Strategic relative advantage is not immediately realizable and requires group 
coordination.   
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Senior management or corporate departments drive decisions to join 
marketplaces to achieve strategic relative advantage.  Achieving strategic relative 
advantage involves buying organizations reengineering procurement procedures.  One 
example may include moving from company negotiated supplier contracts, which are 
executed a variety of ways (e.g., face-to-face, phone, fax, computer), to marketplace 
negotiated supplier contracts, which are the executed via the B2B e-marketplace.  
Achieving strategic relative advantage involves selling organizations breaking into new 
markets and/or choosing a new way to sell products.  For example, Office Plus joined 
Pegasus to service the utility market.  When organizations join a marketplace to achieve 
strategic relative advantage, the organization has to change before the organization can 
actually use the marketplace.  These changes may include changing business partners, 
contract negotiation procedures, and the mechanisms for buying or selling products on a 
daily basis.   
Senior management, operational people, or both drive decisions to join 
marketplaces to achieve operational relative advantage.  Operational relative advantage 
involves particular buyers in the organization choosing a new outlet to procure a product 
or service.  For selling organizations, operational relative advantage involves using the 
marketplace to increase sales.  Distinguishing between operational and strategic relative 
advantage for selling organizations is hard.  The best way may be whether the decision 
to sell over the marketplace requires group coordination or whether selling via the 
marketplace can occur based on one individual’s decision and actions.    
Table 14 shows that one organization in the study cited strategic relative 
advantage as a marketplace membership motivation.  Among other things, Lone Star 
Utilities saw Pegasus’ membership as a  process improvement facilitator.  Compared to 
other Pegasus members, Lone Star Utilities is a low buyer.  When Mark from Lone Star 
Utilities drew Table 12, they were in quadrant three.  Several months later,  Pegasus’ 
Sales Vice President and Lone Star Utilities explained that  Lone Star Utilities was 
moving up in use closer to quadrant two.   
    196 
 
Several factors contribute to Lone Star Utilities’ low Pegasus use.  Pegasus’ 
initial offerings were not as efficient or cost effective as Lone Star Utilities’ existing 
business practices.  Lone Star Utilities has a high regard for supplier relationships.  
Pegasus was originally based on shopping suppliers for price.  Both organizations 
ultimately moved to a middle ground, but the mismatch slowed Lone Star Utilities’ use 
of Pegasus.  The following quote illustrates this. 
 
I guess I'll tell you this, Lone Star Utilities knows it.  Lone Star 
Utilities has a cultural challenge.  They are very Southern in their 
thinking.  We have this problem with our other Southern 
companies.  They have a bias toward relationships.  And, that's 
not bad.  There is a component in our strategy where we do 
emphasize relationships. But sometimes these companies don't get 
it when we tell them your supplier is charging you a 400% 
mark-up.  They say yes, but we do have a relationship with them. 
 ---President and Chief Executive Officer, Pegasus 
 
Lone Star Utilities’ upper management made the decision to participate in Pegasus and 
then pushed the decision down to the purchasing group (the ones actually buying the 
products).  The buyers thought management adopted Pegasus because they thought they 
weren’t doing a good job.   They also feared Pegasus would replace them.  Lone Star 
Utilities tried to overcome this by educating their buyers and creating incentives to 
encourage buyers to use Pegasus.  Incentives included employee recognition plaques and 
prizes donated by vendors.  Performance measures were implemented that required the 
buyers to consider electronic procurement in their purchasing decisions.   
Because Lone Star Utilities joined Pegasus to achieve a strategic relative 
advantage, the organization kept pushing to use Pegasus and funded efforts to enable 
use.  As a result, Lone Star Utilities reaped some benefits directly from Pegasus’ use and 
some side benefits.  Lone Star Utilities approved funding to update technical 
infrastructure and inventory item descriptions. Management approved this funding 
because they joined Pegasus for a strategic relative advantage and saw these efforts as 
necessary to achieving this.   In addition, Lone Star Utilities got to learn about best 
practice procurement procedures from utilities nationwide.  Without Pegasus’ umbrella, 
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utilities getting together to share information and collaborate would have caused concern 
in terms of antitrust violations.   
Lone Star Utilities’ case indicates organizations that join marketplaces to achieve 
strategic relative advantage may not immediately achieve use.  However, because of the 
strategic relative advantage vision, organizations make efforts to move forward with 
using the marketplace.  As the marketplace’s value propositions and the organization’s 
perception of the marketplace’s immediate benefits come closer together these efforts 
result in increased use over time.   
Table 14 shows joining marketplaces to achieve operational relative advantage 
leads to high use.   In the NTX case, we interviewed a high buyer and a low buyer.  Both 
buyers cited operational relative advantage in terms of immediate freight savings and a 
more efficient way to procure freight as their only marketplace membership driver.  
Office Plus joined Pegasus to gain access to the utilities market for selling office 
suppliers.  We classify this as an operational relative advantage because Office Plus 
already had experience working with marketplaces and their decision to join Pegasus 
was made by a sales person and didn’t require much organizational change.  CSX 
evolved within Gulf Coast Oil.  Before the term marketplace came to be, Gulf Coast Oil 
implemented an Intranet to improve communication between their corporate office and 
3,500 retail stores.  CSX formed by making this Intranet available to the entire 
convenience store industry.  Gulf Coast Oil was a frequent CSX user because CSX 
offered Gulf Coast Oil an immediate operational relative advantage.  We classify Gulf 
Coast Oil as a low buyer because, while they frequently used CSX for communication, 
the field notes do not indicate that they were ever able to conduct transactions. 
These cases indicate marketplace membership motivated by achieving an 
operational relative advantage drives an organization’s marketplace use.   
9.2.2. Business Environment Change  
We define business environment change as organizations joining marketplaces 
because they view marketplace membership as a mechanism for dealing with the 
changing business environment.  Many organizations in our study joined their given 
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marketplace because the environment was encouraging electronic commerce (EC) 
involvement.  See  Table 14.  At the time Wall Street was pushing EC heavily and 
rewarding organizations for EC involvement.  The following quote captures this. 
 
We see our investment in Pegasus as a learning experience.  We 
have to get in and learn about it.  If we're successful that is good.  
But, if we're not then we can take what we've learned and use it in 
our next e-business project. 
 ---Low buyer, Pegasus 
 
Organizations thought business was changing rapidly and organizations that did not 
embrace e-business might not survive.  A popular term was “e-business or out of 
business.”    
Every utility in the study cited the need to do EC as why they joined Pegasus.  
Every member of CSX, except Gulf Coast Oil, also cited the need to do EC as their 
motivation for joining the marketplace.  How do we explain this motivation’s effect on 
use?  During the EC boom, the organizations were hearing a lot of EC hype.  The 
organizations had limited EC knowledge, but thought there must be something to it since 
everyone was asking if they had an EC strategy and analysts were saying organizations 
that didn’t do EC were going to have problems.  The desire to learn about EC fueled the 
organizations’ marketplace membership.  While organizations may join a marketplace to 
learn about EC, when the marketplace begins offering services, organizations will 
evaluate the services and will not adopt value propositions that do not offer a perceived 
value.  This explains why so many organizations joined marketplaces but far fewer 
became high users.   
9.2.3. Business Partner Encouragement 
This study finds organizations that join a marketplace at their business partner’s 
encouragement use the marketplace to the extent the encouraging business partner 
requires.  We define business partner encouragement as an organization joining a 
marketplace because an organization they either do business with, or want to do business 
with, is a member of the marketplace and requests that they join the marketplace.   
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The data shows “business partner encouragement to join only” as a marketplace 
membership motivation results in hardly any use by the organizations that joined for this 
reason.  We categorize McMurray Distributing as both a buyer and a seller since they are 
a distributor and their intended marketplace role was buying and selling over the 
marketplace. In an effort to secure a contract to service all of the Gulf Coast Oil stores, 
at Gulf Coast Oil’s request, McMurray Distributing joined CSX.  As a distributor, 
McMurray Distributing does business any way their customer wants.  Gulf Coast Oil 
never made efforts to do business with McMurray Distributing via CSX.  Since winning 
Gulf Coast Oil’s contract fueled McMurray Distributing’s marketplace membership, 
McMurray Distributing only used CSX for 4-5 experimental distributions.  McMurray 
Distributing never incorporated CSX into their business practices.  The following quote 
illustrates this. 
 
We got into CSX because we were trying to get Gulf Coast Oil’s 
business and Gulf Coast Oil wanted to do business with CSX.  We 
don't really look to improve processes.  You can go down to our 
room and see how many different programs we have running.  We 
wants to do business with our customers the way the customers 
want to do business.   
 
Gulf Coast Oil still does their business the same way they have 
always done business with EDI and telxon units.  When we got 
involved in CSX we assumed Gulf Coast Oil wanted to do 
business via CSX, but they have not moved that direction.    
 ---Low seller and buyer, CSX 
 
When McMurray Distributing joined CSX, CSX requested McMurray 
Distributing’s help in influencing a key industry supplier to join.  Momentum 
Manufacturing is one of the largest suppliers in the convenience store industry.  
McMurray Distributing is Momentum Manufacturing’s largest customer.  McMurray 
Distributing requested Momentum Manufacturing join CSX, but never requested 
Momentum Manufacturing do business with McMurray Distributing via CSX.  As such, 
Momentum Manufacturing joined CSX but never used the marketplace.  The following 
quote illustrates this. 
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Big companies like Momentum Manufacturing get involved 
because we ask them to and then they just charge their investment 
to advertising expense.  They get involved but don't really care 
what happens.  
 ---Low seller and buyer, CSX 
 
The case studies indicate “business partner encouragement to join and do 
business with the encouraging business partner” will result in the target organization 
using the marketplace to the extent the encouraging business partner requires. 
Both carriers that joined NTX explained that they joined NTX because one of 
their trading partners wanted to do business with them over NTX.  In R.E. Transport’s 
case, existing trading partners representing high volume drove R.E. Transport into the 
marketplace.  In Southwestern Trucking’s case, NTX had one company that wanted to 
do business with Southwestern via NTX.  When NTX approached Southwestern 
Trucking about this opportunity, Southwestern joined NTX and did business with this 
customer over the marketplace.  
In both cases, the low suppliers we interviewed became involved in Pegasus at 
Lone Star Utilities’ request.  Lone Star Utilities wanted to do an auction for their 
dragline bid.  Mining Manufacturing participated in the auction and won the bid to build 
the two draglines.  This is the only transaction Mining Manufacturing has done through 
Pegasus.  Bearing Point Manufacturing also joined Pegasus at Lone Star Utilities’ 
request.  While Bearing Point Manufacturing is involved in several marketplaces, they 
are a low supplier in Pegasus.  This is partly because Lone Star Utilities has moved 
slowly in doing business with them over the marketplace.   
Organizations joining a marketplace because their trading partners want them to 
join and conduct transactions with them over the marketplace are more likely to use the 
marketplace. 
This section illustrates organizations that join a marketplace at their business 
partners’ encouragement, use the marketplace to the extent their business partner 
requires.   
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9. 3.   PERCEIVED VALUE FROM MARKETPLACE USE 
Chapter VII explains organizations join marketplaces to achieve a relative 
advantage, at their business partners’ request, and/or if they view joining as a means of 
dealing with a changing business environment.  However, as we investigated why some 
organizations use the marketplace they join and others do not, perceived value from 
marketplace use seems to be a major driver of an organization’s marketplace use.  We 
define perceived value from marketplace use as whether the organization’s decision 
makers believe using the marketplace helps their organization achieve its operating 
objectives.  In the paragraphs below, we discuss perceived value from marketplace use. 
 Table 15 categorizes the study’s marketplace participant organizations by use 
level (high vs. low) and organization type (buyer vs. seller).  The table also shows 
whether the organization mentioned a perceived value from marketplace use and the 
mentioned value.    The table analysis combined with the case data explain perceived 
value from marketplace use drives an organization’s marketplace use. 
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Table 15  Analysis of Perceived Value from Marketplace Use 
 ORGANIZATION 
CATEGORIZATION 
PERCEIVED VALUE FROM 
MARKETPLACE USE 
 
WHAT VALUE 
   
NATIONAL TRUCKING EXCHANGE (NTX) 
R.E. Transport  High seller No  
Southwestern Trucking, 
Inc. 
Low seller No  
Texas Plastics High buyer Yes Lower prices 
Leading Edge Brands 
(2 interviews) 
Low buyer Yes Lower prices 
PEGASUS    
Office Plus (4 interviews) High seller Yes More customers 
Mining Manufacturing Low seller No  
Bearing Point 
Manufacturing 
Low seller Yes More customers, tighter  
customer relationships 
Synergy High buyer Yes Unavailable 
Gulf Coast Energy 
(Regulated) 
High buyer Yes Lower prices 
Gulf Coast Energy 
(Unregulated) 
Low buyer Yes Lower prices 
Lone Star Utilities 
(2 interviews) 
Low buyer Yes Lower prices 
U.S. Electric and Power Low buyer No  
C-STORE EXCHANGE (CSX) 
Momentum 
Manufacturing  
Low seller Unavailable  
McMurray Distributing, 
Inc. (3 interviews) 
Low seller No  
McMurray Distributing, 
Inc. (3 interviews) 
Low buyer No  
Gulf Coast Oil  Low buyer Unavailable  
 
 
Table 15 shows all of the high users perceived a value from marketplace use 
except R.E. Transport.  This is because R.E. Transport joined NTX to continue to do 
business with several of their existing customers.  R.E. Transport didn’t gain customers 
by joining the marketplace.   
High buyers perceived the marketplace lowered prices.  High sellers perceived 
the marketplace gave them more customers.   This is interesting because marketplaces 
emphasize reducing supply chain costs by making industry practices more efficient 
rather than comparing prices and lowering supplier margins.  However, the case data 
indicate that even when marketplaces offer supply chain efficiency benefits, marketplace 
buyers perceive and quantify the lower price benefits not the efficiency benefits.  Both 
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Texas Plastics and Leading Edge Brands compiled reports comparing their usual freight 
rates to NTX’s freight rates for the same route.  The reports showed cost savings from 
using NTX.  However, both companies noted that using NTX saved time in procuring 
freight.  Before NTX, shipping organizations could spend many hours contacting carriers 
to obtain pricing and availability to ship a single load.  NTX improves this process by 
allowing shipping organizations to post the load to NTX’s website for carriers to view.  
Neither company quantified or emphasized this process efficiency as a driver of their 
marketplace use.  Both companies emphasized lower freight rates as a driver of their 
marketplace use.  The following quote illustrates a similar situation with Lone Star 
Utilities and Pegasus.   
 
In addition, in evaluating Pegasus the company isn't looking at the 
total cost of ownership for products.  Pegasus has knocked 2 
weeks off of some procurement processes.  In evaluating Pegasus, 
Lone Star Utilities has to consider the total cost and benefits of 
ownership.    
 ---Low seller, Pegasus 
 
Furthermore, the following case shows a marketplace reducing efficiency, but the 
member still participating because the marketplace increased customers.  Office Plus is a 
high seller in Pegasus.  Office Plus currently participates in 10 other marketplaces.  
During the EC hey day Office Plus was participating in 34 marketplaces.  However, 
Office Plus explained that selling products over the marketplace, especially in hosted 
arrangements, is less efficient than traditional procurement practices.   
Marketplace members can do business with Office Plus with punch out/round 
trip arrangements or hosted arrangements.  When organizations choose a punch 
out/round trip arrangement, the organization goes to the marketplace website to procure 
products.  The marketplace website reroutes the buying organization to Office Plus’ 
website, which accesses Office Plus’ internal catalogue.  Buyers then shop from this 
catalogue.  The catalogue integrates with Office Plus’ existing systems, and therefore 
inventory and pricing are current.   
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When organizations do business with Office Plus over the marketplace using a 
hosted arrangement, the marketplace maintains pricing and item lists.  This requires 
Office Plus to prepare Excel spreadsheets with all of the items the purchaser wants to 
view in the catalogue.  Office Plus has to submit these spreadsheets to the marketplace 
monthly.  Invariably prices change and available items are sold out.  This leads to price 
corrections and stock outs. 
The following quote shows increased sales is more important as a marketplace 
use driver for Office Plus than increased efficiency. 
 
Every customer can potentially have different pricing, so everyone 
we are doing a hosted agreement with I have to send a file.  In this 
case the utility has to pay hosting fees.  The risk in hosting is that 
the information is out of date as soon as I send it.  Hosted 
agreements are lots of work and in the end the member pays.   
 
We don’t see marketplaces as reducing costs and in fact it 
increases our product and supply chain costs, especially with the 
hosting arrangements.  More business is why we got into the 
marketplace.  
 
Being in Pegasus gave us a recommended license to hunt.  By 
joining Pegasus we got credibility and it made the utilities give us 
a more serious look at a higher level.   
 ---High seller, Pegasus 
 
Two types of low users exist.  Perceived value low users (Leading Edge Brands, 
Bearing Point Manufacturing, Gulf Coast Energy (Unregulated), Lone Star Utilities, and 
Gulf Coast Oil)  consistently use the marketplace or are making efforts to use the 
marketplace.  Table 15 shows each of these low users, perceived value from joining the 
marketplace.  Non-perceived value low users (Southwestern Trucking, Inc., Mining 
Manufacturing, U.S. Electric and Power, Momentum Manufacturing, and McMurray 
Distributing) have never completed a transaction over the marketplace, have 
experimented with the marketplace and decided not to continue use, or joined the 
marketplace to transact with one customer.  Table 15 shows none of the low users in this 
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second category perceived a value from marketplace use.  The quotes below illustrate 
this. 
 
We saw no benefit for the annual fee and event fee.  
 ---Low user, Pegasus 
 
We don't see reverse auctions as the newest greatest way to sell 
products.    
 ---Low user, Pegasus 
 
This discussion shows an organization’s perceived value from marketplace use 
drives an organization’s marketplace use.  This is in line with previous IOIS research.  
Crook and Kumar’s (1998) EDI case studies link system benefits to EDI use.  
Premkumar et al.’s (1994) survey links relative advantage to EDI diffusion stages.  
Tabor et al.’s (2001) case study links relative advantage to B2B EC use.  Grewal et al.’s 
(2001) survey links efficiency motivations to B2B e-marketplace use.   
9. 4.   ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES 
Different organizations have different capabilities.  The field notes indicate an 
organization’s capabilities affect their perceived value from marketplace membership. 
For buying organizations relevant capabilities include procurement systems and supplier 
pricing. Organizations with advanced procurement systems and well-developed supplier 
relationships will perceive less value from the marketplace.  For selling organizations 
relevant capabilities include customer relationships.  Selling organizations with strong 
customer relationships and automated ordering systems perceive less value from 
marketplace use than selling organizations trying to build market share and/or selling 
organizations without automated ordering systems.   
For NTX we interviewed three carriers, two members and one nonmember.  Each 
carrier was a large trucking company.  The trucking companies all had automated 
processes in the form of preexisting logistics programs to facilitate efficient truck 
routing.  The carriers also had sales staff to develop relationships and build business.  
Because of these existing capabilities, none of these carriers perceived a value from 
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using NTX.  R.E. Transport joined because their existing customers wanted to do 
business via the marketplace.  Southwestern Trucking joined to secure a customer.  Each 
of the carriers noted that e-marketplaces did not emphasize their strengths and only 
evaluated them on price.  The quotes below illustrate this. 
At R.E. Transport we like to stress our strengths, that we are R.E. 
Transport, we have a large capacity, and we have the ability to 
react when our customers need something.  We don't like 
competing with second-rate carriers.  On the marketplace, these 
carriers may bid for the business and not really have the capacity 
or do as good of job as us.    
 ---High seller, NTX 
 
NTX’s President is locked to this vision of people going out and 
putting their loads on the marketplace and then the trucking 
companies going out and looking for the loads and picking them 
up.  We don't do business that way.  I can't dedicate someone to sit 
in front of a computer and pick up loads. We do things with 
contracts and repetitive business and lanes.   
 
We have a great system.  Southwestern knows where they are 
going everyday.    
 ---Low seller, NTX 
 
The carriers further noted that independent trucker or trucking companies 
without an external sales staff would benefit from NTX.  They said these smaller 
truckers didn’t have the customer relationships they had and NTX could help fill their 
trucks. 
 
Using these marketplaces may be better for companies just getting 
started or the ones that don't have the reputation we have. 
   ---Low seller, NTX 
 
The majority of the carriers that use NTX are truckers that hauled 
something somewhere and they are then in a truck stop looking at 
screens to backhaul something to their origin.   
 ---Nonmember, NTX  
 
We interviewed two organizations procuring freight via NTX.  Both 
organizations achieved better freight pricing by using NTX.  However, both 
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organizations were small.  Each was a single-warehouse operation.  In addition the 
organizations shipped non-perishable, non-refrigerated items.  Leading Edge Brands 
shipped rootbeer.  Texas Plastics shipped trash bags.  We interviewed one buying 
organization that chose not to participate in NTX.  McMurray Foodservice supplies 
restaurants and ships primarily perishable products with a 1-2 day shelf life.  McMurray 
Foodservice has distribution centers throughout the United States.  Because they 
represent repeat business and significant volume, McMurray Foodservice negotiates 
great carrier rates.  The quotes below illustrate that buying organization capabilities 
affect the organization’s perceived value from marketplace use. 
 
Carriers have to go through a fairly detailed certification process 
to do business with us.  This includes insurance, service, and 
driver training.    For a carrier to do business with us, they must be 
compliant with our technology.  In this situation, the option of 
using spot carriers goes away.  Most of our business is lane 
specific and repetitive. 
 ---Nonmember, NTX   
 
This (NTX) may work for the small mom and pops and allow 
them to get better pricing.  If a small mom and pop called 
Southwestern and wanted Southwestern to haul for them, they 
wouldn't get a discounted price because they didn't represent very 
much business.  When these mom and pops go through a broker or 
something like NTX, they can get a better price because the 
broker, NTX, represents a lot of business.   
 ---Low seller, NTX 
 
Pegasus had a difficult time getting utilities to use the marketplace.  Pegasus’ 
original business model was based on utilities conducting all of their business via the 
marketplace.  The problem was that many utilities had better supplier relationships than 
the Pegasus marketplace. Many utilities had been doing business with the same industry 
suppliers for years.  In addition, most buying utilities had automated procurement 
systems for routine purchasing from their industry suppliers.  The following quote 
illustrates that organizational capabilities affect an organization’s perceived value from 
marketplace use, which then affects the organization’s marketplace use.   
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In a lot of cases Gulf Coast Energy isn't using Pegasus’ offerings 
because we are already there with lots of pricing and processes 
and Pegasus cannot really help us. 
 ---High buyer, Pegasus   
 
Pegasus also had a difficult time getting industry suppliers to join and then use 
the marketplace.  Industry suppliers already had relationships with Pegasus’ buying 
organizations so they did not perceive a benefit from joining Pegasus.  Most industry 
suppliers that did join, did so at their buying utility’s request.  Suppliers with a large 
market share or suppliers with a virtual monopoly on a product were less likely to 
respond favorably to a utility’s request to do business over the marketplace.   
The selling organizations that perceived value from using Pegasus were primarily 
organizations that were trying to build industry relationships and/or organizations 
without automated ordering systems integrating with industry buying organizations.  
Office Plus is a high seller within Pegasus.  They explained their motivation for using 
Pegasus was to build customer relationship with the utility industry.  The quotes below 
illustrate that organization capabilities affect an organization’s perceived value from 
marketplace use, which then affects the organization’s marketplace use. 
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The big suppliers, the ones that have the business, have no reason 
to participate in Pegasus.  In addition, most of these suppliers are 
already doing electronic commerce.  They have the infrastructure 
where we can go online and place orders.  Pegasus doesn't help 
them any.    
 ---High buyer, Pegasus 
 
The suppliers that do well on Pegasus, the ones that have been 
successful, are the ones trying to get into the market.  We are 
working with a supplier that is new and has just installed a new 
ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) system.  They are planning 
to send everything through the marketplace.  This makes sense for 
them since they are just starting out.   
 ---Sales Vice President, Pegasus  
 
The findings that the better an organization’s capabilities are the less likely the 
organization is to perceive marketplace value and use the marketplace, is contrary to 
existing IOIS research.  Several IOIS studies find information technology capabilities 
facilitate IOIS diffusion, particularly IOIS use.  Crook and Kumar’s (1998) qualitative 
study finds organization’s information technology capabilities facilitate EDI use.  
Damsgaard and Lyytinen’s (1998) field study links an organization’s infrastructure to 
EDI diffusion.  Grewal et al.’s (2001) survey of  members in the Polygon marketplace 
links emphasizing information technology capabilities to organizations functioning 
effectively in B2B e-marketplaces.  Hope et al. (2001) links current technology to B2B 
EC diffusion.  Tabor’s (2001) case study of a major U.S. airline also links technology 
performance to B2B EC use. 
9. 5.   USER BUY-IN 
The data indicate user buy-in drives an organization’s B2B e-marketplace use.  
User buy-in  is whether the organization’s intended marketplace users want to do 
business via the marketplace.  The data indicate who made the organization’s 
marketplace membership decision and whether marketplace use helps users achieve 
existing performance measurements affects user buy-in. 
    210 
 
Table 16 shows users made selling organizations’ marketplace membership 
decisions and management/corporate made buying organizations’ marketplace 
membership decisions.   
Table 16  Marketplace Membership Decision Makers 
 DECISION 
MAKER 
NATIONAL TRUCKING EXCHANGE (NTX) PEGASUS 
Management/ 
Corporate  
HB, LB    
(Texas Plastics, Leading Edge Brands) 
2 HB, 3 LB                    
(Synergy, Gulf Coast Energy 
(unregulated), Gulf Coast 
Energy Regulated, Lone Star 
Utilities, U.S. Electric and 
Power) 
User  LS                       
(Southwestern Trucking, Inc.) 
1 HS, 2 LS      
(Office Plus, Bearing Point 
Manufacturing, Mining 
Manufacturing) 
Key:  The table categorizes user organizations by their use level (high vs. low) and how 
they use (sell vs. buy).  This results in the classifications below. 
HS-high seller, LS-low seller, HB-high buyer, LB-low buyer 
 
In the low selling organizations, the organization’s customer or potential 
customer wanted the selling organization to do business with them over the marketplace.  
The customer/potential customer communicated this with the selling organization’s field 
sales representative.  The field sales representative then went to their organization with 
the request and pushed the organization to do business with the customer/potential 
customer via the marketplace.  In these cases, the organizations met the request and 
participated to the extent the customer wanted.   
In the high selling organization, the organization’s sales representative made the 
organization’s marketplace membership decision.  In this situation, a utility contacted 
Office Plus’ National Sales Manager about doing business with the utility over Pegasus.  
Office Plus’ National Sales Manager’s performance metrics are based on increased sales.  
Doing business with this utility over Pegasus helped the sales representative increase 
sales.  Once Office Plus joined Pegasus, their various sales representatives began 
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soliciting all the member utilities’ business.  Since the sales representatives made the 
decision for Office Plus to join Pegasus and Pegasus helped the sales representatives 
achieve their performance objective of higher sales, Office Plus achieved user buy-in 
and high use.  The following quote illustrates this. 
 
Office Plus thought that being a member of Pegasus would give us 
a leg up with the utilities.  When we did our sales calls it would 
bring us into the utilities at a higher level than otherwise. Being in 
Pegasus gave us a recommended license to hunt.  By joining 
Pegasus we got credibility and it made the utilities give us a more 
serious look at a higher level.   
 ---High buyer, Pegasus 
 
None of the selling organizations in Table 16 noted a problem with user buy-in.  
The field data indicate this is probably because users made the marketplace membership 
decision and marketplace membership helped users achieve their existing performance 
objectives of increased sales.   
Table 16 indicates management/corporate made the buying organizations’ 
marketplace membership decisions and then pushed marketplace use down to the users.  
The two NTX buying organizations had immediate user buy-in.  The users adopted NTX 
and immediately started using.  Four of the five Pegasus buying organizations mentioned 
lack of user buy-in as a marketplace use inhibitor.  See  Table 17. 
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Table 17  Buying Organization Quotes Mentioning Struggling with User Buy-in 
ORGANIZATION QUOTES MENTIONING STRUGGLING WITH USER BUY-IN 
 
Gulf Coast Energy 
(Regulated) 
It is hard pushing doing business via an electronic marketplace out to  
our employees.   
 
Gulf Coast Energy 
(Unregulated) 
What would happen is I would talk to a supplier about doing business 
with us via Pegasus and then the supplier would call the buyer and say 
what is going on with wanting us to do business over this marketplace?  
The supplier would call the buyer and the buyer would basically call me.  
So there was not communication or power between our efforts with 
Pegasus and the purchasing departments. We would try to move the 
suppliers with Pegasus, but couldn't get the support of purchasing.  
 
When Pegasus tried to engage suppliers to be part of Pegasus, the 
suppliers would contact the people in the supply chain that were 
purchasing items from Pegasus.  When the supplier said that Pegasus 
says you want to do business this way, the supply chain people at Gulf 
Coast Energy would shrug their shoulders and say we know nothing 
about it.   
 
I was the only one with performance metrics related to Pegasus. 
Lone Star Utilities The buyers believe Pegasus will make their doom.  They won’t try and 
make it work. 
 
U.S. Electric and Power Director Strategic Procurement/Supply Chain:  The financial group at 
U.S. Electric and Power made the decision (to participate in Pegasus).   
This was a time when our company was looking for things to invest in.  
And, they made the decision purely as an investment, as a revenue 
generator.  Then they pushed the decision down to the supply chain 
group and told us to try and find some things to use the marketplace for.   
 
We're in a marketplace that is actually a competitor of Pegasus.   
We're using it as a learning tool.   
 
Hope: Who made the decision to participate in this other marketplace? 
 
Director Strategic Procurement/Supply Chain:  Me and the Senior Vice 
President of Procurement.   
 
 
 
 
Why did the two buying organizations participating in NTX achieve user buy-in, 
while the buying organizations participating in Pegasus struggled to achieve user buy-in?  
Using NTX helped both users in the study achieve their existing performance metrics of 
reducing freight costs.  In addition, NTX’s use helped with other performance metrics 
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because NTX made the users more efficient.  Rather than calling several carriers to 
procure freight, NTX’s users could post the load on the website. 
Pegasus’ adopting utilities struggled persuading their users to buy-in to Pegasus.  
Pegasus’ initial offering did not help utility buyers achieve their existing performance 
metrics.  For most products, Pegasus’ marketplace was not as efficient as existing 
purchasing systems and using Pegasus took time to learn, which then took time away 
from achieving existing performance metrics.  The following quote explains the 
relationship between existing performance metrics and utility user buy-in. 
 
Performance metrics for buyers in utilities are still not clear with 
the use of marketplaces. 
   
 ---Buyer Development Manager, Pegasus 
 
The utilities that use Pegasus the most modified their buyers’ performance metrics to 
encourage Pegasus’ use.  The following quote illustrates this. 
 
The companies that have operational alignment with us know the 
strategic agenda, 1+1=3.  We have a deep business unit 
relationship with them.  The success metrics for their companies 
are inclusive of Pegasus. 
 ---Sales Vice President, Pegasus 
 
In addition to not helping achieve existing performance metrics, 
management/corporate making the utility’s marketplace membership decision and 
pushing it down also hurt user buy-in.  In some cases, management did not communicate 
to the buyers that they were supposed to use the marketplace nor did they show them 
how to use the marketplace.  In other instances, the users felt threatened by the 
marketplace and wanted to prove that they could attain better pricing than the 
marketplace.  The quotes below illustrate this.  
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The customer wants us to do something so we join the 
marketplace.  What has been interesting is there is this real big 
deal and the customer wants to do it, we do  join, we help the 
customer do sales presentation to their users, and then nothing 
happens.  There is  a disconnect between what the customer’s 
corporate office wants to do and what the people out in the field 
do.  They sign up because corporate wants to do it but then the 
company’s buyers keep doing it the old way.  I think they don't 
like to change. 
 ---Low seller, Pegasus   
 
Hope:  Why do organizations get involved in a marketplace and 
then not use it?   
 
Vice President of Strategic Accounts:  This happens when the 
decision to join a marketplace is not made at the procurement 
level.  So, when the procurement people find out that the 
organization has joined a marketplace they feel threatened, like 
the organization doesn't think they are doing their job.  So, they 
will do anything they can to undermine the marketplace.  They 
think that the marketplace is going to put them out of a job.  I deal 
with procurement people who are trying to undermine 
marketplaces.  Their procurement manager will call me in and 
say, hey our company joined this marketplace.  Is there any way 
you can look at the contract and show that the marketplace isn't 
giving good prices?  Of course, I'll give them a better price every 
time.  The catch 22 is when Office Plus is in the marketplace and 
they then call me in.  I still pat the local sales guy on the back and 
offer a better price.  This is the “not invented here mentality.”  
Procurement people will spend a year trying to undermine the 
marketplace.  In the current economy, it is especially hard to get 
buyers to use marketplaces because they are scared they are going 
to lose their jobs.  
 ---High seller, Pegasus 
 
The IOIS studies in the review do not mention user buy-in as an IOIS use driver. 
9. 6.   CONCLUSION 
This chapter examines organization characteristics driving an organization’s 
marketplace use.  Situations where organizations join marketplaces and then don’t use 
them formed this research question.  To investigate this question, we interviewed three 
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marketplaces, buyers and sellers participating in each marketplace, and at least one 
organization that chose not to participate in the marketplace.  We coded the data into 
categories.  We then analyzed the data to determine what organizational characteristics 
distinguish high users from low users.   
Figure 12 shows the investigation’s results.  Figure 12 proposes membership 
motivation, perceived value from marketplace use, and user buy-in affect an 
organization’s marketplace use.  The model indicates membership motivation, perceived 
value from marketplace use, and user buy-in can overlap.  We observed three cases 
(Office Plus, Leading Edge Brands, and Texas Plastics) in which the organization joined 
the marketplace because of a perceived value and immediately achieved user buy-in.  In 
all three situations, the organizations immediately began using the marketplace.  The 
model further proposes an organization’s capabilities affect perceived value from 
marketplace use.  The better an organization’s supplier or customer relationships and/or 
the more automated the organization’s processes, the less likely an organization is to 
perceive value from marketplace use and then use the marketplace.   
9.6.1. Comparison to Original Model 
The original model (Figure 8) posits top management support, champion 
existence, and adequate resources impact an organization’s B2B e-marketplace use.  We 
designed the interview guides (see Appendix A) to solicit structured responses regarding 
the degree of these drivers’ presence in each organization.  Giving us greater insight, the 
respondents often elaborated on their responses to the structured questions.  We also 
asked open interview questions.  During the open interviews top management support, 
champion existence, and adequate resources were rarely mentioned.   
In an effort to determine how these drivers affect an organization’s B2B 
e-marketplace use, we compare the level of each of these drivers to the organization’s 
use level. See Table 18.    Based on the structured and the unstructured portion of the 
interviews, we did not include any of these drivers in the final model of organization 
characteristics driving marketplace use.  The results indicate these drivers are minimum 
criteria necessary to achieve marketplace use, but their presence does not strongly 
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impact an organization’s marketplace use.  In the paragraphs below, we discuss each 
proposed driver.  
 
Table 18  Analysis of Original Marketplace Use Drivers Model 
 ORGANIZATION
USE LEVEL 
TOP 
MANAGEMENT 
SUPPORT 
CHAMPION 
EXISTENCE
CHAMPION'S 
STATUS 
ADEQUATE 
FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES 
ADEQUATE 
TIME 
NATIONAL TRUCKING EXCHANGE (NTX)    
R.E. Transport High seller 2 2 N/A 5.5 5.5 
Southwestern Trucking, Inc. Low seller 7 1 Medium 3 2 
Texas Plastics High buyer 7 7 High 7 7 
Leading Edge Brands 
(2 interviews) 
Low buyer 7 7 High 7 7 
PEGASUS       
Office Plus (4 interviews) High seller 7 7 Low 7 7 
Mining Manufacturing Low seller 6 No champion N/A 6 6 
Bearing Point Manufacturing Low seller 7 2 High 7 6 
Synergy High buyer 5 5 High 7 7 
Gulf Coast Energy 
(Regulated) 
High buyer 5 5 High 4.25 5 
Gulf Coast Energy 
(Unregulated) 
Low buyer 1 1 Medium/Low 7 5 
Lone Star Utilities 
(2 interviews) 
Low buyer 7 7 High 5 4.25 
U.S. Electric and Power Low buyer Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable 
C-STORE EXCHANGE (CSX)    
Momentum Manufacturing Low seller Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable 
McMurray Distributing, Inc. 
(3 interviews) 
Low seller 2 7 High 6 6 
McMurray Distributing, Inc. 
(3 interviews) 
Low buyer 2 7 High 6 6 
Gulf Coast Oil Low buyer Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable 
Key:  The table reports response to Likert scale questions.  1 indicates not at all.  7 
indicates very much.  
 
 
9.6.1.1.   Top Management Support 
The original model proposes top management support drives an organization’s 
marketplace use.  Top management support refers to whether, in the period after 
deciding to participate in the B2B e-marketplace, a participant organization’s 
management favors the organization using the marketplace.  We asked the following 
question to solicit information regarding top management support.  
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 With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, in the periods after 
they decided to join the marketplace and once the marketplace became 
available for use,  to what extent would you say top management 
favored  your organization using the marketplace?   
 
Table 18 shows the use level for each marketplace’s member organizations and 
the degree of top management support within each member organization.  The table 
shows mixed results for relationships between top management support and an 
organization’s marketplace use. The table shows high responses for top management 
support and high and low organization use levels.  The table also shows low responses 
for top management support and high and low organizational use level.  Gulf Coast 
Energy (unregulated)  and McMurray Distributing both had low responses for top 
management support, and as expected, achieved low use.  R.E. Transport had a low 
response for top management support, but achieved high use.  The following field note 
excerpt indicates business partner encouragement was a stronger organization use driver 
for R.E. Transport than top management support. 
 
Top management did not want to do business over the 
marketplace.  We were pushed by our trading partners.  
 ---High seller, NTX 
 
The field data indicate top management support ebbs and flows with the 
environment and the organization’s perceived value from marketplace use.  For the most 
part, top management made the marketplace membership decisions.  See Table 16.  
These decisions were made at the height of the EC boom.  At this time, top management 
made the decision to join and then supported the marketplace.  When the environment 
stopped encouraging EC initiatives and organizations were struggling to achieve use and 
value from their e-marketplace endeavors, top management support diminished.  The 
quotes below illustrate this. 
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Earl (the Chief Executive Officer) got involved in CSX because 
McMurray Distributing thought they needed to do something 
about e-business, but it hasn't taken off like they thought it was.  
Earl really isn't seeing value so is unwilling to continue to invest 
in it. 
 ---Low seller and buyer, CSX  
 
No one in top management has “actively pushed” Lone Star 
Utilities to use the marketplace.  Yes, they favored Lone Star 
Utilities using the marketplace as long as it brings value, but they 
used the value proposition as a way out.  If there was no value 
then they weren't in favor of it.    
 ---Low buyer, Pegasus  
 
Given the mixed results for top management support and organization use level, 
this research cannot posit top management support as a marketplace use driver.  
Perceived value from marketplace use drives an organization’s marketplace use.  If top 
management perceives a value, they will support marketplace use.  If they do not 
perceive a value, they will not support marketplace use. 
Several IOIS studies (Cox and Ghoneim 1996, Hope et al. 2001, Ramamurthy et 
al. 1999) link top management support to various IOIS diffusion aspects.  In the sense 
that the findings indicate, independent of business partner encouragement, top 
management support is necessary to achieve marketplace use, the findings support the 
existing literature.  The findings also expand the existing IOIS literature to use, a 
specific aspect of diffusion, and to marketplaces, a type of IOIS where top management 
support’s effect on use has not been investigated.  
  However, the findings open up a question.  Were these studies conducted in 
situations where IOIS use offered a perceived value?  In some of the marketplaces, the 
organizations did not perceive  a value from marketplace use.  As such, the findings 
indicate an interrelationship between perceived value, top management support, and use 
with perceived value a strong use driver.   
9.6.1.2.   Champion Existence 
The original model proposes champion existence drives an organization’s 
marketplace use.  Champion existence refers to someone in the organization consistently 
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pushing for the organization to use the B2B e-marketplace.  We asked the following 
questions to solicit information regarding champion existence: 
 
 Did a particular individual play a critical role in getting your 
organization to use the marketplace? 
 
 If so, how would you characterize this person’s status in the 
organization?  High, Medium, or Low? 
 
 With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, to what extent would 
you say there has been one or more continuous strong advocates 
(champions) of the marketplace’s use within your organization? 
 
Table 18 indicates mixed results for champion existence as a driver of an 
organization’s marketplace use.  The table shows high and low champion existence 
scores and low use levels.  However, every high user had a high champion existence 
score, except R.E. Transport.  R.E. Transport’s low champion existence score and high 
use level indicates that business partner encouragement may be a stronger use driver 
than champion existence.  
Because of these results and the fact that champion existence was rarely 
mentioned except when we asked the structured questions indicate, we cannot posit a 
relationship between champion existence and an organization’s marketplace use.  We 
also gathered information on the champion’s status. Table 18 does not indicate a 
relationship between champion status and marketplace use. 
Other researchers (Cavaye and Cragg 1995, Runge 1985, Runge 1988) have also 
investigated champion existence and are unable to find a strong link between champion 
existence and their dependent variable.  Cavaye and Cragg  (1995) find mixed support 
for champion existence in IOIS design and building.  Runge (1985, 1988) is unable to 
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correlate champion existence with IOIS adoption even though his field notes mention 
champion existence a number of times.   
9.6.1.3.   Adequate Resources 
The model posits adequate resources drive an organization’s B2B e-marketplace 
use.  We define adequate resources as dedicating financial resources and time to 
incorporate the marketplace into the organization’s existing processes.  We asked the 
following questions to solicit responses about adequate resources:  
 
 With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, to what extent 
would you say that adequate financial resources have been dedicated 
to getting the organization to use the marketplace?   
 
 With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, to what extent 
would you say that adequate time has been allocated to programs 
associated with getting the organization to use the marketplace?  
These programs may include training people on the use of the system 
or programming time to integrate the marketplace into the existing 
procurement processes. 
 
In evaluating the responses regarding adequate financial resources and adequate 
time, Table 18 indicates every organization except Southwestern Trucking had higher 
scores in these areas.  Given that both high and low users had higher scores, adequate 
financial resources and adequate time do not appear to impact an organization’s 
marketplace use.  Rather, adequate financial resources and adequate time may be 
minimum criteria necessary for an organization to achieve high marketplace use.    
9.6.2. Research Implications 
This research is one of the first investigations noting that organizations 
participating in the same B2B e-marketplace can achieve different use levels.  The 
research is one of the first in-depth investigations of this phenomenon. The investigation 
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finds that membership motivation, perceived value, and user buy-in affect an 
organization’s marketplace use.  An organization’s existing capabilities (relationships 
and automated processes) affect perceived value.  These findings offer insights to the 
existing IOIS literature, as well as to a number of theories underpinning this literature. In 
this section we discuss the IOIS literature implications as well as the theoretical 
implications of this chapter’s findings.   
9.6.2.1.   Interorganizational Information Systems (IOIS) Literature Implications 
 As we discussed each of our study’s findings in the chapter, we compared each 
finding with the existing IOIS literature.  In the comparison, we recognized and cited 
other IOIS studies that agree with the particular individual findings in our study.  Our 
literature comparison expanded to the IOIS literature, because very little e-marketplace 
research exists.   
Two studies (Grewal et al. 2001, Premkumar and Ramamurthy 1995)  somewhat 
corroborate our finding that an organization’s e-marketplace adoption motivation affects 
their e-marketplace use.   Premkumar and Ramamurthy’s survey results indicate that 
firms proactively adopting EDI better integrate their EDI systems with other internal 
applications and more aggressively expand their external connectivity.  Grewal et al. 
find firms emphasizing efficiency motivations and deemphasizing legitimacy 
motivations are more likely to develop substantial knowledge about their marketplaces 
and procedural knowledge about doing business on the marketplace.   
Premkumar et al. and Grewal et al. studies used surveys.  The surveys collected 
information on predetermined factors effect on a predetermined dependent variable.  
Surveys include many responses, increasing the generalizability of the findings.  
However, surveys collect information on predetermined factors and may not capture 
other factors that are even more relevant to the situation.  Our study used a grounded 
theory method.  Grounded theory involves in-depth case studies with a smaller number 
of organizations compared to surveys.  As such, the findings may be idiosyncratic to the 
particular set of cases in the study.   
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The generalizability of the findings that adoption motivation affects use is 
increased because the three studies are in three different contexts, use two different 
research methods, and focus on two different IOIS types.  
Our study recognizes three different e-marketplace membership motivations and 
shows that each motivation leads to different organization e-marketplace use levels.  
Grewal et al. do not recognize that organizations join e-marketplaces because their 
business partners encourage them to join.   Premkumar and Ramamurthy’s survey 
recognizes adoption motivations similar to our study but in an electronic data 
interchange context.  This study shows that use transpires differently dependent on 
motivation.  Premkumar and Ramamurthy ultimately group motivation into proactive 
and reactive.  They do not show how the different aspects of a reactive motivation 
ultimately affect an organization’s EDI use. 
Several IOIS studies link different aspects of business environment change to 
various aspects of IOIS use.  Sabherwal and Vijayasarathy’s study (1994) links 
environmental uncertainty to telecommunications between customers and suppliers.  
Several EDI studies (Crook and Kumar 1998, Damsgaard and Lyytinen 1998, 
Premkumar and Ramamurthy 1995, Ramamurthy et al. 1999) link aspects of business 
environment change to aspects of EDI use.  Ranganathan et al. (2001) link the external 
business environment to B2B EC deployment. Our study finds that many organizations 
joined e-marketplaces because the business environment was encouraging e-marketplace 
adoption.  However, these organizations would not extensively use the e-marketplace 
unless they perceived that e-marketplace use offered their organization a relative 
advantage.  In many cases, senior management decided to join the e-marketplace and 
when the workers tried to use it, the e-marketplace did not help them achieve their 
performance objectives.  The other IOIS studies probably do not recognize this because 
most used surveys and the surveys were not designed to capture this information.   
Crook and Kumar’s (1998) grounded theory EDI study corroborates our finding 
that an organization’s business partner encouraging the organization to use an IOIS 
facilitates an organization’s e-marketplace use.  However, our finding further shows that 
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organization’s that join e-marketplaces for this reason only use the e-marketplace to the 
extent their requesting business partner requires.  Neither Crook and Kumar’s study nor 
the existing IOIS literature recognize this.  This may be because other IOIS are 
point-to-point connections between two organizations.  In these types of connections, an 
organization does not have the same opportunity to further use the IOIS as in 
e-marketplaces.   
Several IOIS studies (Crook and Kumar 1998, Grewal et al. 2001, Premkumar et 
al. 1994, Tabor 2001) support our finding that an organization’s perceived value from 
marketplace use drives an organization’s marketplace use.  However, our data indicate 
that business partner encouragement may be a stronger use driver than an organization’s 
perceived value.  R.E. Transport implemented and extensively used NTX even though 
the organization did not perceive a value from the marketplace.   
This study’s finding that organizational capabilities are negatively related to 
perceived value from e-marketplace use is contrary to the existing IOIS literature.  This 
study defines organizational capabilities as existing relationships and automated 
processes.  Many studies  (Crook and Kumar 1998, Damsgaard and Lyytinen 1998, 
Grewal et al. 2001, Hope et al. 2001, Tabor 2001) of a variety of IOIS types link better 
organizational information technology capabilities to IOIS use.   
This may be explained by considering the life cycle of IOIS connections.  EDI 
was one of the first IOIS.  When organizations implemented their first IOIS connections, 
they were comparing the perceived value from IOIS connections to their existing 
systems.  These systems did not involve interorganizational information technology 
connectivity.  Given this, the organizations with better technology capabilities would be 
better able to implement interorganizational connectivity.  However, as years have 
passed many organizations have refined their interorganizational information systems 
connections.  The decision to use e-marketplaces therefore involves evaluating existing 
interorganizational connections against e-marketplace connections.  The organizations 
with strong interorganizational connections are unlikely to see many benefits from using 
e-marketplaces.  Especially since at the time of this study, e-marketplace automation and 
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integration was evolving.  Organizations without automated interorganizational 
connections perceived a value from e-marketplace use.  These organizations are usually 
small, new, and/or less technically advanced companies than their counterparts. 
The above explanation posits why our findings differ from the EDI studies.  This 
explanation does not hold for studies of more recent IOIS implementations, including 
B2B EC (Hope et al. 2001, Tabor 2001) and e-marketplace  (Grewal et al. 2001) studies.  
Our study also identifies business partner relationships as an aspect of 
organizational capabilities. Our findings indicate that organizations perceive less value 
from using an e-marketplace to do business with organizations in which they have strong 
relationships.  The existing IOIS literature does not recognize this.  This is probably 
because one benefit of e-marketplaces is the ability to easily compare business partners.  
Previous IOIS did not have this benefit and as such previous IOIS studies would not 
have this finding.   
This study indicates that user buy-in drives e-marketplace use.  The study finds 
who made the decision to join the e-marketplace and whether using the e-marketplace 
helps users achieve their existing performance metrics affects user buy-in.  The existing 
IOIS literature does not investigate user buy-in.  Our study’s contribution is introducing 
user buy-in to the IOIS literature.   
9.6.2.2.   Theoretical Implications 
In addition to providing implications to the existing IOIS literature, this study 
also provides implications to a number of theories underpinning the existing IOIS 
literature. 
Resource dependency (Pfeffer 1988, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) theory posits 
that an organization that is dependent on its trading partners will do what they ask to 
maintain the relationship with its trading partners.  The findings support resource 
dependency theory by showing organizations that join marketplaces at their business 
partner’s encouragement will only use the marketplace to the extent their trading 
partners require.  
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The findings also indicate that resource dependency theory may override 
innovation diffusion theory in explaining organizational marketplace use.  Innovation 
diffusion theory (Rogers 1995) posits organizations will adopt technology they perceive 
offers a greater relative advantage than their existing systems.  R.E. Transport indicated 
marketplace membership and use offered a very low relative advantage.  However, R.E. 
Transport used the marketplace heavily.  In addition, most of the other organizations that 
adopted marketplaces at their business partner’s encouragement indicated no perceived 
value from marketplace use.   
Institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977) posits 
that organizations adopt practices that may not necessarily increase technical efficiency, 
but increase legitimacy in external stakeholders’ eyes.  This work supports institutional 
theory.  The cases indicate several organizations joined marketplaces because everyone 
else was and Wall Street was encouraging organizations to have EC initiatives.  
However, the work shows that organizations adopting marketplaces for this reason will 
only use marketplace offerings that they perceive will help their organization.  This 
extends institutional theory explaining that institutional theory may be limited to 
adoption and does not apply to use.   
Innovation diffusion theory (Rogers 1995) posits organizations will adopt 
technology they perceive offers a relative advantage.  The theory defines relative 
advantage as “an innovation being better than the idea it supersedes” (p. 212).  The work 
supports innovation diffusion theory by showing relative advantage as one motivation 
for organizations adopting B2B e-marketplaces.  The work extends innovation diffusion 
theory by explaining that organizations may adopt innovations for a number of reasons, 
but organizational use is driven by the organization’s perceived value from marketplace 
use.   
Innovation diffusion theory identifies the following relative advantage 
subdimensions:  “degree of economic profitability, low initial cost, decrease in 
discomfort, social prestige, savings in time and effort, and immediacy of the reward” 
(Rogers 1995, p. 216).  The cases illustrate economic profitability in terms of reduced 
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costs or increased sales is the primary way organizations measure perceived value.  See 
Table 15.  In Office Plus’ case, doing business with marketplaces took more time and 
effort and was more error prone than traditional business practices, especially when 
organizations adopted hosted arrangements.  However, Office Plus was a high 
marketplace user.  Both organizations purchasing freight via NTX mentioned that using 
NTX made their jobs more efficient.  Rather than calling carriers for quotes, the 
organizations could post the bid on NTX’s website.  However, both organizations 
mentioned this only in passing and did not quantify the efficiency impact of this 
improved process.  These cases may indicate economic profitability has greater weight 
as a relative advantage subdimension than a decrease in discomfort or savings in time 
and effort. 
The discussion above shows that in some cases the existing literature and 
theories support our findings.  These situations increase our findings’ validity and extend 
the IOIS literature and theories to a different context, B2B e-marketplaces.  In other 
situations, our findings conflict with the existing literature and theories.  This section 
identifies and examines these situations, offering greater insight both to our study’s 
findings and the existing literature and theories. 
9.6.3. Practical Implications 
The research offers practical implications for marketplaces and organizations 
considering joining and trying to use e-marketplaces. 
In deciding whether to join a B2B e-marketplace, organizations should evaluate 
the marketplace’s value propositions’ alignment with their existing capabilities and 
performance metrics.  If organizations join marketplaces for reasons other than the 
marketplace’s relative advantage, the organization will have difficulty using the 
marketplace.  Organizations in the study joined marketplaces at membership fees of $0, 
$85,000, and over $15 million.  These are expensive fees if your organization cannot use 
the marketplace. Consider these questions in evaluating whether your organization will 
use the marketplace. 
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How does the marketplace’s customer or supplier relationships compare to your 
organization’s customer or supplier relationships?   For marketplace buying 
organizations, if the marketplace has better relationships with suppliers than your 
organization, using the marketplace may help your organization achieve better pricing.  
For marketplace supplier organizations, if the marketplace represents customers your 
organization would like to gain, using the marketplace may provide entrée to these 
customers.   
How does the marketplace’s procurement processes compare to your 
organization’s procurement processes?  If the marketplace has more efficient 
procurement processes than your organization, then the marketplace is worth using as it 
will provide your organization value. 
Does using the marketplace help the marketplace’s intended users achieve their 
performance metrics?  If it does, they are likely to buy-in to the concept and use the 
marketplace.  If it does not, your organization will struggle convincing them to use.   
Finally, listen to your ground-level people.  If they bring the idea of joining a 
marketplace to your organization, it is because they see an immediate value and will 
therefore use the marketplace.   
Marketplaces must consider our research.  Marketplaces must design their 
marketplace’s value propositions so that the marketplace’s intended members will 
perceive  value.  Marketplaces may use a variety of ways to solicit membership, but the 
marketplace will not survive long-term unless the members perceive a value from 
marketplace use.   
Marketplaces should identify the organizations their intended membership does 
not have strong relationships with, but would like improved relationships. Developing 
relationships with these organizations will improve the marketplace members’ perceived 
value from marketplace use.  Marketplaces should also identify industry processes that 
need automation and concentrate on offerings improving these processes.  Finally, in 
addition to soliciting executive level support, develop offerings that help the marketplace 
users achieve their existing performance objectives. 
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9.6.4. Future Research 
In conducting this research, we found a number of areas worthy of future 
investigation.  
Because we used field research,  we were able to identify that different 
organizations achieve different B2B e-marketplace use levels and then propose several 
factors affecting an organization’s marketplace use.  This is based on interviews, 
participant observations, and external data from buyers and sellers participating in three 
B2B e-marketplaces.  Survey research investigating these factors would make the 
propositions more generalizable.  Survey research in this area is possible because the 
organization is the unit of analysis.  A researcher would be able to send out enough 
surveys to achieve a large enough response rate to determine how these organizational 
characteristics distinguish high users and low users.    
What are the side benefits of marketplace use?  The research indicates most 
organizations measure their marketplace benefits in terms of reduced product costs or 
increased sales.  A few marketplace members noted that because their organizations 
decided to join the marketplace their department got funding to upgrade systems, 
improve processes, and update item lists. Several of the respondents noted using the 
marketplace to gather pricing information and then using this information to negotiate 
with their existing business partners.  Others explained that marketplace use made their 
jobs more efficient.  What are the side benefits of marketplace use?  How do we measure 
these benefits? 
The model posits that organizational capabilities affect perceived relative 
advantage, which then affects an organization’s marketplace use.  Some of the field data 
indicate that organizational size may affect organizational capabilities and perceived 
value from marketplace use.  How does an organization’s size affect an organization’s 
capabilities, perceived value from marketplace use, and marketplace use? 
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CHAPTER X 
10 CONCLUSION 
In the 1990s corporate America discovered the Internet and its ability to connect 
multiple buyers and sellers.  Fueled by consultants, analysts, Wall Street, and the trade 
press, organizations became very excited about the potential of business-to-business 
(B2B) electronic marketplaces (e-marketplaces) to revolutionize business by increasing 
efficiencies, reducing costs, and increasing sales.  This excitement led to a frenzy of 
e-marketplace initiatives.   One analyst predicted that “there were between 600 and 
1,000 B2B e-marketplaces in 2001 and that there would be 4,200 by 2003” (Tumolo 
2001).   
Organizations have invested significant research and development in B2B 
e-marketplaces.  The enabling technology is widely available.  Yet, despite the early 
enthusiasm, most e-marketplaces have failed and most e-marketplace members only use 
e-marketplaces on a limited basis (Bannan 2001, Clark 2001, Gulledge 2002).  As such, 
this dissertation identifies and investigates two critical challenges to e-marketplace 
success:  achieving membership and marketplace utilization.  The specific research 
questions are: 
 What drives B2B e-marketplace membership? 
 What marketplace characteristics drive B2B e-marketplace use? 
 What organizational characteristics impact an organization’s B2B 
e-marketplace use? 
 
Since very little research addresses B2B e-marketplace implementation, 
qualitative research using a grounded theory approach is the most appropriate way to 
investigate these questions.  Data collection included participant observations, 
unstructured interviews, structured interviews, internal document reviews, and external 
document reviews.  The field research spanned from August of 2000 through May 2003.  
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This time period included the early stages of the electronic commerce (EC) boom, the 
EC boom, the EC bust, and stabilization.   
The research included a theoretical sample of e-marketplaces and participant 
organizations.  Theoretical sampling involved selecting cases that provide contrasting 
evidence on the research question.  The theoretical sample included four e-marketplaces; 
each with different outcomes in terms of membership levels and use levels.  Within each 
e-marketplace, the theoretical sample included different types of organizations as well as 
organizations with different use levels.  The research design included a high seller, a low 
seller, a high buyer, a low buyer, and a nonmember.   
Using line-by-line analysis, advocated in grounded theory, we assimilated 
insights from nearly fifty executives involved in B2B e-marketplaces.  This analysis 
resulted in three research models explaining factors influencing each research question. 
Research model 1 explains what factors influence B2B e-marketplace 
membership.  The field investigations indicate organizations join e-marketplaces for 
three reasons.  These are: perceived relative advantage, perceiving the e-marketplace as 
a mechanism for dealing with a changing business environment, and business partner 
encouragement.  Perceived relative advantage must be currently realizable to “in-power” 
organizations.  Communicating the e-marketplace’s relative advantage and the business 
environment change and influencing member organizations to use the marketplace takes 
time.  As such, marketplaces must develop complementary services to support continued 
existence.   The e-marketplace’s drivers must be communicated.  Relationships, industry 
promoters, and education drive communication.  Industry competitive nature affects 
relationships.   
Research model 2 explains what marketplace characteristics drive a B2B 
e-marketplace’s use.  The field investigations indicate perceived relative advantage 
drives B2B e-marketplace use. Customizing to existing industry practices, supporting 
low-leverage procurements, fee structures, and reporting price/sales benefits drive an 
e-marketplace’s perceived relative advantage.  Investor commitment and support drive 
both perceived relative advantage and use.  Investor commitment is defined as the 
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founding organizations making efforts to use the marketplace and/or providing the 
marketplace feedback to enable member marketplace use.  Support is defined as 
assisting member organizations with e-marketplace use.   
Research model 3 explains what organizational characteristics impact an 
organization’s B2B e-marketplace use.  The field investigations indicate membership 
motivation, perceived value from marketplace use, and user buy-in affect an 
organization’s marketplace use.  Membership motivation, perceived value from 
marketplace use, and user buy-in can overlap.  In three cases, organizations joined the 
e-marketplace because of a perceived value and immediately achieved user buy-in.  In 
all three situations, these organizations immediately began using the marketplace.  The 
model further proposes an organization’s capabilities affect perceived value from 
marketplace use.  The better an organization’s supplier or customer relationships and the 
more automated the organization’s processes, the less likely an organization is to 
perceive value from marketplace use and then use the marketplace.   
10. 1.   CHAPTER INTERRELATIONSHIP 
Information systems success is one of the most commonly investigated areas in 
the information systems field.  The information systems literature (Delone and McLean 
1992) posits a number of success definitions, success measures, and  success drivers.  
B2B e-marketplace success has yet to be formally defined.  Potential definitions may 
include financial viability or continued existence.  Achieving membership and 
influencing members to use the e-marketplace is necessary to achieve this definition of 
e-marketplace success.   
The existing information systems literature does not posit membership as a 
success criterion.  Most of the existing information systems research focuses on 
information technology implementation in a single department, a single organization, or 
between two organizations.  These information technology implementations do not 
require that organizations become members of the initiative.  B2B e-marketplaces 
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require a number of organizations join the e-marketplace.  As such, achieving 
membership is an initial criterion for e-marketplace success. 
Use is one of the most common dependent variables in information systems 
research (Delone and McLean 1992).  This research investigates two dimensions driving 
use.  These include marketplace characteristics making e-marketplace use viable for all 
marketplace members and organizational characteristics driving an organization’s 
marketplace use.  
As success drivers, membership and use interrelate.  As e-marketplace 
membership increases, the chance of some organizations using the e-marketplace 
increases.  Organizations using the marketplace cause the environment to change.   Other 
organizations observe this change and perceive joining the marketplace as a mechanism 
for dealing with the environment change.  These organizations then explore the 
marketplace’s relative advantage, and potentially use the marketplace.   
Pegasus’ Sales Vice President explains the interrelationship of marketplace 
membership and use as a chicken and egg problem.  The e-marketplace must have 
member organizations for the marketplace to be used, but organizations won’t join 
unless the marketplace is being used.  Use level and number of participants follow one 
another.  NTX, the marketplace with the highest use level, has the highest number of 
participants.  Retail Matrix, the marketplace with no use, has the fewest participants.   
The following excerpts illustrate the interrelationship of marketplace 
membership and use. 
 
The problems were hesitancy of the industry players to join 
because we didn't even have a base of real players that could 
conduct any kind of transaction. 
 ---Senior Vice President of Strategic Alliances,   
 United States Convenience Store Association   
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It was a  catch 22.  Until they used the community was not going 
to get big.”  “When we talked to the other companies to get them 
in, they would say well your investors aren’t using it why should 
we?  This is the same thing the analysts said.     
 ---President and Chief Operating Officer, CSX 
 
The interrelationship of membership and use is in line with critical mass theory 
(Granovetter 1978, Granovetter 1985, Markus 1990).  Critical mass theorists posit 
collective action participation decisions are based on perceptions of what the group is 
doing, who participates, how many participate, and contributions to date.   
The investigation indicates aspects of perceived relative advantage drive 
e-marketplace membership, e-marketplace use, and an organization’s e-marketplace use.  
An organization may join an e-marketplace for a variety of reasons, but extensive 
organizational use arises when the organization’s decision makers perceive 
e-marketplace use helps the organization achieve its operating objectives.  As such, 
perceived relative advantage is critical to e-marketplace success.   
10. 2.   CONTRIBUTIONS 
This research contributes to practice, the IOIS literature, and theory.   
10.2.1. Contributions to Practice 
This research offers practitioners objective insight into e-marketplaces and their 
role within industries and within their organization.  First, the research provides insights 
into designing an e-marketplace that will add value by improving existing industry 
operations.  Second, the research identifies several strategies marketplaces can use to 
attract members.   Third, the research helps organizations evaluate e-marketplace 
membership opportunities and join e-marketplaces that will improve their business 
operations.  Finally, this research gives organizations insight into motivating their 
employees to use the e-marketplace. 
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10.2.2. Contributions to the Interorganizational Information Systems (IOIS) Literature 
In 1987,  Malone et al. predicted that with the availability of information and 
communication technologies, electronic markets would become the favored mechanism 
for coordinating the flow of goods and services.  Even though the electronic markets 
hypothesis is now sixteen years old, most of the literature anticipates the impacts of 
these e-marketplaces and does not investigate factors contributing to their adoption and 
use.     
This research is one of the first in-depth data-driven B2B e-marketplace 
inquiries.  The research identifies two challenges to the widespread acceptance of B2B 
e-marketplaces:  achieving a critical mass of members and then influencing these 
members to use the e-marketplace.  By investigating these challenges, this research 
promotes in-depth understanding of three aspects of B2B e-marketplaces. 
 What drives e-marketplace membership? 
 What marketplace characteristics drive e-marketplace use? 
 What organizational characteristics impact an organization’s 
e-marketplace use? 
By comparing the findings from this study to the existing IOIS literature, this research 
shows adoption and use drivers that are similar to and different from the IOIS literature.  
The research then reconciles the difference between the findings, promoting a better 
understanding of both e-marketplaces and IOIS.    
Most importantly, the research challenges existing notions and categorizations of 
e-marketplaces.  Zwass defines an e-marketplace as a telecommunications network 
created to facilitate transactions between multiple buyers and multiple sellers (Zwass 
1999, p. 10).  Given this definition, most researchers  (Choudhury 1998, Dai and 
Kauffman 2001, Grewal et al. 2001, Lee and Clark 1996a, Lee and Clark 1996b, 
Memishi 2001) conceptualize e-marketplaces as open trade where any buyer can buy 
from any seller and vice versa.  This research shows that e-marketplaces are currently 
not as open as had been originally anticipated.  The e-marketplaces in this study are 
primarily used to procure goods and services from a handful of existing business 
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partners, rather than shopping an entire market. In addition, trade does not occur purely 
over the e-marketplace.  Transactions may culminate in a transaction over the 
e-marketplace.  However, usually the transaction includes a variety of other 
communication mechanisms, including face-to-face, paper, telephone, etc.  
E-marketplaces may also be the impetus for a transaction that ultimately occurs using 
another trade mechanism such as electronic data interchange. 
In e-marketplace studies, a number of authors (Andrew et al. 2000, Dai and 
Kauffman 2001, Kaplan and Sawhney 2000, Memishi 2001, Tumolo 2001) have 
developed schemes to classify e-marketplaces. This research challenges the notion of 
existing e-marketplace classification schemes.  As we tried to classify the 
e-marketplaces in this study into relevant schemes, many of the e-marketplaces fell into 
multiple author proposed schemes or into no author proposed schemes.  See Table 8.  
The dynamic nature of e-marketplaces explains the lack of fit between schemes and 
existing e-marketplaces. The e-marketplaces in this study evolved. When one business 
practice didn’t work, the e-marketplaces tried others, continuously evolving in order to 
achieve a critical mass of users. 
10.2.3. Contributions to Theory 
Chapters VII, VIII, and IX discuss the findings’ theoretical implications.  The 
findings have implications to a number of theories, including transaction cost economics, 
resource dependency theory, innovation diffusion theory, institutional theory, and the 
electronic markets hypothesis. 
The findings indicate organizations join e-marketplaces for three competing 
motivations.  In comparing these motivations to existing theory, innovation diffusion 
theory, institutional theory, and resource dependency theory each support a particular 
motivation for e-marketplace membership.  No one theory explains why organizations 
join e-marketplaces.  In addition, these existing theories do not address how an 
organization’s membership motivation ultimately affects the extent the organization uses 
the e-marketplace.  Chapter IX’s findings address this.  E-marketplace membership 
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motivation affects e-marketplace use and a particular organization’s e-marketplace use.  
This supports and extends innovation diffusion theory to a B2B e-marketplace context.   
As part of the electronic markets hypothesis, Malone et al. posit the electronic 
brokerage effect.  This explains that buyers will establish e-marketplaces in order to 
maximize the number of alternative products and services available and the ease of 
comparing them.  All of the original business models of the four e-marketplaces in our 
study were based on this premise.  However, buyers would not extensively use 
e-marketplaces based on this premise because they value their existing supplier 
relationships and recognize that their suppliers offer many services (e.g., guaranteed 
in-stock, warehouse stocking)  that cannot be contracted for in an e-marketplace setting.  
In addition, buyers depend on their supplier relationships especially when they need 
something extra from the supplier as part of unforeseen circumstances (e.g., fast delivery 
to rebuild electrical infrastructure damaged by inclement weather).  The e-marketplaces 
in this study had to move away from the open e-marketplace predicted by Malone et al. 
to an e-marketplace supporting their existing relationships.   
Furthermore, transaction cost economics also explains why the original 
implementations of open B2B e-marketplaces were unsuccessful in achieving extensive 
use.  Open B2B e-marketplaces were based on the idea of the buyer shopping many 
suppliers to obtain the best deal.  Most existing procurement practices are based on 
prenegotiated contracts and automated purchasing based on desired inventory levels.  
The transaction cost of shopping and comparing via an open B2B e-marketplace was 
more than the transaction cost of  continuing to use existing automated procurement 
practices.  Transaction cost economics explains why modifications to B2B 
e-marketplace business models (e.g., customizing to existing industry practices, 
supporting low-leverage procurements, and fee structures)  have been successful in 
increasing e-marketplace use.   
This research as a whole offers insights to Monge et al.’s  (1998) public 
goods-based theory.  Their theory of collective action in alliance-based 
interorganizational communication and information systems describes the process of 
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producing multi-firm, alliance-based interorganizational communication and information 
public goods.  The B2B e-marketplaces investigated in this study are value chain 
alliances.  Value chain alliances create information public goods to reduce transaction 
costs between buyers and sellers (Monge et al. 1998).   Value chain alliances are the 
result of members investing in efficiency-producing information and communication 
systems that reduce coordination costs (Malone et al. 1987).   
Monge et al.’s (1998) theory of collective action in alliance-based 
interorganizational communication and information systems does not consider power’s 
role in the process of producing multi-firm, alliance-based interorganizational 
communication and information public goods.  This research uncovers e-marketplace 
membership’s contingency on the e-marketplace offering a relative advantage to “in-
power” organizations.  When “in-power” organizations join the marketplace, they then 
encourage their less powerful business partners to join.  These less powerful business 
partners join because they depend on their powerful trading partners.  The research finds 
organizations that join marketplaces because of their powerful business partner’s 
encouragement will use the marketplace to the extent their business partner requires. 
Monge et al.’s (1998) theory of collective action in alliance-based 
interorganizational communication and information systems does not consider the fad 
aspect of a public good as a driver of the good’s creation.  The research indicates many 
organizations joined the B2B e-marketplace because they viewed the marketplace as a 
mechanism for dealing with a changing business environment.  Wall Street was 
encouraging marketplace membership and everyone else was initiating EC initiatives.  
The fad aspect seems to account for marketplace membership, but does not hold for 
marketplace use.  Organizations will not use the marketplace unless the marketplace 
offers a perceived relative advantage. 
As a whole, this research provides data-driven insight into three aspects of 
producing this type of alliance-based interorganizational communication and 
information public goods.   
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In some cases, existing theory supports this study’s findings.  In these situations, 
both the findings and the existing theory become stronger.  This extends existing theory 
to another setting and increases the generalizability and internal validity of this study’s 
findings.  In some cases, this study’s findings identify aspects not considered in the 
existing theories or conflicts with the existing theories.  In these situations, we’ve tried 
to explain the new concept or the conflict.  Identifying these differences gives greater 
understanding to the boundaries of existing theory and deeper insight into this study’s 
findings.   
10. 3.   LIMITATIONS 
This research has limitations.  Some limitations are inherent in the method, while 
others are limitations of this study’s application of the method.   
Strauss and Corbin  (1998) define a theory as a set of well-developed categories 
that are systematically interrelated through statements of relationships to form a 
theoretical framework that explains some phenomenon.  The models in Chapters VII, 
VIII, and IX are theories derived from a bottom up approach of collecting and analyzing 
data in a variety of B2B e-marketplace settings and from a variety of B2B e-marketplace 
participants.  The theories are not yet generalizable to a broad range of issues or 
phenomena.  These theories speak specifically about the populations in which they were 
derived.  These theories offer predictive power and explanations in similar B2B 
e-marketplace settings.   
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests a theoretical sample of at least four cases in order to 
make comparisons and contrasts between the cases.  We designed this study to include a 
theoretical sample of four e-marketplaces, four member organizations within each 
e-marketplace, and one organization that chose not to join each e-marketplace. Because 
two of the e-marketplaces in this study never achieved extensive use and ultimately 
failed, some comparisons were difficult.  However, this outcome also made some 
comparisons stronger.  
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Grounded theory suggests using data collected through both participant 
observations and interviews.  Our data consists of more interview data than 
observational data.  This research involved high-level, in-demand, industry experts.  In 
most cases, negotiating an interview with a single organization took months, and in a 
few cases this process took more than a year.  In most situations, we were unable to 
negotiate observational access over an extended period of time.  Deeper insights would 
have emerged had we been allowed to shadow the participants in our study or observe 
more meetings related to attracting members to the marketplace and then influencing the 
members’ marketplace use. 
Finally, we have not yet shared our findings extensively with study participants.  
The next step in this research is sharing this information with study participants and 
others involved in e-marketplaces.   Sharing this information with and obtaining 
feedback from participants will make these findings stronger.   
10. 4.   FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research investigates factors driving B2B e-marketplace membership, 
marketplace characteristics driving B2B e-marketplace use, and organizational 
characteristics driving an organization’s B2B e-marketplace use.   
B2B e-marketplace membership and B2B e-marketplace use are criteria for a 
successful B2B e-marketplace, with success defined as continued existence and/or 
financial viability.  However, existing research does not define B2B e-marketplace 
success.  Future research should define e-marketplace success.  Other success aspects 
also warrant investigation.  What is the relationship between staying power and success?  
What drives e-marketplace success? What causes e-marketplace failure?  Answering 
these questions will help create successful B2B e-marketplaces.  Answering these 
questions will close a gap in the literature and start a research stream for a type of 
information system requiring a critical mass of participants. 
Defining critical mass is another area worthy of investigation.  When we began 
this research, we asked the respondents about critical mass.  The respondents had a very 
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difficult time explaining when their marketplace would achieve critical mass and what 
marketplace critical mass was.  Since B2B e-marketplace viability requires membership 
and use from a critical mass of buyers and sellers, this area is worthy of investigation.   
In 1987, Malone et al. (1987) developed the electronic markets hypothesis.  The 
electronic markets hypothesis predicts that with the presence of electronic 
communication technologies, electronic markets will be the favored mechanism for 
coordinating material and information flows among organizations.  Bakos followed this 
work in 1998 by defining the benefits of using electronic markets for product, price, and 
transaction cost.  An interpretive study investigating how the B2B e-marketplaces in this 
study have evolved compared to Malone et al.’s and Bakos’ prediction will yield further 
insight into the electronic markets hypothesis.   
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APPENDIX A 
11 INTERVIEW GUIDES 
This section presents the three interview guides we used to conduct our research.  
The marketplace interview guide organized interviews with marketplace representatives.  
The participant organization interview guide structured interviews with organizations 
participating in the B2B e-marketplace.  The nonmember interview guide structured 
interviews with organizations that had been asked to join a particular marketplace but 
turned the offer down, or organizations that joined but did not use the marketplace.  
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MARKETPLACE INTERVIEW GUIDE 
RESPONDENT INFORMATION 
 
Date:   
 
Interview Time:  
 
Interview 
Location: 
 
Name: 
 
 
Job Title: 
 
 
Company:  
 
 
Marketplace 
Name: 
 
  
Do you wish for these names (your name, company name, marketplace name) to remain anonymous?   
Yes 
No 
PROJECT INFORMATION 
1. What has been your role with the marketplace your company is involved in? 
 
 
2. What is the business model and value proposition of the marketplace? (What is the marketplace 
supposed to do?) 
 
 
3. Why was the marketplace formed? 
 
  
4. How was the marketplace formed? 
 
 
5. What companies are involved in the marketplace? 
 
 
6. How did the companies become involved? 
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MARKETPLACE INTERVIEW GUIDE CONTINUED 
 
 
7. Why did most of the companies join the marketplace? 
 
 
8. What types of products/services are offered over the marketplace? 
 
 
CRITICAL MASS 
9. How may of the following are members of the marketplace? 
Buyers 
Suppliers 
 
10. How many did you originally anticipate needed to be part of the marketplace to achieve critical mass? 
  
Buyers 
  
Suppliers 
 
11. At what rate has the marketplace been adopted by target participants? 
  
not at all 
  
slowly 
  
moderately 
  
rapidly 
 
12. How will you know when the marketplace has achieved a critical mass of participants? 
 
 
USE 
13. How does the marketplace measure marketplace use? 
 
 
14. In the last 3 months, what has been the average use or number of transactions completed over the 
marketplace? 
 
 
15. In the past 3 months, how frequently has the marketplace been used?  (For example, 10 
transactions/day, or we could look at number of connections per day) 
 
 
16. How do you know how your marketplace is doing in terms of use?  What standard do you use for 
comparison?  Is there an average for marketplaces in the industry or marketplaces in general? 
    252 
MARKETPLACE INTERVIEW GUIDE CONTINUED 
 
CRITICAL MASS FACILITATORS 
Marketing and Promoting the System 
17. With regard to the marketplace, how much attention was given to publicity, advertising, or promotion 
of any kind? 
none 
a little 
a lot 
 
18. What types of publicity, advertising, or promotion were used to make organizations that the 
marketplace would like to be members of the marketplace aware of the marketplace? 
 
 
19. What percentage of organizations that the  marketplace would like to be part of the marketplace have 
been contacted? 
 
 
20. On a scale of 1 to 7 with 7 being very much so and 1 being not at all, to what extent would you say 
the marketplace has been adequately marketed and promoted to its intended participants? 
 
 
21. On a scale of 1 to 7 with 7 being very much so and 1 being not at all, to what extent would you say 
that the marketplace’s efforts with marketing and promotion have affected its outcome in regards to 
achieving critical mass? (Do you think there is a relationship between marketing and achieving 
critical mass?) 
 
 
22. What  other aspects of marketing and promotion have affected the marketplace’s achievement of 
critical mass? 
 
 
Key Players 
23. What organization would you say are key in the industry, with key being defined as producing or 
consuming an industry good with limited competition and/or being in the top 25% in terms of annual 
sales compared to the rest of the industry? 
 
 
24. How many of these organizations are participating in the marketplace? 
 
 
25. How many are not? 
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MARKETPLACE INTERVIEW GUIDE CONTINUED 
 
26. On a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being very much so and 1 being not at all, to what extent would you say 
that the involvement or lack of involvement of key players affect the marketplace’s outcome in 
regards to achieving critical mass?  (Is there a relationship between key player involvement and 
achievement of critical mass?) 
 
Industry Support 
27. Is an industry trade organization involved in getting the industry to join the marketplace? 
  
Yes 
  
No 
 
28. On a scale of 1 to 7 with 7 being very much so and 1 being not at all, to what extent would you say 
that the involvement or lack of involvement of a trade organization has affected the marketplace’s 
outcome in regards to achieving critical mass? 
 
Ownership Structure 
29. What is the ownership structure of the marketplace? 
  
Independently owned with a governance process separate from the organizations involved 
  
Independently owned with a management team separate from the organizations involved 
  Independently owned with both a management team and a governance process separate from the 
organizations involved 
  
Owned by industry players 
  
Other, if other explain:   
 
30. On a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being very much so and 1 being not at all, to what extent would you say 
that the ownership structure has affected the marketplace’s outcome in regards to achieving critical 
mass?  (Is there a relationship between ownership structure and critical mass?) 
 
External Pressure 
31. When did most of the organizations join the marketplace? 
 
 
32. On a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, to what extent would you say 
that companies got involved in the marketplace because of what competitors were doing or intending 
to do in the same area? 
 
 
33. On a scale of 1 to 7 with one being not at all and 7 being very much so, to what extent would you say 
organizations joined the marketplace because they felt they had to get involved in electronic 
commerce? 
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MARKETPLACE INTERVIEW GUIDE CONTINUED 
 
 
34. What efforts did marketplace participants make to get their trading partners to join the marketplace? 
 
 
35. What percentage of organizations got involved in the marketplace because their trading partners 
wanted them to/sponsored their involvement? 
 
 
Open-ended 
36. What factors do you think most influenced the marketplace’s results on critical mass? 
 
 
USE FACILITATORS 
Compatibility 
37. With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, to what extent would you say that the participant 
organizations had to customize the marketplace’s technology so that it seamlessly integrates with the 
participant organizations’ information systems? 
 
 
38. Of the organizations participating in the marketplace, what percentage have seamlessly integrated the 
marketplace’s technology into their existing systems?  
 
 
39. What are the differences between the marketplace’s business practices and the existing industry 
business practices?  (For example, is the marketplace based on price competition and the industry on 
long-term relationships?) 
 
 
Uniform Standards 
40. Is there currently a standard way of describing products in the industry in which the marketplace 
operates ?  
Yes  
No 
 
41. With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, to what extent would you say that there is a standard 
way of describing products in the industry in which the marketplace operates?  
 
 
42. On a scale of 1 to 7 with 7 being very much so and 1 being not at all, to what extent would you say 
that uniform standards, or the lack of, has affected the use levels of the marketplace? 
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MARKETPLACE INTERVIEW GUIDE CONTINUED 
 
Trust 
43. Would you say that the marketplace ensures that the promises made in transactions conducted via the 
marketplace are kept?  (The promises refer to on time delivery, product quality) 
 
Yes  
No 
 
44. On a scale of 1 to 7 with 7 being very much so and 1 being not at all, to what extent would you say 
that trust in terms of belief that the marketplace will ensure promises made in transaction conducted 
via the marketplace or the lack of has affected marketplace use levels?   
 
Open-ended 
45. What factors do you think most influence the marketplace’s use levels? 
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PARTICIPANT ORGANIZATION INTERVIEW GUIDE 
RESPONDENT INFORMATION 
 
 
Date:  
 
Interview Time:  
Interview  
Location: 
 
 
 
Name:  
 
Job Title:  
 
Company:   
 
Marketplace Name:  
 
Do you wish for these names (your name, company name, marketplace name) to remain anonymous?   
 
  Yes 
  No 
PROJECT INFORMATION 
 
1. What is your company’s share of the industry?  Consider the industry the marketplace represents. 
Less that 10% 
11-20% 
21-30% 
31-40% 
41-50% 
51-60% 
61-70% 
71%-and above 
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PARTICIPANT ORGANIZATION INTERVIEW GUIDE CONTINUED 
 
2. What does your company use the marketplace for?   Check all that apply. 
Buy 
Sell 
Provide information 
Gather information 
 
3. What has been your role with the marketplace in which your company is involved? 
 
 
4. What is the business model and value proposition of the marketplace in which  your company is 
involved? (What is the marketplace supposed to do?) 
 
 
5. When did your company get involved with the marketplace? 
 
 
6. How did it come about that your company got involved in the marketplace? 
 
 
7. Why did your company get involved with the marketplace? 
 
 
8. With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, to what extent did your company get involved in the 
marketplace because:  
 
of what competitors were doing in the area 
your trading partners wanted you to get involved in the marketplace 
your organization felt that they needed to do get involved in electronic business 
 
the marketplace’s offerings would improve the way your organization does business in terms of 
reduced supply chain costs, reduced product costs, or more business 
RESEARCH MODEL INFORMATION 
9. How does your organization use the marketplace? 
 
 
10. How does the marketplace measure your marketplace use ? 
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PARTICIPANT ORGANIZATION INTERVIEW GUIDE CONTINUED 
 
11. What types of transactions does your organization engage in with the marketplace? 
 
 
12. By transaction type, in the past 3 months, what has been the average number of transactions your 
organization has: 
 
completed over the marketplace 
 
had facilitated over the marketplace (transactions other than those completed over the 
marketplace) 
 
13. In the past 3 months, how frequently has your organization used the marketplace?  
 
More than 10 times per day 
Daily 
A few times a week 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Hardly ever 
Not at all 
 
 
14. With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, to what extent would you say your trading partners 
have assisted your organization in using the marketplace?  In this case trading partners being the 
organizations your company does business with. 
 
 
15. If your trading partners did assist your organization in using the marketplace, what type of assistance 
was provided? 
Financial resources to join the marketplace 
Financial resources to update technology 
Training on the benefits of the marketplace 
Training on how to use the marketplace 
Advice on implementing the marketplace 
Other, please specify: 
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PARTICIPANT ORGANIZATION INTERVIEW GUIDE CONTINUED 
 
16. With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, in the periods after they decided to join the 
marketplace and once the marketplace became available for use,  to what extent would you say top 
management favored  your organization using the marketplace?   
 
 
17. With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, in the periods after they decided to join the 
marketplace and once the marketplace became available for use,  to what extent would you say top 
management actively pushed your organization using the marketplace?   
 
 
18. Did a particular individual play a critical role in getting your organization to use the marketplace?
 
 
19. If so, how would you characterize this person’s status in the organization? 
High 
Medium 
Low 
 
20. With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, to what extent would you say there has been one or 
more continuous strong advocates (champions) of the marketplace’s use within your organization? 
 
 
21. With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, to what extent would you say that adequate time has 
been allocated to programs associated with getting the organization to use the marketplace? (These 
programs may include training procurement people on the use of the system, or programming time to 
integrate the marketplace into the existing procurement processes.) 
 
 
22. With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so, to what extent would you say that adequate 
financial resources have been dedicated to getting the organization to use the marketplace?  (This may 
include consulting fees associated with integrating the marketplace into the organization’s existing 
systems or external training fees.) 
 
 
Open-ended 
23. What factors do you think most influenced your organization’s use of the marketplace? 
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NONMEMBER INTERVIEW GUIDE 
RESPONDENT INFORMATION 
 
Date:   
  
Interview Time:  
 
 
Interview 
 Location:  
 
Name: 
 
 
 
Job Title:  
 
Company:  
 
 
Marketplace Name: 
 
  
Do you wish for these names (your name, company name, marketplace name) to remain anonymous?   
Yes 
No 
PROJECT INFORMATION 
 
1. Are you familiar with _____ marketplace? 
 
 
2. How did you become familiar with _____marketplace? 
 
 
3. Is your company involved in a marketplace similar to _____ marketplace? 
 
 
4. Why did your company choose not to adopt _____ marketplace? 
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NONMEMBER INTERVIEW GUIDE CONTINUED 
 
5. To what extent would you say each of the following were true for  _____ marketplace?  With 1 being 
not at all and 7 being very much so.  If you can’t assess, put ca. 
 
  Marketplace was adequately marketed 
  Key industry players were participating in the marketplace 
  Industry supported the marketplace 
  Marketplace ownership structure was independent 
  Marketplace offered participants advantages 
  Competitors were participating in the marketplace 
 
6. To what extent would you say each of the following influenced your company’s decision not to adopt  
_____ marketplace?  With 1 being not at all and 7 being very much so.  Consider answer to question 5 
in listing alternatives. 
 
  Level of marketplace marketing 
  Level of key industry player participation 
  Level of industry support 
  Marketplace ownership structure  
  Level of marketplace advantages offered to participants 
  Level of competitor participation in the marketplace 
 
7. To what extent would you say each of the following were true for your organization?  With 1 being 
not at all and 7 being very much so? 
 
  At the time, we were already involved in a similar marketplace 
  We felt the marketplace was going to lower our margins 
  We felt the marketplace did not help our existing relationships with customers or suppliers 
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APPENDIX B 
12 CONFESSIONAL ACCOUNT OF GAINING ENTRÉE  
This research began in the fall of 2000.  Corporate America had discovered the 
Internet a few years prior and was enamored with using the Internet in business.  
America was enjoying great prosperity.    Investors were looking for investments and 
corporate America had extra money to explore new endeavors.   
Many companies were exploring electronic commerce (EC). Almost weekly 
another company would announce an EC initiative.  Wall Street was rewarding 
companies for EC initiatives and penalizing those without EC initiatives.  As academics, 
we knew very little about EC and felt that the business world’s EC knowledge was out 
pacing ours.  For this reason, when I started my qualitative research class in the fall of 
2000, I chose to study several companies’ efforts in creating a business-to-business 
(B2B) electronic marketplace (e-marketplace) for the convenience store industry. 
I chose CSX (C-Store Exchange) for my study because my husband was an 
executive at McMurray Distributing.  McMurray Distributing was one of the four 
companies founding CSX.  I thought with my husband’s connections he would be able to 
get me access to do the study.  This proved much more difficult than I thought.  The 
convenience store industry is very competitive and at the time I started my study there 
were a number of convenience store industry marketplaces forming.  Every CSX 
founding organization signed a non-disclosure agreement and any company CSX 
approached about joining also had to sign an agreement before CSX would talk to them 
about the marketplace.  CSX’s founders wanted to be sure none of their proprietary 
information was leaked to any of their competitors.  In addition, they were in a rush to 
get the marketplace up and going so they could be the first one to market and the first 
one to go public.  This created a very busy environment not conducive to talking with a 
student about the project.  In addition, the McMurray Distributing executive in charge of 
CSX, who was also sitting on CSX’s board of directors, was one of the top five 
executives at McMurray Distributing.  McMurray Distributing has over 10,000 
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employees. He had a very busy schedule and this was a very busy time.  Nevertheless, 
my husband got me access to him.  I had five interviews and was able to observe  one 
meeting during the fall of 2000.  I had another interview in the summer of 2001.  
Because of my relationship with the organization, I stayed up-to-date on CSX.   
After I defended my proposal in the spring of 2002, my husband went back to 
McMurray Distributing’s CSX representative, Bob,  and asked him to help me get 
interviews with all of CSX’s members for my dissertation.  Bob said he would help me 
get access to the rest of CSX’s members, but that I needed to wait a while.  He said CSX 
had just had a very hostile board meeting and one of the board members was moving for 
CSX’s shutdown.  In May and June of 2002, my husband got me interviews with three 
people within McMurray Distributing that were involved in CSX.  My access to CSX’s 
other board members was on-hold until Bob felt comfortable approaching the board.  In 
October of 2002, CSX was shutting down.  My husband again asked Bob to help me 
interview Longoria, the President and Chief Operating Officer of CSX.  Bob said this 
was a good time.  He called Longoria, Longoria called me, and I went to Alamo, 
California for the interview.  Longoria was the President of CSX, but also a former 
long-term Gulf Coast Oil employee.  During the interview, I got both the marketplace’s 
perspective and Gulf Coast Oil’s perspective for my research.   
As of June 2003, I still need to interview Momentum Manufacturing and I have 
some questions to clarify with Gulf Coast Oil.  Longoria introduced me to a lady at Gulf 
Coast Oil that did a learning look back study on Gulf Coast Oil’s CSX investment.  I 
contacted her in March 2003.  She asked that I send her the questions I want to ask so 
she could take them to legal to see if she could talk to me.  I called her back in May 
2003, and she told me she hadn’t heard back from legal, but would get back with me the 
next week and let me know something.  I have still not heard from her.  My husband is 
working with Bob to see if Bob will call the Gulf Coast Oil and Momentum 
Manufacturing board members and ask them to participate in my study.   
My involvement with Pegasus began in December 2000.  I was in the midst of 
my CSX study and one of my professors thought I should present my research to Texas 
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A&M’s Center for the Management of Information Systems (CMIS).  CMIS consists of 
businesses with a relationship with Texas A&M.  I made the presentation and Lone Star 
Utilities was interested in the project.  The CMIS member took the project back to Mark, 
the Lone Star Utilities  person that could help me with my project.  Mark called me to 
talk about the project and we hit it off.  Part of it was that we were from the same area 
and had similar personalities.  Mark was also an A&M graduate.  My dissertation 
co-chairmen had taken Mark to dinner in the fall of 2000 when Mark was a guest 
speaker in a class.  Mark remembered him.  Mark’s company, Lone Star Utilities, also 
takes an active interest in the community.  Lone Star Utilities encourages their 
employees’ community involvement.  My dissertation co-chairmen, another student, and 
myself had an introductory meeting about the project in December of 2000.  Ever since 
then, Mark has gone out of his way to help us with the project.   
Between December of 2000 and December of 2001, we had eight lengthy visits 
with Mark learning about Lone Star Utilities’ efforts with Pegasus.  In the spring of 
2001, Mark introduced me to Pegasus’ portfolio manager.  When I met the portfolio 
manager, Mark mentioned that I would like to talk with Pegasus about my study and the 
marketplace.  The portfolio manager said he would be happy to help with this.  I emailed 
the portfolio manager a few week later and he responded back with a very curt email 
explaining that what Pegasus does is top-secret and he would need to get approval from 
legal before talking with me.  
In May 2002, we called Mark and asked for his help with interviewing Pegasus 
and buyers and suppliers participating in Pegasus.  Mark was more than happy to help.  
He called Pegasus’ suppliers that were also Lone Star Utilities’ suppliers and introduced 
us so we could set up interviews.  He also asked Pegasus’ Buyer Development Manager, 
who was on-site at Lone Star Utilities, to help us with interviewing Pegasus’ Chief 
Executive Officer and Gulf Coast Energy.  The Buyer Development Manager set up our 
interviews.  When we interviewed Pegasus’ Chief Executive Officer, he told us that we 
were one of the first interviews he had given.  He said during the “dot.com” boom 
analysts were frequently calling him for interviews.  
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We also interviewed Pegasus’ Sales Vice President.  During our interview, we 
asked which utilities had joined Pegasus and subsequently dropped.  Pegasus’ Sales Vice 
President told us Pegasus didn’t even know who to talk to at these utilities. He did not 
tell us the names of the utilities.   In January 2003, I asked Mark if he knew who the 
utilities that had quit using Pegasus were.  He contacted Pegasus’ Buyer Development 
Manager.  The Buyer Development Manager wouldn’t disclose who these companies 
were and wanted to meet with Mark about Mark asking for this information.  In January 
2003, Mark was at a conference and ran into a friend working at another utility.  The 
friend told Mark they had dropped out of Pegasus.  Mark told the friend about me and 
then told me about the friend.  I contacted the friend and, after a few attempts between 
March and May, I interviewed him. I would have never gotten such lengthy interviews 
with such high-level people had it not been for Mark’s help.  
In February of 2002, my husband and I were at a Houston Astros Party in 
Temple, Texas.  We were talking with Brett, a fellow my husband and I used to work 
with, about my dissertation.  Brett told us that his company was involved in NTX and 
they had documented several hundred thousand dollars savings from using NTX.  This 
was a little different than the marketplaces in which I had been working.  CSX and 
Pegasus had been struggling.   
After I defended my proposal, I remembered this conversation with Brett and 
asked my husband if he would call Brett so I could interview him for my dissertation.  
My husband called Brett and Brett called Jennifer, the lady at Leading Edge Brands that 
uses NTX.  I interviewed Jennifer and Brett.  Brett’s boss, Webb, mentioned that Texas 
Plastics uses NTX heavily and that he could get me an interview with them.  I said great 
and he called the President and introduced me.  I then called the President to set up the 
interview.  The day I went for  the interview I called the President to  reconfirm and the 
receptionist told me the President no longer worked there.  After I told her what I needed 
and that I was a friend of Webb’s, she arranged for me to speak with Randy, the 
Warehouse Manager that actually implemented NTX.  
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Neither Leading Edge Brands nor Texas Plastics had a relationship with NTX’s 
executives.  In addition, NTX did not disclose which carriers were using NTX.   Randy, 
from Texas Plastics, told me he had seen R.E. Transport and Southwestern Trucking 
pick up for NTX.  My husband mentioned that McMurray Foodservice (a foodservice 
distributor owned by McMurray Distributing) had contracts with lots of carriers.  My 
husband set up an introduction with McMurray Foodservice’s Vice President of 
Logistics.  She told me she used R.E. Transport extensively and that they were currently 
negotiating a new long- term contract with R.E. Transport.  I interviewed her as an NTX 
nonmember and then requested her contact at R.E. Transport and asked if I could use her 
name as I called R.E. Transport.  She said I could.  I called R.E. Transport as a student 
McMurray Distributing was helping.  I got shuffled from the R.E. Transport sales 
representative, up to a Senior Vice President, and back down to a bid manager.  I 
interviewed the bid manager regarding R.E. Transport’s use of NTX.   
I needed another carrier. My husband contacted the President of Merit (a 
long-haul trucking company owned by McMurray Distributing) to see if I could 
interview him.  Merit was not using NTX and had chosen not to get involved with online 
marketplaces.  I interviewed Merit as another NTX nonmember.  I still needed another 
carrier.  I was studying NTX’s website one day and noticed that Southwestern Trucking 
was on their advisory board. I also noticed that the advisory board member was from 
Southwestern Trucking in Waco, Texas.  I used to work with a lady that works for 
Southwestern Trucking.  I called Deborah and scheduled lunch.  Deborah and I ate lunch 
and I asked her if she knew Eddie, the Southwestern representative that sat on NTX’s 
advisory board.  She knew Eddie and later told Eddie about me and my study.  I then 
called Eddie and went to Southwestern to interview him.  Interviewing Eddie gave me a 
low seller’s perspective on NTX.   
Because Eddie sat on the advisory board, he knew who at NTX could answer 
questions regarding getting people to join and use NTX.  He gave me NTX’s Director of 
Sales’ name and phone number.  From the interview with Eddie, I knew Eddie did not 
have a strong enough relationship with NTX’s Director of Sales to help me get an 
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interview.  I also knew if I “cold called” the Director of Sales, I wouldn’t get to meet 
with him.  After some thought, I decided if I could get one of NTX’s customers or a 
potential customer to call Brent I would have better luck getting an interview.  My 
husband talked with Brett, the Chief Financial Officer of the company that owns Lone 
Star Plastic and Leading Edge Brands.  Brett called NTX’s Director of Sales, introduced 
himself, explained several of his companies were users, and explained my project.  
NTX’s Director of Sales agreed to meet with me.  I then called him and visited him in 
Dallas. 
By the time I started the study, Retail Matrix had folded and I could find no 
information about Retail Matrix on the Internet.  Retail Matrix had taken down their 
Internet site.  The United States Convenience Store Association (USCSA) is the trade 
organization for the convenience store industry.  USCSA formed Retail Matrix with the 
help of two technology companies.  McMurray Distributing is a long-term active 
USCSA member.  My husband knows the McMurray Distributing Vice President that is 
responsible for McMurray Distributing’s active role in USCSA.  My husband asked the 
Vice President if I could interview him to get McMurray Distributing’s perspective as a 
nonmember in Retail Matrix.  I got the interview.  In the course of the interview, it 
became obvious that Roger knew a lot about USCSA and knew the Senior Vice 
President at USCSA who was in charge of getting the industry to join Retail Matrix.  I 
asked Roger if he could introduce me to this Senior Vice President so I could meet with 
her for my dissertation.  He called her, she agreed to meet with me, and a few months 
later we met in Alexandria, Virginia.   
She was very helpful.  Because the website was down, I did not know what 
companies had joined Retail Matrix.  In the course of the interview, she explained that 
Retail Matrix had several companies sign letters of intent, but by the time Retail Matrix 
became incorporated the “dot.com” bust hit and the companies backed out.  I mentioned 
that I needed to interview some buyers and suppliers for my study and she gave me the 
contact information for a buyer and supplier that were close to joining.  I asked if she 
would introduce me to them and she agreed.  A little time passed after my interview with 
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her and I had not heard back on whether I could contact the two people that were close 
to joining Retail Matrix.  She mentioned in a follow-up email that she had left them both 
voice mail messages.  I called the fellow with SuperSport Retail, introduced myself as a 
student USCSA was helping, and scheduled an interview.  He was very helpful.   
I try not to leave voice mail messages or send email messages when introducing 
my study and myself.  If I call the person until I catch them at their telephone, I will have 
more success scheduling a visit.  However, I tried several times a day for several weeks 
to contact the Retail Matrix supplier I needed to interview.  I could never get this person 
at his telephone.  I knew if I called and left a message he would probably not call me 
back.  McMurray Distributing (the company my husband works for) is one of this 
supplier's largest customers.  I thought if McMurray Distributing called this person then 
he would call them back.  My husband called the supplier, left a message, and the 
supplier immediately called him back.  My husband introduced himself, explained my 
study, and scheduled a conference call time.  I interviewed the supplier the next day.  
My husband knew that the competing industry distributor was also involved in 
Retail Matrix.  He knows his counterpart at this company very well.  He called her and 
introduced my study.  She agreed to visit with me, as she was involved in her company’s 
decision to join Retail Matrix.   
I wrote this confessional account of how I got in so other people trying to do this 
kind of work would know how to do it and how difficult it is.  I have never been turned 
down for an interview.  This is because I had two people (Mark and my husband Kevin) 
with extensive business contacts introducing me to companies.  While I’ve never been 
turned down, this process of getting in takes time.  I usually have to wait for my contact 
to contact the other contact,  and then for the other contact to contact the person I 
actually need to interview.  Once I got an interview I tried to get the person I was 
interviewing to introduce me to the other people in the marketplace that I needed to 
interview.  Sometimes this worked and sometimes it did not.  When we met with 
Pegasus in the summer of 2002, we asked for the names of the companies that did not 
join Pegasus and also asked for an introduction to Pegasus’ highest user.  The Pegasus 
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Vice President didn’t want to give us the name of the utilities that signed up for Pegasus 
and did not use.  We never heard back from him on an introduction to the marketplace’s 
highest user. 
Whereas I’ve never been turned down for an interview, this process is very 
time-consuming and requires maintaining an open schedule because you never know 
when you’ll be invited for a field visit.  We tried for over two years before I got the 
interview with Retailer Market Exchange’s President.  When Pegasus’ Buyer 
Development Manager called me to say he had scheduled an interview with Pegasus’ 
Chief Executive Office, the interview was in two days.  Because I was trying to 
interview very high-level people and my interviews were dependent on someone that 
was helping me setting them up, I had to drop everything and go whenever the interview 
was scheduled.  If I were to say, “that does not work for me, let’s try another day” 
chances are the person helping me would have grown tired of helping me and I would 
have never gotten the interview. 
Preparing for these interviews was time-consuming.  I had to find out where I 
was going.  Because most of my interviews were in large cities, I would always leave 
early just so I wouldn’t be late.  This almost always resulted in me arriving at the 
location more than an hour early.  Because I was interviewing very high-level people, I 
would practice the interview for hours before I actually met with them.  The interview 
always turned out really good and they were always very helpful and interested in the 
study.  I would always write a note thanking them for their time. I have also promised to 
write a white paper sharing the results of my study with each of them.  This is a way of 
thanking them for participating, but will also strengthen the study’s findings.  Given how 
difficult it was to secure interviews with each of my informants, it will be even more 
difficult to go back to each of them and ask their input on the validity of my results. The 
white paper will be a forum for doing this.  I plan to send the white paper and then call 
them and see what they think about the study’s results.   
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APPENDIX C 
13 ACRONYMS 
Acronym Definition 
  
B2B Business-to-business 
CEO Chief executive officer 
COSS Customer-oriented strategic system 
EC Electronic commerce 
EDI Electronic data interchange 
ERP Enterprise resource planning 
HB High buyer 
HS High seller 
IOIS Interorganizational information system(s) 
LB Low buyer 
LS Low seller 
NTX National Trucking Exchange 
RFQ Request for quote 
CSX C-Store Exchange 
SKU Stock keeping unit 
USCSA United States Convenience Store Association 
Y2K Year 2000 
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